RAA Liaison Letter – 2025 / 2026 Edition 106 concerted effort digging in, once they fire guns are usually detected with relative accuracy. Consequently they must move frequently and in doing so make themselves vulnerable. While drones are handy, they are limited: artillery remains the most valuable target for both sides. Radars and observers are not the only tools for counterbattery fire. Passive counterbattery assets, like sound ranging microphones and flash spotting cameras, are virtually undetectable when connected with wire rather than radio, can be sited relatively easily, and are exceedingly difficult to disable. They are also increasingly accurate, particularly if the information from multiple sources/sensors can be fused to locate multiple dispersed points of origin. The technology is neither expensive nor new and is gaining increasing investment in research and development. While the AN/TPQ-48 Multi Mission Radar used by 9th Regiment RAA has a handy close counterfires capability, there is a huge capability (and utility) gap between that, and the Multi Mission Phased Array Radar based on the CEA Operational Sensor. A cache of ‘cheap and cheerful’ passive systems would allow us to present an extremely challenging counterbattery problem to any adversary where there is currently little or no capability, but very high risk. Nesting effects at echelon creates opportunity Striking high payoff targets often causes reactions above the detection threshold. For example, the destruction of a radar (gun, air defence missile, jammer, etc.) that causes a hole in the deployment plan causes other radars to have to move to plug the gap – if they can be seen or heard while they move, they are vulnerable. If those radars are destroyed, the gap remains or gets bigger, causing further opportunity to detect other radars, or for other echelons/forces to act in the area where there is reduced radar overage. While difficult to achieve, one should aim to cue surveillance to find the reaction after a strike – successful or not. The second and subsequent order effects create opportunities that may be fleeting, and if you aren’t looking for them at the right time can waste opportunities. This is important not just in a single headquarters, but across echelons. It requires communication and coordination at a level that requires sound and well-known procedures, as well as the high situational awareness up and down the chain of command. Australians are highly valued The majority of Australians – particularly staff officers – are highly valued by our overseas partners. Our no-nonsense approach to work, readiness to ask uncomfortable questions, and casual social attitude set us apart from (and make us attractive to) our partners. Working in a foreign environment offers challenges with bureaucracy, as any exchange or embedded officer with NATO or the US can attest. For any request there can be several independent sections (inside and outside the unit) that require sequential approval. Network access can take months, and network security gateways can often fail. It took close to half my deployment to resolve access, only for recurring issues to occur almost weekly. While this can be frustrating, it makes one appreciate the relative efficiency of our own systems. Core knowledge as an artilleryman is vital. The majority of questions I answered for Australians were air defence, rocket artillery, and radar related - despite having no background or experience with any of those systems. I was one of very few who could identify armoured vehicles from videos and could explain issues of calibration and probability errors readily, despite being a number of postings out of a gun regiment. The depth and availability of that knowledge lend great credibility and confidence, particularly in phone calls with someone under pressure. Briefing senior officers is vastly different from briefing an instructor on a career course. For the latter, one is trying to compress as much information into a prescribed window of time to demonstrate how smart you are. This doesn’t work for senior officers, particularly when they will read much of the detail in extensive reporting twice a day. Similarly, just ‘reporting the news’ when they are time poor and have swathes of information to absorb does them a disservice. If it isn’t relevant to them, don’t say it. Ensure they have the context for what you report, give them the wavetops (‘headlines’), and outline relevance or consequence (e.g. “Why’s this important? Sir, you will likely be asked in your next meeting…”). Where a decision is needed, give your recommendation. Be ready to expand on any of your wavetops, or explain the context or logic of your brief. Don’t waste data We rarely spend much time on measures of performance, impact, and effectiveness and even
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