RAA Liaison Letter 2024 - 2025 Edition

RAA Liaison Letter – 2024 / 2025 Edition 118 Further compounding the issue was the heightened risk of sea-based loitering munitions, which increased the risk of Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) and the use of naval assets. The only reliable form of fire support came from fixed and rotary-wing assets, which were flexible enough to manage the growing frontage of the battlegroups. Once in the area of operations, the air-based assets were coordinated through Tactical Air Control Parties (TACP) down to Joint Fires Observers (JFO) and Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTAC) to integrate into the ground commander’s plan and be used to engage targets. The challenges presented by the littoral environment revealed a harsh reality for offensive support and highlighted shortcomings that can be addressed through enhanced support for the JFO and JTAC capabilities. Ensuring we retain the close air support role in the RAAF while also adapting for the future through the employment of UAS will allow the Army to maintain the initiative and be ready to fight tonight. This article highlights the history of Close Air Support (CAS), details how the capabilities of JFO and JTAC have evolved, and argues why CAS will remain essential in future conflicts. It also proposes actions and outcomes to ensure that JFO/JTAC capabilities are suitable and relevant for the future. A Short History CAS is defined (in JPUB 3-09.3 – Close Air Support) as: "Air action by aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces and require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces". Since the advent of aircraft as a weapon in World War I, militaries have sought ways for aerial assets to support ground combat, requiring trained personnel to integrate aircraft into ground manoeuvres. Although rudimentary in its early stages, the latest iteration of these trained personnel includes the qualifications of JFO and JTAC. These highly trained individuals have made CAS the predominant form of offensive support over artillery in non-permissive environments. Examples from the Global War on Terror (GWOT) demonstrated its flexible employment within restrictions such as rules of engagement (ROE) and collateral damage estimates (CDE) that limited the latter’s involvement. In every major war since World War I, aircraft used in the CAS role have been critical to the success of ground operations. Lessons from these wars indicated that ground personnel needed to be thoroughly current in procedures to prevent friendly fire and strike targets swiftly. A prevalent theme throughout each of these conflicts is the risk of fratricide, with significant instances of friendly fire arising due to inadequate training of pilots and ground personnel in both the procedures and application of CAS (Cooling, 1990). Furthermore, integrating CAS proved challenging outside of static situations and could only be effectively carried out by skilled ground personnel. However, as these conflicts progressed, CAS procedures became more established, and these ground personnel gained experience, enabling a high level of air-ground integration (Cooling, 1990). The introduction of the JFO and JTAC qualifications represents the latest iteration in a long line of qualifications aimed at training ground forces to expedite strikes from aircraft. This capability reduces fratricide, quickly achieves the intent of the ground commander, and emphasises maintaining a high level of currency for personnel. The current JTAC/JFO program began in 2000 when US TACP members struggled to maintain their skills due to insufficient support from the USAF. The program was timely, arriving just before the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, and received support across the services. Shortly after, in 2004, the US Army adopted the JFO curriculum, and in 2006, Australia joined the program. Essentially, both qualifications are designed to train JFOs and JTACs to safely and swiftly strike targets using air assets, all within the ground commander’s intent. The JTAC holds authority on behalf of the ground commander for the strike but collaborates with a JFO to engage targets and support ground operations. Operationally, while a JTAC can be qualified to coordinate indirect fire (IDF), it is primarily the JFO who requests, controls, and adjusts surface- to-surface fires, provides targeting information in support of CAS, and is more likely to perform terminal guidance operations. Although history demonstrates the effectiveness of this qualification, air forces worldwide de- prioritised CAS after each war, only to relearn it