RAA Liaison Letter 2024 - 2025 Edition

RAA Liaison Letter – 2024 / 2025 Edition 89 It is fair to assume, however, that on operations a conventional adversary would have the capacity to deny Australian air and naval forces the opportunity to shape the land battle. It is reasonable to predict that in this situation Army would be unable to support the close fight while simultaneously providing shaping and interdiction fires. Army’s forthcoming acquisition of the high-mobility artillery rocket system (HIMARS) will give it the capacity to achieve some level of deep shaping; however, the capability is unlikely to fully address its tactical requirements. This is because the DSR has flagged that HIMARS will be primarily focused on strategic deterrence-by-denial tasks. 14 The result is a firepower gap at the divisional level. This gap is made more challenging by Australia’s reliance on foreign manufacturers for artillery components. Acquisition of such equipment would inevitably become vulnerable to supply chain disruption if tensions were to escalate. 15 The opportunity to use LAWs to achieve tactical deep shaping effects presents efficiencies to the Army as it allows the small fleet of howitzers to be concentrated on the tactical close fight, and HIMARS to be focused on strategic deterrence. Drones such as Israel’s Harpy and Germany’s HERO boast endurances spanning hours and ranges nearing 100 kilometres, making them an ideal deep shaping instrument within the decentralised littorals of the Pacific. 16 While the promise of casualty mitigation holds considerable appeal, automated systems do have their limitations. Azerbaijan’s use of LAWs in 2020 to systematically destroy Armenia’s air defence network within 48 hours offers a striking example of the deep shaping potential of LAWs. 17 Moreover, the ability to pre-program and evasively manoeuvre groups of LAWs enables large areas of the battlefield to be held at risk, aiding the divisional screen and covering force battles. Finally, swarms of small, inexpensive drones are more difficult to target than expensive air defence systems, making LAWs effective in contested airspaces. Automated Artillery Systems The development of automated artillery systems (such as Sweden’s Archer and Germany’s Remote Controlled Howitzer (RCH) artillery platforms) represents another important 4IR innovation. 18 These systems are distinguishable from their fully crewed counterparts in that they leverage robotisation and automation to undertake functions normally performed by humans, such as loading, laying and firing. Such systems offer several benefits to the Army, as has been clearly demonstrated in high counter-battery threat environments such as that which currently exists in Ukraine. 19 In such settings, artillery is at greatest risk when it is firing and then when it moves into hides. 20 Automated artillery lowers the casualty risk by reducing the number of personnel exposed to counter-battery fire. Added benefits include the fact that automated machines are unaffected by human limitations such as hunger, fatigue and loss of morale. Further, they can continue to function at times when human crews may be suppressed by enemy fire. 21 Given these characteristics, automated systems are well placed to complement a larger fleet of crewed platforms because they can deliberately draw out enemy counterfires and sensors without risking casualties among friendly troops. While the promise of casualty mitigation holds considerable appeal, automated systems do have their limitations. For one, they are complex and therefore likely be more expensive than crewed weapons. Furthermore, while automated systems have the potential to lower the danger to gun crews, the risk would likely be redirected to the larger teams of maintainers that would be needed to support the weapons. 22 Reducing this risk would depend on the establishment of hides where maintenance and resupply could be conducted in relative security. Notwithstanding these caveats, the automated artillery technology is worth serious consideration as designs mature and reliability improves. Targeting While 4IR technology can improve fire support hardware, it can also greatly improve how militaries prioritise, locate and engage targets according to their military worth. This process, known as targeting, 23 is a joint function performed by teams of highly skilled multidisciplinary specialists using a variety of technical systems. The Army’s recent formation of 10 Brigade and its acquisition of a HIMARS-based long-range strike capability will see it become increasingly involved with targeting. 24 As the Army develops the skill set to conduct this function, it must also consider how 4IR technologies can help generate