RAA Liaison Letter – 2025 / 2026 Edition 103 Australia will need much more control over the supply chain to secure ADF access to missiles; it will also need large production capacity. Selfreliance demands diversification of missile types in domestic production and use of a variety of supply chains to avoid dependence on a single foreign source. Australia’s planned solution is to develop a domestic capability to make every component required for any missile type it puts into domestic production, which is hindered by restrictive technology sharing agreements. Since missile types can use widely different components, an ability to do this for one doesn’t necessarily imply an ability to do it for others. But it does imply the strengthening of technical skills and knowledge that ease barriers to broader production. Australia can make domestic manufacturing and technology transfer a condition of its procurements. Poland did this in 2023 when it agreed to buy CAMM anti-aircraft and antimissile missiles from the Anglo-French-Italian company MBDA. It gained sufficient rights to make the missiles and their launchers domestically. A December 2025 agreement between South Korea’s Hanwha Aerospace and Poland’s WB Electronics will lead to Polish production of the Chunmoo CGR-080 (which is very similar to GMLRS), building what Polish Deputy Prime Minister Wladyslaw KosiniakKamysz refers to as their ambition for ‘production independence’. Deliveries are due to begin in 2030. The Australian government is clearly aware that these partnerships are possible. Australia’s deal with Norwegian company Kongsberg for NSM and JSM strike missiles will deliver technology sharing and industrial depth which will allow for sustainment in Australia. The production facility at Newcastle will exactly replicate an advanced new Kongsberg plant in Norway. While it will also begin as an assembly station, it is planned to produce priority components, assemble, and maintain missiles of both types by 2028. In addition, BAE Systems Australia has the contract for supplying sensor technology for the Kongsberg JSM seeker globally, and, with support from German manufacturer TDW, Australia may also make the warhead for NSM and JSM. When Australia makes all components for a missile, it has more control over the timing and volume of production. It need not await foreign supplies or approvals. Within the limits of its budget and local factory capacity, it can feed its armed forces as it needs to. The question is whether Australia will keep making large exceptions to this ideal, as it’s doing with GMLRS. AUTHOR: MADI JONES IS AN ANALYST WITH ASPI’S DEFENCE STRATEGY PROGRAM. OPINIONS ARE THE AUTHORS', NOT ASPI'S. Are Drones Replacing Artillery in the Ukrainian Theatre? Major James Casey, RAA There is ongoing discussion in the military community about the employment of attack drones at scale in the Russio-Ukrainian War. Having supported Ukrainian forces on Operation KUDU in 2025, it is clear that much of the discussion is well meaning, but often inflated or ill informed. As the conflict persists, operational security limits the ability to provide the supporting data. Consequently the prevailing opinion will be discussed with general observations in this esteemed journal, with my apologies for being necessarily vague. It is important to establish for context that artillery is not dead in the conflict. Both sides are limited in their employment due to a number of interconnected and complex factors. Firstly, ammunition is scarce, and has been for some time. Any decent official history of the First and Second World Wars in particular will highlight the logistical complications of artillery ammunition and its criticality for success. Secondly for the Ukrainians, the extensive variety of guns (origin, calibre, etc.) makes shellcharge combinations a logistical nightmare. Supply is not always assured, and account for this must be made in their daily expenditure and where/how they are arrayed. Thirdly, the extensive use of counterbattery fire has forced guns to widely disperse and to be sited at close to maximum range. Fourthly, jamming of radios and GPS is ubiquitous and near-constant, making the use of radios, precision munitions, and counterbattery radars extremely difficult. Consequently, artillery is still considered extremely valuable by both sides - it just can’t be employed as desired. With the artillery’s freedom of action drastically reduced, drones have been used to mitigate the
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy MjE4NTMz