RAA Liaison Letter – 2025 / 2026 Edition 104 absence of indirect firepower. But they do not fill the gap – not by a long measure. This is for several reasons. Firstly, countermeasures makes remote control extremely difficult, and often impossible. This is often not known until the drone is lost, and consequently most drones have a single use. The loss rate on both sides is surprisingly high. Secondly, weather greatly affects the utility and the ability to fly drones. Their electronics or sensors are compromised by wind, rain, snow, fog, and cold weather. As a consequence, artillery and mortars are the only reliable indirect fire support for anywhere between a third and half of the time (season dependant). Thirdly, drones are usually single use. Attack drones use improvised fuzes to prevent tampering and assure detonation if they crash; they can’t be recovered. Even reconnaissance drones with more advanced sensors do not have long life spans: jamming or interdiction causes them to be lost after only a couple of flights. Fourthly, they are effective only for point targets. Depending on their size, drones have limited endurance and a small payload. For troop or vehicle concentrations, they can only be used on one target, and because of their limited endurance and high loss rate to jamming, operators will usually strike whatever they can rather than lose the chance completely. This makes coordination difficult. It relies on a drone unit with sufficient drones and explosives nearby and ready to fly, as well as having the intelligence available to vector limited resources to the most valuable targets. But what does this mean for us in our theatre? Firstly, tropical terrain and weather make drone use patchy, and limited by the ability to penetrate jungle canopy. Secondly, mountainous terrain will limit radio signals, limiting range. Thirdly, the Army doesn’t possess an electronic warfare jamming capability that is powerful and can be dispersed, so we will be at the mercy of any adversary that does. Fourthly, without an extensive fixed telecom infrastructure like Ukraine, the ability to communicate will be extremely difficult, bordering on impossible where electronic warfare features prominently. Fifth (and most importantly), it’s clear that drones cannot replace artillery as indirect firepower, and we should bank on feeding the guns, as well as investing in their protection (counterbattery sensors and fire units). Sixth, drones are an extensive opportunity to augment what we already have across fires, reconnaissance, and logistics. While my professional judgement is that drones cannot replace artillery, it is foolish to discount them as a threat and an opportunity, in a similar vein as one would have considered armed helicopters when they were in their infancy. We should be heavily invested in their use, as well as passionate about defending against the threat they pose to our own force. Major James Casey is graduate of the Australian Defence Force Academy and the Royal Military College-Duntroon. He served exclusively in regimental appointments prior to consecutive commands of 107th Battery and Operational Support Battery of 4th Regiment RAA. He has subsequently undertaken numerous staff roles in Canberra, notably in joint fires, long range fires, and operationalising Army’s fledgling land targeting capability. Having qualified as a targeteer with the Royal Air Force, he has been a targeting staff officer and is the inaugural Senior Instructor of the Defence School of Intelligence’s Targeting Wing. Observations from Supporting Ukrainian Forces Major James Casey, RAA Introduction In 2024, a fires planner position was established in the Security Assistance Group –Ukraine (SAG-U), an ad hoc corps-level combined joint headquarters formed under United States Army Europe and Africa. The three-star command provides non-material support, advice, and assistance to the Armed Forces of Ukraine, in concert with the NATO assistance mission. While too far displaced to provide tactical insights, the deployment afforded operational and staff insights that are worthy of note. Surprise is dead, long live surprise! The Ukrainian offensive in Kursk employed excellent operational security and limited deception to achieve moral surprise: using the modes of time, place, and force, the Ukrainians imposed the unexpected upon the unprepared. The offensive deep into Russian territory caught virtually everyone – coalition partners included – off guard. Despite the prevalence and persistence
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