RAA Liaison Letter 2024 - 2025 Edition

RAA Liaison Letter – 2024 / 2025 Edition 122 TACP, leading to a shortfall in the brigade's ability to integrate air-based systems in support of their manoeuvre. As the TACP qualification is withdrawn from the brigade level, the School of Artillery should explore the possibility of offering an abridged version of the TACP course to empower JTACs with a higher level of airspace planning and battlespace control. While it may not completely bridge the capability gap that TACPs provide for brigades, it will help alleviate the planning challenges they face in successfully integrating RAAF assets. This approach aligns more closely with how the UK and the US employ their JTACs, and an abridged version of the TACP course could be as brief as four weeks, utilising the current model while adapting it to meet Army needs. A divisional TACP will not be able to deliver the level of fidelity required for a brigade that is engaged in dispersed operations in the littoral environment hundreds of kilometres away from the division, which was emphasised during Exercise Predators Run 24. JTACs need to improve their skills in airspace control measures so they can, if necessary, support battlegroup and brigade headquarters with airspace planning. This means JTACs can play a central role in coordinating the support of air-based systems from various headquarters with senior JTACs prioritised for brigade headquarters. However, this will only succeed if the number of JFOs increases to enable them to be the eyes of the battlefield. Conclusion The JFO and JTAC capabilities are the most recent additions to a long line of qualifications learnt from operational failures in past conflicts. Therefore, it would be a mistake to assume that the war in Ukraine indicates that CAS, along with the JFO and JTAC capabilities, are no longer relevant. History has demonstrated that CAS will always be necessary; however, services must ensure we are prepared by training our members to remain current and proficient. While CAS has traditionally been conducted by manned fixed- wing aircraft, we need to adapt and embrace alternative solutions such as loitering munitions and UAS, while integrating them with assets like artillery and mortars. We must invest more in the JFO program and ensure that they are provided the time to practice and stay current through enabling training to enhance their skills, and by pushing toward exercises that include live or simulated air-based assets. Special thanks to Declan, Craig, Rohan, Eric and Harry for their help with this article. References Aksu, O. (2022, February 3). Potential Game Changer for Close Air Support - Joint Air Power Competence Centre. Joint Air Power Competence Centre. https://www.japcc.org/articles/potential- game-changer-for-close-air-support/ Armfield, R. (2003). JOINT TERMINAL ATTACK CONTROLLER: SEPARATING FACT FROM FICTION. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA424885.pdf Bartels, C., Tormey, T., & Hendrickson, J. (2017). Multidomain Operations and Close Air Support. Military Review. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military- review/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2017430_a rt013.pdf Cooling, B. (1990). Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support. Office of Air Force History. Goodwin, J. (2024, May 28). Allied Air Command Lessons from Ukraine - Joint Air Power Competence Centre. Joint Airpower Competence Centre. https://www.japcc.org/articles/allied-air-command- lessons-from-ukraine/ Matsumura, J., Gordon, J. I., & Steeb, R. (2017, January 30). Defining an Approach for Future Close Air Support Capability. Www.rand.org . https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1233. html Olivieri, A. (2018, June 2). Close Air Support of the Future - Joint Air Power Competence Centre. Joint Airpower Competence Centre. https://www.japcc.org/articles/close-air-support-of- the-future/ Peleschuk, D. (2024, January 13). Ukraine needs more attack aircraft for war effort - ground forces commander. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine- needs-more-attack-aircraft-war-effort-ground-forces- commander-2024-01-12/ Phillips-Levine, T., & Tenbusch, A. (2023, May 10). Disappearing Act: Integrated Training with Air and Ground Forces. War on the Rocks. https://warontherocks.com/2023/05/28730/ T. Correll, J. (2019, December 1). The Ups and Downs of Close Air Support. Air & Space Forces Magazine. https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/the-ups- and-downs-of-close-air-support/ Houston, A. (2023). Defence Strategic Review. Defence .gov.au ; Department of Defence. https://www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews- inquiries/defence-strategic-re… Savage, L. (2022, January 28). US INDOPACOM’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense Vision 2028: