RAA Liaison Letter 2024 - 2025 Edition

RAA Liaison Letter – 2024 / 2025 Edition 112 barriers are introduced. Tactical planning was hampered by a shortage of linguists, particularly at the forward observer level, where fire plan design occurs. Several instances of fire order misinterpretation occurred, leading to delays in the kill chain. To combat the almost inevitable shortage of linguists, every opportunity was taken to rehearse both hypothetical and scheduled fire plans to a greater degree than considered normal in a unilateral battlegroup, which paid significant dividends. The other key mitigation is to factor in at least twice as much time to conduct mission planning iterations than what would be required for a English-speaking partner force. This is to afford time to clarify miscommunications and confusion that is unavoidable when working with another language. Miscommunication, friction and delay also originated from the movement of JGSDF fire units in an unfamiliar training area, often at short notice and at night. The greatest mitigation to this was the apportionment of guide vehicles, liaison officers, and traffic control wardens. Figure 3: Australian and Japanese conducting a ROC drill for upcoming tactical actions for the MDB. Mobility and Signature While linking the JFECC and FSCC together served to significantly ease communication, an important tactical implication was the resultant increase in physical and electromagnetic signature. The FSCC comprised a similar configuration as the JFECC, being a vehicle command post with enhanced communications equipment. Planners must therefore factor additional time and space into position sighting and occupation to accommodate partner force systems. Planners must also anticipate differences in mobility and protection, as the JGSDF’s Toyota Mega Cruiser was not authorised for off-road driving and is completely unarmoured. These vehicle differences compelled the JGSDF to operate the FSCC in a dismounted configuration in certain phases, thereby reducing our tactical signature. Fortuitously, the mobility mismatch between our parties encouraged even closer integration and planning unintentionally improving joint fires lethality. The ability for the FSCC to operate dismounted was something they have never trained for and testified to their adaptability and professionalism. Figure 4: Japanese Mega Cruiser (Left), Australian Bushmaster PMV (Right) Fire Unit Advantages The integration of foreign artillery systems presented several important opportunities. For one, the inclusion of both 81mm and 120mm mortars provided the battlegroup the ability to effect targets at range without exposing 3 Brigade’s howitzers to counter fires. The JGSDF enabled more devastating weights of fire to be brought to bear, as Australian howitzers and Japanese mortars frequently engaged targets simultaneously. This lethality was well demonstrated during the live defensive fire plans that occurred during Ex BROLGA SPRINT, where the firepower of Australian and Japanese fire units was brought to bear on multiple targets in rapid succession. A second opportunity was the ability to plan with novel capabilities. For instance, a notable advantage of the JGSDF mortars was their range. The rocket-assisted projectile of the JGSDF Type 96 120mm mortar increases their High Explosive (HE) range from 7.5km to 13km, which afforded a counter-battery asset that we typically do not train with. With this advantage came added responsibility to artillery staff and the battlegroup commander. Battlespace had to be apportioned in the form of primary and