RAA Liaison Letter 2024 - 2025 Edition

RAA Liaison Letter – 2024 / 2025 Edition 110 Joint Fires Interoperability: Lessons Learnt from Australian and Japanese Artillery Integration Lieutenant Benjamin Stephens Battery Captain 106 Battery, 4 Regiment T HIS ARTICLE DETAILS JOINT FIRES INTEROPERABILITY LESSONS LEARNT BY 3 RD B RIGADE DURING E X BROLGA RUN AND BROLGA SPRINT. In a future Large Scale Combat Operation (LSCO) in the Pacific, interoperability between the Australian Army and its partners will be vital. In 2024, the 106th Battery of 4th Regiment, was able to test joint fire interoperability with its artillery counterparts in the Japanese Ground Self Defence Force (JGSDF). This article details the key interoperability lessons that were gained during 3rd Brigade’s war fighter exercises, Ex BROLGA RUN and BROLGA SPRINT. It focuses on the importance of fire support planning, bi-lateral teaming, signature management, and mission processing. The dissemination of these lessons will help to expedite the Australian Army’s interoperability in times of war. It is therefore intended that this article be instructive for other units preparing to train alongside the JGSDF or other Pacific partners. Figure 1: Australian Fire Support Officer and Japanese FSCC Commander Order of Battle The JGSDF fires element comprised of towed 81mm and 120mm mortars, a Forward Observer (FO) team, and an Artillery Fire Support Coordination Centre (FSCC). On the Australian side, 106 Bty provided M777A2 howitzers, two Joint Fires Teams (JFT), an 81 mm mortar platoon, and a Joint Fires and Effects Coordination Centre (JFECC). Together, both organisations were responsible for providing fire support to Battle Group Coral (BG Coral), which also contained a combat team from Unites States Marine Corps, the US Army, and the JGSDF (CT Asahi). Exercise BROLGA RUN / SPRINT, held in Townsville Field Training Area (TFTA), provided the LSCO scenario under which all parties could train. Fire Support Planning The Reception, Staging and Onwards Integration phase was critical for the establishment of role clarity between two culturally different armies, and the identification of friction points between our fires and effects procedures. Before deploying into the field, both parties formed a common understanding of how fire missions would be routed, processed and controlled. This was achieved through deliberate tabletop war games and joint fires rehearsals. During these rehearsals, the entire fires kill chain, from observer to fire unit was rehearsed both diagrammatically in the planning room, then again on the parade ground with all staff and Command Posts (CPs) present. These rehearsals enabled the identification of numerous procedural differences and the clarification of workarounds to facilitate fire support. The sooner these differences can be identified and treated; the less friction will be experienced during execution. As an example, some key differences that were identified were as follows: • Different approaches to risk during danger close mission procedures • Varying level of experience with urban fire planning • Varying levels of experience with event- based, versus time-based, fire planning • Different thresholds for unmasking artillery systems • Different approaches to attack guidance For instance, both parties identified and resolved major differences in how each nation verifies clear air before commencing an artillery engagement.