RAA Liaison Letter 2024 - 2025 Edition

RAA Liaison Letter – 2024 / 2025 Edition 120 As many JFOs and JTACs know, CAS requires the establishment of air superiority, rather than air supremacy, and these conditions can exist briefly, though just enough for aircraft to conduct a strike and egress. By utilising indirect fire assets and electronic warfare to suppress enemy air defences, the JFO and JTAC can create a favourable environment for CAS to take place (Bartels, Tormey & Hendrickson, 2017). This contrasts with the Ukrainian and Russian militaries, which lack trained personnel like JFOs and JTACs to integrate other weapon systems that would facilitate a permissive environment for CAS (Watling & Reynolds 2025). To assume, then, that CAS is a dying role, and along with it, the roles of JFO and JTAC, is naïve. Just as the USAF learned during the Korean War and the Vietnam War, losing expertise in CAS fails to recognise the critical importance of this role in supporting ground operations fight. CAS is a mission; it is not platform-specific. CAS is not limited to a fighter jet operating within visual range while conducting a strike. CAS refers to a mission that is in close proximity to friendly forces and requires detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. CAS can be performed by C-130s armed with pods of AGM- 179 Griffins launched from outside the Weapon Effective Zone (WEZ) of an enemy air defence system. Alternatively, as we are learning from Ukraine, the necessary effects could be delivered by UAVs, such as loitering munitions and FPV drones (Aksu, 2022; Matsumura, Gordon & Steeb, 2017; Olivieri, 2018). An example of where standoff munitions support the close fight is the UMPK Glide bomb used by the Russian Air Force. Although these bombs are effective against section-sized positions, they are not integrated with fire and manoeuvre; instead, they are treated as another tool to degrade Ukrainian forces (Watling & Reynolds, 2025). Browsing through FPV or loitering drone footage reveals that they are used almost exclusively against targets in the deep or for harassing static forces at the Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA), rather than supporting forces in direct contact. Despite being paired with someone who acts as an observer for the drone operator, they lack the situational awareness on the ground needed to provide intimate support without the risk of hitting friendly forces (Molloy, 2024). No one is adequately trained to safely and efficiently integrate these assets into the Ukrainian or Russian Army for operations at the company and battlegroup levels (Watling & Reynolds, 2025). This is where we, as an Army, have an advantage with our JFO and JTAC capabilities to evolve and utilise these assets. This is also why JFOs and JTACs remain relevant but must evolve their skill sets to meet future demands. They are the best-suited capability for integrating both new and old assets into the multi- domain fight. They are the only capability we possess that truly integrates these assets at the battlegroup level and below, thanks to training that expedites the Kill Chain and reduces the risk of fratricide (Vessey, 2021). This capability will allow companies and battlegroups to become more lethal through the integration of all these assets. How JFO and JTAC must evolve For these capabilities to remain relevant, the Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) must evolve. This evolution should involve increased usage of Digitally Aided CAS (DACAS), which reduces the signature of both aircraft and the observer while expediting the kill chain. A DACAS-enabled JFO and JTAC can send a digital message with a minimal electronic signature to an approaching aircraft, providing all the necessary information for a strike, thereby reducing time within the WEZ. Joint Fires Teams currently have limited exposure to using DACAS with the existing DTCS Next Generation due to limited opportunities for simulated or live practice. Regiments must ensure that their members receive DACAS training and remediate it where possible, as JFOs are under-prepared to use DACAS. JFOs and JTACs need approval to utilise a wider variety of munitions, such as standoff munitions, loitering munitions, and other unmanned aerial systems, to achieve a synchronised form of strike that can support companies and battlegroups (Aksu, 2022). These systems will enable JFOs and JTACs to provide support for ground operations but require exposure and practice, which is currently lacking. This limitation arises from the restricted number of drones available to the gun regiments and the limited uptake of loitering munitions within the Australian Army. To address this issue, while policies and platforms for loitering munitions are being acquired, the Army should consider introducing a non-lethal loitering munition to help our forces develop essential knowledge.