RAA Liaison Letter – 2025 / 2026 Edition 105 of sophisticated space and electronic surveillance, the Ukrainians planned an offensive and moved the equivalent of a division of combat power virtually undetected by the Russian military’s intelligence apparatus. Despite an intimidating array of capabilities across domains, the Russians proved unable to adequately detect the march and deployment of a division (+) force in one of the most surveilled regions on Earth. At least to the fidelity that it could support a timely decision. Consequently, the Russians were powerless to prevent the seizure of an area in excess of 1,250 square kilometres - roughly the size of Flinders Island, or half of Moscow city. While it will be some time before we understand the depth of the deception plan (if any), convincing the Russians into a course of action that was to their detriment while supporting the Ukrainian plan would be an excellent example of planning deception to force the enemy to ‘see, think, do’. Dummies and decoys remain relevant without needing to be sophisticated. Despite persistent and sophisticated surveillance, low fidelity dummies and decoys have offered convincing portrayals. High value weapons have been expended on unsophisticated and cheap representations. Repeatedly. These have been as simple as painted wooden mock-ups of weapon systems, simply painted with unsophisticated simulations of thermal and electronic signatures. Attrition is a type of manoeuvre, but it’s messy ‘Break his legs! He can’t run without legs!’ can sometimes be heard in jest at a sports ground: a targetable critical vulnerability. There is, however, wisdom in the theory that if the player is eliminated completely, ascendancy is similarly assured. The grind of attrition is the latter, in that if you kill everything the enemy possesses, the high payoff targets emerge more readily. Personnel are also a targetable critical vulnerability, particularly when they are of increasingly poorer quality and experience. While it offends the perceived superiority of manoeuvre theory, when there is insufficient firepower to create the breathing room needed for manoeuvre, morale-crushing attrition takes on a quality all of its own. Laziness despite cost Operational security (opsec) extends well beyond written documents or overheard phone chatter. Simple camouflage and concealment can decide the difference between being seen or not. Russian and Ukrainian assets remain at the mercy of observation, and poor discipline by troops, including in their own personal kit, continues to prove fatal daily. High value assets continue to be identified in the open, or amongst deciduous forests where trees have long shed their leaves. Other lax behaviours, such as parking vehicles immediately outside a hangar or building instead of designated car parks a short walk away (indicating a senior personage) or discarding track discipline after recent snowfall (allowing swift identification of vehicle hides) are further examples of simple measures that imposed significant costs on high value assets. The simple use of camouflage netting to obscure what can otherwise be seen remains sufficient to prevent positive identification of high value assets in many cases. This is particularly the case when observation is at a distance or using lowresolution sensors. Creating uncertainty about what lies under the netting can be decisive in deciding whether to expend munitions and assets in a resource-constrained and high counterbattery threat environment. Although attack drones are relatively low-cost, netting can prevent them from functioning, and wasting munitions on an uncertain target is often less palatable than a confirmed strike on a target of relatively low value. There can be no manoeuvre without firepower During winter, the Russians all but lost their momentum in the offense across the front. The Ukrainians, strategically focussed on seizing Russian territory in Kursk, opted to defend in remaining regions. Central to the virtual stalemate was the relative lack of firepower on both sides. While Russia was able to fire more ammunition, it was still insufficient to effectively support manoeuvre. Variously, Russian use of preparatory fire, covering fire, and defensive fire were sacrificed due to ammunition shortages. For both sides, artillery fire became sporadic, disjointed from supporting manoeuvre, and increasingly reactive rather than planned. As is widely reported, the consequent Russian losses in the offense were accordingly heavy as troops continued to be thrown into contact without meaningful artillery support. Artillery is high payoff target number one for both sides. The extensive counterbattery complex across the front greatly hinders the deployment and employment of guns. Despite repeated
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