RAA Liaison Letter – 2025 / 2026 Edition 107 less time on what they genuinely mean. It pays to know the difference, and lends credibility when the question is posed ‘how do we know how we’re doing?’ If we know what we mean when we use terms like ‘measure of effectiveness’ and hold people to that meaning it creates clarity and prevents wasted effort. Importantly, we need to know why we are measuring/counting things, not just what we are counting. Otherwise, the measurement is irrelevant. For example, we might identify command and control as a vulnerability and focus our efforts on striking command posts and command nodes. But if that approach isn’t impacting an adversary’s operations because units have multiple command nodes, then why continue to do it? Similarly, know specifically what we’re striking and to what end. What ammunition do you want to interdict? Gun ammunition or small arms? What logistics do you want to disrupt? Is it fuel, food, or materiel? Importantly when providing advice and assistance support to a partner, one must consider measures of performance, impact, and effectiveness of one’s own team, as well as the partner for the same reason. You might be providing the support that’s been asked for, but if the results aren’t meeting the expectation, then something is being missed. Especially when the partner is under pressure, they may not be able to dedicate the time to contemplate what they need – especially if they don’t know what you can do. If you are doing a lot of counting for no observable change, reassess what you’re counting and why. What does it mean to us? One might argue that the list of deductions are axiomatic, but the experience in the largest conventional conflict since the Second World War suggests otherwise. Just because something is obvious, doesn’t mean it is always observed. What we should do is eliminate the chances of laziness or disinterest through training and enforcing standards uncompromisingly. • Even when the battlespace seems saturated in observers and sensors, there is plenty of opportunity for surprise – especially when sound OPSEC is paired with convincing deception. We shouldn’t discount the value of camouflage and concealment, nor of dummies and decoys. • Laziness and sloppiness kills. Discipline in reducing sign and signature must be inculcated early and forcefully reinforced in training. • Firepower is essential to manoeuvre. It requires fire mobility (shifting fire quickly across the entire range of the guns); mass in number of guns; weight of fire in rounds fired; and selection of the right targets before, during, and after manoeuvre. The alternative is a meat grinder approach to attrition, which you also can’t win without firepower. • Have clear measures of performance and impact (effectiveness is too long term at tactical level) and make sure are measuring the right things. If you’re doing well on paper but not on the ground, reassess your metrics. • Create opportunities to exploit by looking for reactions and/or second order effects. Look for what might come above the detection threshold and have a plan to respond with flexible assets. • We need as many guns in the fight as we can muster and weight the effort to decision. Deploy no more guns than you can supply with a healthy expenditure rate (hundreds of rounds a day). Protect the guns jealously with active counterbattery fire plan (radars, guns, mortars, and ammunition as targets), relentless artillery locating effort, and dedicated counterbattery fire assets once the enemy unmasks. While necessarily limited in detail, I pray these insights serve as a source of discussion in the units and the community more broadly. I welcome the opportunity to discuss and examine my experiences and observations with units should the chance arise. Author Major James Casey is graduate of the Australian Defence Force Academy and the Royal Military College-Duntroon. He served exclusively in regimental appointments prior to consecutive commands of 107th Battery and Operational Support Battery of 4th Regiment RAA. He has subsequently undertaken numerous staff roles in Canberra, notably in joint fires, long range fires, and operationalising Army’s fledgling land targeting capability. Having qualified as a targeteer with the Royal Air Force, he has been a targeting staff officer and is the inaugural Senior Instructor of the Defence School of Intelligence’s Targeting Wing.
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