RAA Liaison Letter 2024 - 2025 Edition

RAA Liaison Letter – 2024 / 2025 Edition 100 should exercise discretion when appointing or mandating a DPRAC and consider whether appointing a DPRAC enhances the value of combined arms training, or if it is an opportunity cost to the development of better training due to the administrative burden. Joint practices – with naval, aviation or Special Operation aspects – have precedent of being incorporated into activities not too dissimilar from the BS CALFX. Whilst requiring an element of subject matter expertise and with some mandated appointments, sea-to-land RAN or air-to-surface RAAF practices incorporating live munitions are intrinsically similar to direct fire and indirect fire practices and as such can be incorporated in a relatively straightforward fashion. Extrapolating, however, is speculating on how DPRAC and similar exercise appointments such as Chief Safety Officer (CSO) and Exercise Director (EXDIR) will manage future capabilities. The doctrine for exercise planning needs to support flexibility beyond the superimposition of direct fire Weapon Danger Zones and close support indirect fires, and the ADF-P 7-series (or yet-to-be-released ADF-I-5 Exercise Planning and Conduct) and LP 7.3.0 may not be ready for such practices. It is through this lens that a combined arms and integrated/joint practice should give clarity to the role of DPRAC. When training effects spill across domains and have real-world hazards, there must be absolute clarity on which exercise safety appointment is responsible for its safe and effective employment, either at a doctrinal level or on an activity-by- activity basis. How can we live fire safely whilst practicing electromagnetic spectrum denial or cyber, information warfare and space capabilities? How can we rehearse Land-Based Maritime Strike in support of the deployment of an amphibious force? How can we exercise GMLRS or PrSM in concert with Sea Sparrow or Harpoon, for the insertion of an airborne strike package? How can a counter-UAS element validate its ability to protect ground based forces persistently and conduct identification of friend 1 LP 7.3.0 or foe (IFF) if it cannot be force assigned to and manoeuvre with the supported force over an extended period? How can such actions validate their ability to conduct Battle Damage Assessment if not through live fire? Each of these vignettes is intended to provoke thought by experts on how capabilities beyond the combat corps could train past the Command Post Exercise or discrete scripted serials, and test discretion and decision making processes under live fire pressures. Conclusion The BS CALFX presented a new methodology to train combat commanders under the pressures of live fire and did so with Partner Nation inclusion. Adopting new ways of applying range safety underpinned this, and the DPRAC formed a key juncture to support planners at all levels. This article outlined ways in which the DPRAC facilitated enhanced training and benchmarked Australian range safety against some key Partner Nations. The author intended to outline this to a wider audience to catalyse similar, or further novel, approaches to immersive combined arms training and potential opportunities for the future Joint Force, to offer a contemporary perspective on the role of DPRAC, and to provide some further context and assurance to future DPRAC appointees.