RAA Liaison Letter 2024 - 2025 Edition

RAA Liaison Letter – 2024 / 2025 Edition 97 Lost Art of DPRAC T HIS ARTICLE EXAMINES THE ROLE OF THE D IRECTOR OF P RACTICE AND HOW THEY ARE A VITAL PIECE IN THE EFFECTIVE TRAINING PUZZLE . Major Lachlan McDonald Operations Officer 4th Regiment RAA 2024 The Director of Practice (DPRAC) is appointed for Defence activities where there is a requirement for safety coordination between unit exercises or range practices and is responsible for the coordination of range safety for all units and sub-units placed under their control. 1 The role is the key juncture to enable immersive live-fire rehearsal of Army’s raison d’être (and the ADF no less). As such, this article intends to shed light on the ‘dark art’ of DPRAC, to provide insights to future DPRACs when appointed and looking for a start-point beyond doctrine and discuss how the DPRAC is a tool to enhance training rather than merely an obligation. As such, this article intends to shed light on the ‘dark art’ of DPRAC, … This article outlines the context of a multinational live fire activity, provides insights to planning and execution, and intends to explain how the DPRAC contributes to enhanced combined arms training when employed and executed to best effect. The article will discuss the intrinsic links between range safety and operational command and control, highlight considerations of the juncture of ADF and Partner Nation range doctrines. Finally, the article speculates on how the DPRAC may be utilised when employing emerging and Operational level effects and the resultant interplay with parallel exercise appointments. Context Over the period 06-13 May 24, 3 Bde led the Brolga Sprint (BS) Combined Arms Live Fire Exercise (CALFX) at Townsville Field Training Area. For this activity, CO 4 Regt RAA was appointed as the Director of Practice (DPRAC) and OPSO 4 Regt RAA was appointed as the Deputy DPRAC (DDPRAC). The activity incorporated Ex SOUTHERN JACKAROO and resultantly included elements of the US Marine Corps, US Army, and Japanese Ground Self Defence Force. The activity was determined to be a Level 8 practice, and as an Integrated range included live fire practices of Tank, ASLAV, M113, 155mm artillery, 120mm and 81mm mortars, Demolitions, Explosive Lane Closures, Battlefield Noise Simulation and a slew of small arms and crew served weapon systems, all in a blend of static and manoeuvre practices. The live fire activity exercised the Brigade Headquarters in its synchronisation of Battle Group tactical actions several times within the eight day period and was designed as an immersive scenario with live ammunition carried at the ACTION degree of weapon readiness for up to 72 hours. BS CALFX incorporated insertion, defensive routine, delay, the main defensive battle, counterattack and counterpenetration, tactical resupply, and exfiltration under the same live fire conditions. The activity also allowed for junior commanders to receive orders, develop a plan, issue orders, regroup, rehearse and execute, and to only be directed to modify their plan if it strayed outside the safety parameters. In total, 46 different safety traces were utilised by 17 different OICs Practice functionally, many of which were rotational appointments as Battle Groups fulfilled safety appointments for opposite Battle Groups. DPRAC in Planning Planning for BS CALFX commenced during Q4 2023 and the intent was clear from inception; commanders and staff officers would be tested to analyse problems and synchronise their actions, as distinct from a common LFX format of the Combat Team Scenario Training Exercise (STX) Lane. The STX Lane would only allow a specific tactical action, on a specific axis with constraints, and would have limited opportunities for freedom of action or discretion of timings or triggers. As such the paradigm shifted for BS CALFX in a highly positive way; subordinate commanders were required to achieve their Commander’s Intent, the tactical orders would provide the triggers, and the range safety hierarchy enabled the plan to be executed with a degree of freedom of manoeuvre. At the lowest level junior commanders integrated the layering of their individual and crew served weapons with AFV and indirect fires; at the middle level this manifested as discretionary application of lethality to lead an ‘enemy’ into a course of action, and at the highest level defeat mechanisms and manoeuvre were applied. This necessitated a harmony between the headquarters controlling the tactical actions (Brigade HQ) and the headquarters controlling the safety hierarchy