# Series: AWM95 Australian Army commanders' diaries [Vietnam]

Artillery units

Item number: 3/6/7

Item: 1 Field Regiment

[1 Fd Regt RAA]

Narrative, Annexes

[1 Jan - 28 Feb 1967]

on.....

#### COVERING LETTER

Reference No.

To: OIC, Military History Section, AHQ.

1. I enclose Commanders Diary (AF C 2118) (Adapted) as indicated at Part 2. 2. Please return receipt below.

Rect 5-67

(Signature)

Apr.

(OC Unit or senior staff officer)

PART 2

# SECRET

ORIGINAL DUPLICATE

\* Only to be included during operations. † Cross out whichever is not applicable. Strike out where not applicable

# COMMANDERS DIARY

Unit o	or Formation 7 FD PREGIT PUA	858
rom	1 JAN 67 To 28 FEB 67	100
0 8		THE ME
	NO E INDEX	250 25
Inerati	ve (AF C 2118)	Enclosure Numbers
		B Fig. 5 Q 8
NNEX		NITE . HITT
* A	Duty officer's log	NIL toNIL
* B	Messages connected with log	to MIL
C	Operation orders and instructions issued	ONE to EIGHT
D	Operation orders and instructions received	ONE to TWO
* E	Sitreps issued	to
F	Orders of battle and location reports issued	MIL to NIL
G	Intelligence reports and summaries issued; appreciations made	NIL to NIL
H	Administrative orders and instructions issued	ONE TO ONLY
I	Administrative orders and instructions received	MIL to NIL
J	Administrative reports and bulletins; ammunition returns; field strength	388 -
9.4	returns	to
* K	Standing orders issued	ONE to EIGHT.
L	Commander's policy and demi-official letters	MIL to MIL
M	Action reports (if required)	MIL to MIL
N	Other papers, eg, maps and diagrams, air photos, reports from sub units	ONE to TWO
0	Periodical summaries of operations	MIL to MIL
Z		† NIL
3		RETAINED
0.53		Despatched to

# COMMANDERS DIARIES INSTRUCTIONS

#### AIM

1. The aim of a Commanders Diary is to provide data on which to base future improvements in Army training, equipment, organization and administration, and to furnish historians with a record of the activities of units and formations in operational and non-operational periods in peace and in war.

#### GENERAL

- 2. Entries are to be made daily on AF C 2118 (Adapted) each entry being initialled by the officer detailed to keep it.
- 3. Commanders Diaries will conform with the rules for drafting orders given in "Staff Duties (Australia)" Chapter 2, Section 12.

#### RESPONSIBILITY

#### **During Non-operational Periods**

4. A Commanders Diary is to be compiled by commanders of all formations.

#### During Operational Periods (1)

- 5. A Commanders Diary is to be compiled in duplicate by:
  - a. Commanders of all formations.
  - b. Each branch of the staff at formation headquarters commanded by a brigadier or above.
  - c. Heads of services not below the rank of lieutenant colonel.
  - d. Personal staffs and officers holding special appointments.
  - e. Unit commanders.
  - f. Commanders of a detachment of a unit when so ordered.

#### COMPILATION

- 6. Both original and duplicate copies are to consist of:
  - a. Cover (AF C 2119) (Adapted).
  - b. Index as printed on cover.
  - c. Narrative (AF C 2118) (Adapted).
  - d. Annexes as shown in the Index.
- 7. All details of the unit or formation (if a detachment is concerned, the name of the parent unit), period covered and enclosure numbers of the annexes are to be shown on the cover. If there has been a change of command since the last report, the date of assumption by the new commanding officer is to be included.
- 8. The annexes are to be assembled in the groups shown on the cover. If there are no enclosures for an annex NIL will be entered on the cover. If additional annexes are convenient for a particular headquarters, arting at B.

for operations form Annex "Z", "TOP SECRET he document. It is to be prepared and disposed of as

#### TENTS

es as well as map references), establishment, equipment

d orders given.
he day's fighting, including company movements.
nmander with regard to equipment, factics, organization

officers, men and equipment.

pment captured.

employed in the time not accounted for. The type of

and to save work as much information as possible is to uments issued and received, routine returns, etc. All and the time of receipt or despatch is to be given.

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#### DISPOSAL

- 13. Original Commander's Diary. This is to be forwarded monthly, unless otherwise ordered, by seventh day of the succeeding month direct to AHQ.
- 14. Duplicate Commander's Diary. This must be clearly marked as a duplicate. It is to be sent separately from the original to AHQ one month after the original has been despatched but not before the former has been acknowledged.
- 15. When overseas, both copies of diaries are to be sent through the Army Records organization in the overseas theatre but at different times.

#### 16. TOP SECRET Supplementary Diaries.

non NTL will be entered on the agent.

- a. The documents referred to in Paragraph 9 together with a list of them made out on AF C 2118 (Adapted) must be placed in separate cover (AF C 2119) (Adapted). All details must be filled in and the cover clearly marked in red: "ANNEX Z OFFICER ONLY". It may be convenient to group the papers by appendices.
- b. Supplementary diaries must be forwarded under the normal rules for TOP SECRET correspondence, to AHQ. The inner envelope must be plainly marked:

# TOP SECRET ANNEX Z to

Commanders Diary of		(Formation or Unit)
From	to	(Dates)

c. The duplicate supplementary diaries must be despatched as shown in Paragraph 14 as soon as receipt of the original has been acknowledged.

antenes are to be permitted in the groups shown on the cover. If there are no enclosure for

This form is to be enclosed with the annexes in AF-C 2119 (Adapted).

## COMMANDERS DIARY NARRATIVE

UNIT/FORMATION ...... 1. Pd

MONTH AND YEAR Jan / Feb 67

REFERENCE MAP Vietnam 1 : 50,000 Series

COMMANDING OFFICER Lt Cel D R HEGG

Place and grid reference	Date	Time	Event or information	Annex letter and enclosure number
	26 Dec 66	***********	1 Fd Regiment Standard Operational Procedure, Section 5, Movement issued	K 1
	31 Dec 66		Artillery statistics for 1 ATF Artillery period 6 Jun 66 to 30 Dec 66	. E 1
	5. Jan. \$7		Operation WHITEWASH issued ( Re-issue of target numbers for 1 ATF and re-enforcing artillery.	0 1
	6 Jan 67		Minutes of a MG! Staff Conference held at 1 Fd Regt RAA , NUI DAT.	К. 2
	6 Jan 67		1 ATF instructions on the Handling and Processing of PW	D 1
	9 Jan 67	******************	1 Fd Regt RAA Op Order 1/67 Operation EOLLONGONG	C 2
	15 Jan. 67		1 Fd Regt Op Order 2/67 Operation CAMDEN	0.3
		****************	Confirmatory notes from a Conference held by Commander 1 ATF 4 Jan 67	К3

This form is to be enclosed with the annexes in AF-C 2119 (Adapted).

#### COMMANDERS DIARY NARRATIVE

AF-C 2118 (Adapted)

UNIT/FORMATION 1 FA T

COMMANDING OFFICER to Col D R BEGG

MONTH AND YEAR Jan / Feb 67 REFERENCE MAP Vietnam 1 : 50,000 Series Place and grid reference Annex letter and Date Time Event or information enclosure number 18 Jan 67 Instruction on Fire Support for 1 ATF issued to cover : Duties of the Artillery Commander Duties of the GSO2 (Air) Allocation and Control of Fire Support Function of Artillery Tactical Headquarters Sefety of own Troops and Aircraft 31 Jan 67 Confirmatory notes to COs verbal orders for Operation CAMDEN 31 Jan 67 Cancellation of Minutes and Papers issued by Lt Col R M C CUEIS 31 Jan 67 1 Fd Regt Operational Report for Jan 67 1 Fd Regt On Order 4/67 - Operation HEAUMARIS 12 Feb 67 12 Feb 67 Minutes of a Technical Conference held at 1 Fd Rest on 9 and 10 Feb 67

1 B.P Coy-275/65-55m

MONTH AND YEAR

## COMMANDERS DIARY NARRATIVE

AF-C 2118 (Adapted) Revised Jun, 1965

UNIT/FORMATION 1 Fd Rep\* RAA

COMMANDING OFFICER Lt Col D R BEGG

Jan/Feb 67

REFERENCE MAP Vietnam 1: 50,000 Series

Place and grid reference	Date	Time	Event or information	Annex letter and enclosure number
	15 Feb 67		1 Fd Regt Op Order 5/67 - Operation DALBY	
	16 Feb 67	ă	1 Fd Rest Op Order 5b/67 - Operation RENHARK	
	20 Feb 67		Regimental Line Layout	
			1 Pd Rest Op Order 6/67 - Operation KIRRIBILLI	
	23 Feb 67		Minutes of Debricfing - Operation BRIBIE	
			Ammunition Sealing adopted by the Regiment	
			Regimental Instruction on Correction of the Moment and Prediction	E. 8
	31Feb. 67.	100000000000000000000000000000000000000	Collected Regimental Information Sheets for Feb 67	И. 2
	24 71-2 67			

1 B P Coy-275/65-55m

MARKETHINGS .

ANNEX- CI

1 Fd Regt RAA NUI DAT

5 Jan 66

#### OP WHITEWASH

#### 1. Situation

- a. Blocks of target numbers (US concentration designation numbers) have been issued to artillery sub-units and individuals, within 1 ATF since Jun 66. During operations, targets are cancelled for safety and other reasons, but even after cancellation the number cannot be used again as this leads to confusion or error.
- b. The majority of target numbers held by TF artillery have now been used. It is necessary to destroy all record of previous targets, reallocate blocks of numbers to users and begin target records afresh.
- c. This must be done simultaneously by all concerned at a specific time.
- 2. Mission. To re-issue target numbers for 1 ATF and re-inforcing artillery.

#### Execution

- a. General Outline. All Artillery command posts/FDCs are to prepare fresh target record books forthwith. These target records books are to contain normal survey information. At H hr, which will be given by 1 Fd Regt with the approval of HQ 1 ATF, all previous target records are to be destroyed by burning and the new numbers and target records taken into use.
- b. RHQ 1 Fd Regt will issue new lists of close DF targets surrounding the TF base area. The location of these targets will remain the same the new lists will simply renumber existing targets.
- c. TFA10 will prepare new HB lists.
- d. Initiators of all other target lists will, if it is desired to retain a target, be required to resubmit the target with numbers from the appropriate new block of target numbers. This will apply to targets for proposed offensive operations as well as to DF targets.
- e. Allocation of target numbers. Issued separately.
- f. System of prefixes. Issued separately.
- g. Co-ord Instrs.

  H hr To be advised. Not before 0001 hrs 11 Jan 67.

a Karas Capt

Lieutenant Colonel Commanding Officer

#### Distribution

101 Fd Bty RAA 103 Fd Bty RAA 161 Fd Bty RNZA (2) Det 131 Div Loc Bty 1/83 US Arty (3 (3)TAC HQ Regt CP (2) 5 RAR 6 RAR 1 APC Sqn 1 Fd Sqn RAE Capt M Wells (c/- TF TOC for Sector HQ) HQ 1 ATF CO 2IC Adjt TF AIO Svy Offr LO Spare

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Copy No.../6..... 1 Fd Regt RAA NUI DAT

9 Jan 67

#### OP ORDER 1/67 OP WOLLON, ONG

Confirmatory Notes to CO's verbal orders issued at 091000 hrs Jan 67. No changes.

Reference: Map Vietnam 1: 50,000 Sheets 6442 III and IV series 6701.

#### Situation

a. En. See current Intreps.

#### b. Friendly Forces

(1) General situation. Mission of 1 ATF is to re-establish domination of the TAOR. This will be done in stages.

#### (a) Stage 1

- i Domination of TAOR from 9 to 31 Jan in whole TAOR less two areas res for 1 ATF and areas . SARAH and WENDY as marked on map OP WQLLONGONG.
- i Cordon and search of Binh Ba by 5 RAR on 9 10 Jan. OP CALOUNDRA
- jii: Cordon and search of HOA LONG on 17 -18 Jan by 1 ATF. OP CAMDEN.
- (b) Stage 2. Deliberate TF ops against targets in 1 ATF res areas or in areas SARAH and WENDY which are to be searched by SAS during period 9 31 Jan.
- (2) 9 Div will be operating in area marked, from 26 Jan.
- (3) Boundaries. Marked on maps.
- (4) Dates and Timings. Marked on maps.
- (5) Routes. Marked.

#### c. Atts and Dets

Remaining in sp: 1/83 Arty less two Btys, A Btry 2/35 Arty

2. Mission. 1 Fd Regt RAA is to sp 1 ATF operation WOLLONGONG from 9 to 31 Jan 67.

#### Execution.

#### a. General Outline

#### (1) Allotment of sp

- (a) 101 Fd Bty RAA. In DS 6 RAR.
- (b) 103 Fd Bty RAA. In DS 5 RAR.
- (c) 161 Fd Bty RNZA. In sp 1 ATF and at pri call to 5 RAR and 6 RAR whilst DS btys are moving.

#### (2) Ammo allotment

(a) Base posn. Normal.

(b) Btys deployed outside base 100 rds per gun initially. 5% Illum. 15% CVT airburst.

#### b. 101 Fd Bty RAA

9 - 19 Jan - Remain base loc.

20 - 24 Jan - Deploy in either 1 4568 or 4665. Details later

24 - 31 Jan - Deploy in 3063. Mov by CH-47.

31 Jan - Return to base camp. Mov by CH-47

#### c. 103 Fd Bty RAA

9 Jan - Deploy WEST end of LUSCOMBE Field as ordered (OP CALOUNDRA).

9 - 16 Jan - Remain LUSCOMBE FIELD.

16 Jan - Return to base area.

20 Jan - Deploy in . 3 4571.

20 - 25 Jan - Remain 4571.

25 Jan - Deploy on new diversion rd vic 430690.

31 Jan - Return to base area.

#### d. 161 Fd Bty RNZA

9 - 31 Jan. Remain pres loc.

#### e. 1/83 Arty (less two btys)

9 - 31 Jan. Remain pres loc.

#### f. A Btry 2/35 Arty

9 - 31 Jan. Remain pres loc.

#### g. Det 131 Div Loc Bty.

- (1) Provide theatre grid in all bty posns.
- (2) Prot to be detailed by 2IC.

#### h. Co-ord Instrs

- (1) Movement. Arrangements for mov and orders to mov will be issued by this HQ.
- (2) Recce. Details to be given by 2IC.
  - (3) Recording of DFs. Fire may be adjusted on DF(SOS) and other important DFs for ni posns at discretion of infoomd concerned.
- (4) Protection. All parties working outside base area must have protection. Inf coy will be provided for bty posns.

#### (5) Safety.

(a) Fire within 500 metres of a boundary is to be cleared with neighbouring unit.

#### (b) Other clearances. Normal

- (c) CVr should not be fired overhead unless in emergency:
- (6) Meteor. No change.

#### 4. Admin and Leg

a. Air del eqpt to be trans to 101 Bty by 18 Jan 67. 101 Bty to return eqpt to QM after 31 Jan.

#### b. Ammo

- (1) All btys to carry 100 rds per gun including 5% Illum, 15% CVT.
- 101 Bty to be resupplied by air, 160 rds per day (WESTERN position).
- Water. Jerry cans
- Rats. Bty Requirements to be submitted to QM ASP. d.
- e. Resupply. 101 Bty in WEST area to be resupplied by hel daily at 0900 hrs. Bty to advise Regtl CP by 1500 hrs day prior, of weight of lift. Adjt to book ac for 25 31 Jan inclusive.
- f. Tpt. QM to arrange 6 x trucks for mov of ammO for 101 Bty on 20 Jan, and 24 Jan, and for 103 Bty on 31 Jan. Timings later.
- Med. RAP remains base loc.
- Rep and Rec. LAD remains base loc. Bty secs mov with btys.

#### 5. Comd and Sig.

- RHQ. Remains pres loc.
- Tac HQ. Remains pres loc.
- Liaison. No change. C.
- d. Radio. Normal, except that FOs with 5 RAR and 6 RAR flick to 161 Bty net for shoots while own DS bty is moving.
- Line. Line will not be laid to btys outside base area e.
- Nicknames. f.

"Enpty Guns" "Move" or "Moving"

WHIP LASH SITTING PRETTY "Ready Bty Grid"

"Ready Theatre Grid"

LAUGHING KITBAGS

CRACK DOWN

Security. All details remain SECRET until completion of

Operation,

ACK

a Kuns Cyt

Lieutenant Colonel Commanding Officer

Distribution 101 Fd Bty RAA 103 Fd Bty RAA 161 Fd Bty RNZA 1/83 US Arty Tac HQ Regt CP CO 2IC Adjt	(2)	Copy No 1-2 3-4 5 6 7 8 9	
TFA10 HQ 1 ATF Comd's Diary Spare File	(3)	12 13 14-16 17 18	SECRET

#### SECRET

569/1/52

1 Fd Regt RAA NUI DAT 15 Jan 67

OP ORDER 2/67 OP CAMDEN

Maps: VIETNAM, 1:25,000, XA BINH BA SE Sheet No 6430 111 SE 1:5,000 HOA LONG Special

Reference: A. 1 ATF Op Order 1/67 (Op CAMDEN) Ops 21 dated 14 Jan 67.

- 1. Sit. See Reference A.
- 2. Msn. 1 Fd Regt RAA is to support 1 ATF in cordon and search of HOA LONG YS4264.
- 3. Exec.
- a. Gen Outline. 1 Fd Regt RAA remains in base loc during operation except that 101 Bty comes under comd 6 RAR for Phase 2, to be employed in infantry role. During phase 2 161 Bty is at pri call to 6 RAR.
- b. 101 Fd Bty RAA.
  - (1) Phase 1. Remain in DS 6 RAR. Base Loc.
  - (2) Phase 2. Under command 6 RAR from 1600 hrs 16 Jan 67. Personnel will be used in infantry role. FO parties remain in DS 6 RAR, NOT under comd.
  - (3) Phase 3. In DS 6 RAR. Base Loc.
- c. 103 Fd Bty RAA.
  - (1) Remain in DS 5 RAR.
  - (2) Remain in base loc.
- d. 161 Fd Bty RNZA.
  - (1) Phase 1. Remain in sp 1 ATF.
  - (2) Phase 2.
    - (a) In sp 1 ATF.
    - (b) Pri call to 6 RAR from 1600 hrs 16 Jan 67 until 101 Bty is in action on completion of phase 2.
  - (3) <u>Phase 3</u>. In sp 1 ATF.
  - (4) Remain in base loc.

SECRET

e. Det 131 Div Loc Bty. No change from tasks given in Op Order 1/67 WOLLONGONG.

#### f. Co-ord Instr.

- (1) No change from Reference A.
- (2) BC 101 Fd Bty RAA is to inform Regtl CP when 101 Bty is in action after completion of Phase 2. (Estimated by 1900 hrs 17 Jan 67). Nickname: "LIMPING LADY".

#### 4. Admin and Log.

- a. RAP. Remains base loc.
- b. LAD. Remains base loc.

#### 5. Comd and Sig.

- a. RHQ. Remains base loc.
- b. Tac HQ. Remains base loc.
- c. Liaison. No change.
- d. Radio. 101 Fd Bty to maintain one set, either C/S 1 or C/S 19, on Regtl Net during Phase 2 while under comd 6 RAR.

ACK

a Kans Eye

Lieutenant Colonel Commanding Officer

Distribution	Copy No
101 Fd Bty RAA (2) 103 Fd Bty RAA (2) 161 Fd Bty RNZA Tac HQ Regtl CP 5 RAR 6 RAR HQ 1 ATF CO 2IC Adjt	1-2 3-4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
TFAIO Comd's Diary Spare File	14 15 - 17 18 19

#### CONFIDENTIAL

Copy No. 200020 1 Fd Regt RAA NUI DAT

31 Jan 67

00 No 2 /67

Confirmatory Notes to CO's verbal orders given 311200H. No change except in timing for extraction of 6 RAR and 101 Fd Bty RAA (see para 3 g (2).

#### 1. Situation

- a. En. No change from current Intreps.
- b. Friendly Forces
  - (1) 6 RAR and 101 Fd Bty RAA will return to base loc on 31 Jan 67, 101 Bty moving by CH-47. (No change Op WOLLONGONG).
  - (2) 5 RAR will conduct Op CAMDEN, cordon and search of part of village HOA LONG, on 31 Jan, 1 and 2 Feb 67.
  - (3) 6 RAR begins operation TAMBOURINE, (operations SE of 1 ATF TAOR) on 1 Feb 67 for approx six days.
- c. Atts and Dets

Det 176 AD Coy att for assistance in air moves.

- 2. Mission. 1 Fd Regt RAA is to continue to sp TF operations.
- 3. Execution
  - a. General Outline
    - (1) Grouping
      - (a) 101 Fd Bty RAA remain in DS 6 RAR
      - (b) 103 Fd Bty RAA remain in DS 5 RAR
      - (c) 161 Fd Bty RNZA:
        - i Remain in sp 1 ATF and at pri call to 6 RAR during movement of 101 Fd Bty, until 1400 hrs 1 Feb 67.
        - ii In sp 6 RAR from 1400 hrs 1 Feb 67 until conclusion of Op TAMBOURINE, approx 7 Jan 67.
    - (2) Ammunition allotment. No change.
  - b. 101 Fd Bty RAA. Return to base loc by CH-47 on 31 Jan 67, then remain hade loc.
  - c. 103 Fd Bty RAA.
    - (1) Remain base loc during op CAMDEN and until further notice.
    - (2) Accommodate one sec mors 5 RAR from 311600H Jan 67 until completion of search by A Coy 5 RAR 2 Feb 67.
  - d. 161 Fd By RNZA
    - (1) Mov by CH-47 to vic 514 644 approx 1530 hrs 1 Feb 67.

- (2) Return to base loc by CH-47 approx.7 Feb 67.
- (3) Liaise with C Coy 6 RAR reference mov bty recce party.

#### e. Det 131 Div Loc BtyRAA

- (1) Survey. Provide theatre grid for 161 Bty vic 514 644 ASP, but no work in area before 1400 hrs 1 Feb 67.
- (2) Radar. Remain base loc.

#### f. Det 176 AD Coy

- (1) Assist 101 Bty mov 31 Jan. Mov by heli 101 Bty 310700 hrs Jan 67.
- (2) Assist 161 Bty mov 1 Feb. Report 161 Bty 011330 hrs Feb 67.

#### g. Co-ord Instrs

- (1) Recce. 161 Bty recce party have received separate orders.
- (2) Movement.

#### (a) 101 Bty

- i 1 x CH-47 aval for mov to base loc on 31 Jan 67.
- ii "Empty guns" will be ordered by 2IC after extraction of A Coy 6 RAR, approx '0845 hrs.
- iii 0930 hrs, CH-47 arrives 101 Bty fwd.
  - iv. Det 176 AD Coy arrives 101 Bty fwd loc approx 310715 hrs Jan 67.

#### (b) 161 Bty

- i. 011400 hrs Feb 67, C Coy 6 RAR moves by air to secure gun area vic 514 644 with 761 Bty recce party.
- ii 011500 hrs, initial load HE dropped in gun area by CH-47, ex Vung Tau.
- iii 011530 hrs, 2 x CH-47s arrive 161 Bty for mov to gun area.
- .iv, Det 176 AD Coy reports 011330 hrs Feb 67.
- (3) Gun Area. 161 Bty will be in vic 514 644 during Op TAMBOURINE.

#### (4) Fire Plans.

- (a) Fire Plan CHRISTINE JUNE, in sp 5 RAR Op CAMDEN issued separately.
- (b) Fire Plan CB TAMBOURINE issued separately.

#### 4. Admin and Log

- a. Ammo. Resupply 160 rds HE for 161 Bty by air arranged 3,4,5,6 Feb for approx 0800 hrs.
- b. Resupply. By UH-IB daily at 1500 hrs from KIWI Pad, from 2 Feb 67 till completion of Op TAMBOURINE. 161 Bty to advise duty offr 1500 hrs previous day lift required.
- c. Med. RAP remains base loc.
- d. Rep and Rec. LAD remains base loc. Bty secs remain with Btys.

#### 5. Comd and Sigs.

- a. RHQ remains base loc.
- b. Tac HQ remains base loc.
- c. Liaison no change.
- d. CH47 (HILLCLIMBER) will op on 161 Bty main frequency for 161 Bty mov and 101 Bty main frequency for 101 Bty mov.
- e. Bty radios MUST be turned to "ON" position, NOT squelch to work to aircraft.

"Empty Guns" CRACK DOWN

"Move" or "Moving" WHIP LASH

"Ready Bty Grid" SITTING PRETTY

"Ready Theatre Grid" LAUGHING KITBAGS

6. Security. This op order is to be destroyed on completion of Op TAMBOURINE (except for Comd's Diary Copies).

ACK

Lieutenant Colonel Commanding Officer

Distribution		Copy No
101 Fd Bty RAA 103 Fd Bty RAA 161 Fd Bty RNZA 1/83 US Arty 5 RAR 6 RAR 176 AD Coy HQ 1 ATF	(2) (2) (2)	1-2 3-4 5-6 7 8 9
Tac HQ Regt CP CO 2IC Adjt QM RMO OC LAD		12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Comd's Diary File	(3)	20-22

CONFIDENTIAL

Comolo Dien

1 Fd Regt RAA NUI DAT

12 Feb 67

No 4/67 (BEAUMARIS)

aps: Vietnam 1: 25000 Sheets 6429/IV/NE 6429/I/NW

#### Situation

- a. En. See current Intrep.
- b. Friendly forces
  - (1) 1 ATF will cordon and search village vic 4659 on 13/14 Feb 67.
  - (2) 5 RAR
    - (a) Two companies mov to vic 438580 approx 131100N and patrol North of Nui Da Dang 4455 by day.
    - (b) Two companies mov by APC to vic 477602 by last light 13 Feb 67.
    - (c) 5 RAR cordons village 4659 during ni 13/14 Feb 67 and begins search 14 Feb 67 together with an RF Coy.
  - (3) 6 RAR. One pl moved by air to APC loc 4659 14 Feb. APCs to patrol East of Nui Da Dang (4455) during 14 Feb 67.
  - (4) 1/83 US Arty. Remains base loc. At pri call to 5 RAR during op BEAUMARIS.
  - (5) A Btry 2/35 US Arty. Remains base loc. At pri call to 5 RAR during Op BEAUMARIS.
  - (6) Timings. Estimated operation will be completed 1600 hrs 14 Feb 67.

Mission. I Fd Regt RAA is to support 1 ATF operation

#### Execution.

- a. General Outline. 1 Fd Regt RAA remains in base loc.
  - (1) Grouping

In DS 5 RAR 103 Fd Bty RAA In DS 6 RAR 101 Fd Bty RAA 161 Fd Bty RNZA

- (2) Ammo allotment. No special restriction.
- b. 101 Fd Bty RAA. Remain base loc.
- c. 103 Fd Bty RAA. Remain base loc. Provide FO party to A Sqn 140900 hrs Feb to 141600 hrs Feb. (C/S 25)
- d. 161 Fd Bty RNZA. Remain base loc.

#### e. Det 131 Div Loc Bty.

- (1) Survey. Continue with task of establishing datum points WEST of TF base area on 13 Feb 67. (Separate orders). Survey to be established area DATDO in conjunction op BEAUMARIS (Separate orders).
- (2) Radar. Remain base loc.

#### f. Co-ord Instra

- (1) Safety. Area of operations is shown at Annex P.
- (2) Fire Plans. Issued separately.

#### Comd and Sig

- a. RHQ. Remains base loc
- b. Tac HQ. Remains base loc.
- c. Liaison. No Change.
- d. Radio. FO with pl of 6 RAR and APCs uses C/S 25.

ck

5.

Light Colonel

Lieutenant Colonel Commanding Officer

Annexes. Annex P. Area of Operations.

#### Distribution

101 Fd Bty RAA 103 Fd Bty RAA 161 Fd Bty RNZA 131 Div Loc Bty RAA HQ Bty 1 Fd Regt LAD Tac HQ Regtl CP 5 RAR 6 RAR A 3qn 3 Cav Regt HQ 1 ATF CO 2IC 1djt OM RMO IO RSO Sig Offr CA Offr 0 'omd's Diary

Annex P to 1 Fd Regt RAA 00 4/67 BEAUMARIS 12 Feb 67 Scale 1 : £0,000

CONFIDENTIAL

1 Fd Regt RAA NUI DAT

12 Feb 67

No 4/67 (BEAUMARIS)

aps: Vietnam 1: 25000 Sheets 6429/IV/NE 6429/I/NW

#### Situation

- a. En. See current Intrep.
- b. Friendly forces
  - (1) .1 ATF will cordon and search village vic 4659 on 13/14 Feb 67.
  - (2) 5 RAR
    - (a) Two companies mov to vic 438580 approx 131100H and patrol North of Nui Da Dang 4455 by day.
    - (b) Two companies mov by APC to vic 477602 by last light 13 Feb 67.
    - (c) 5 RAR cordons village 4659 during ni 13/14 Feb 67 and begins search 14 Feb 67 together with an RF Coy.
  - (3) 6 RAR. One pl moved by air to APC loc 4659 14 Feb. APCs to patrol East of Nui Da Dang (4455) during 14 Feb. 67.
  - (4) 1/83 US Arty. Remains base loc. At pri call to 5 RAR during op BEAUMARIS.
  - (5) A Btry 2/35 US Arty. Remains base loc. At pri call to 5 RAR during Op BEAUMARIS.
  - (6) Timings. Estimated operation will be completed 1600 hrs 14 Feb 67.

REAUMARIS. Mission. I Fd Regt RAA is to support 1 ATF-operation

#### Execution.

3.

- a. General Outline. 1 Fd Regt RAA remains in base loc.
  - (1) Grouping

In DS 5 RAR 103 Fd Bty RAA
In DS 6 RAR 101 Fd Bty RAA
In sp 1 ATF 161 Fd Bty RNZA

- (2) Ammo allotment. No special restriction.
- b. 101 Fd Bty RAA. Remain base loc.
- c. 103 Fd Bty RAA. Remain base loc. Provide FO party to A Sqn 140900 hrs Feb to 141600 hrs Feb. (C/S 25)
- d. 161 Fd Bty RNZA. Remain base loc.

-

# e. Det 131 Div Loc Bty.

- (1) Survey. Continue with task of establishing datum points WEST of TF base area on 13 Feb 67. (Separate orders). Survey to be established area DATDO in conjunction op BEAUMARIS (Separate orders).
- (2) Radar. Remain base loc.

#### f. Co-ord Instrs

- (1) Safety. Area of operations is shown at Annex P.
- (2) Fire Plans. Issued separately.

#### 5. Comd and Sig

- a. RHQ. Remains base loc
- b. Tac HQ. Remains base loc.
- c. Liaison. No Change.
- d. Radio. FO with pl of 6 RAR and APCs uses C/S 25.

ok

Lieutenant Colonel

Lieutenant Colonel Commanding Officer

Annexes. Annex P. Area of Operations.

#### Distribution

101 Fd Bty RAA 103 Fd Bty RAA 161 Fd Bty RNZA 131 Div Loc Bty RAA HQ Bty 1 Fd Regt LAD Tac HQ Regtl CP 5 RAR 6 RAR A Eqn 3 Cav Regt CO 2IC Mijt QM RMO IO RSO Sig Offr CA Offr LO 'omd's Diary

Annex P to 1 Fd Regt RAA 00 4/67 BEAUMARIS 12 Feb 67 Scale 1 : £0,000

#### CONFIDENTIAL

1 Fd Regt RAA NUI DAT

151400H Feb 67

00 No 5/67 (Op DALBY)

Maps : Vietnam 1 : 50000 Sheet 6430 II

1: 25000 Pictomap Supplement

#### 1. Situation

a. En. See current Intreps.

b. Friendly Forces. 6 RAR gp will search and destroy in the area NORTH of DAT DO YS 4960 to excl NUI DAT YS 4868. (Area of operations Annex P).

#### (1) Concept of Ops

- (a) First lt heliborne aslt into insecure LZs after LZ preparation by Arty and LFTs.
- (b) Search and destroy by Coys in area NORTH of 615 NORTHING and EAST of TL 52.
- (c) Search and destroy by A Sqn 3 Cav Regt WEST of TL 52 and NORTH of LONG TAN YS4865.
- (d) Extraction by hels, to be completed by last lt,
- (2) 6 RAR Mor Pl (-) est base plate posn vic YS 484 634.

#### (3) Timings

- (a) D Day 16 Feb 67
- (b) H Hr 160715H (Time first hel touches down on aslt LZ)

#### (c) Order of Flt In

B Coy LZ KING YS 513648
A Coy LZ QUEEN YS 501645
D Coy LZ JACK YS 485623
C Coy LZ QUEEN YS 501645

Fly in will be one coy at a time approx 10 - 15 mins between Coys.

- 2. Mission. 1 Fd Regt RAA is to support 1 ATF during Op DALBY.
- 3. Execution
  - a. General Outline. 1 Fd Regt RAA remains base loc.

#### (1) Grouping

In DS 6 RAR 101 Fd Bty RAA
In DS 5 RAR 103 Fd Bty RAA
In Sp 1 ATF 161 Fd Bty RNZA

(2) Ammo Allotment. No special restrictions.

#### b. 101 Fd Bty RAA

- (1) In DS 6 RAR.
- (2) Provide FO with A Sqn 3 Cav Regt (C/S 16)
- (3) Remain base loc.

#### c. 103 Fd Bty RAA

- (1) In DS 5 RAR
- (2) Remain base loc.

#### d. 161 Fd Bty RNZA

- (1) In sp 1 ATF
- (2) Remain base loc.
- (3) Provide one FO under command BC 101 Bty.
- e. Det 131 Div Loc Bty RAA. Remain base loc.

#### f. Co-ord Instrs

- (1) D Day 16 Feb 67
- (2) FOs
  - A Coy 6 RAR Lt B Harrison
  - B Coy 6 RAR Capt J Ryan
  - C Coy 6 RAR Lt J Raasch
  - D Coy 6 RAR Capt S Gower
  - A Sqn 3 Cav Regt Lt M Pearce (C/S 16)
- g. Safety. Area of ops Annex P
- h. Fire Plans. Fire Plan DALBY HAT Annex Q

#### 5. Comd and Sig

- a. RHQ. " Remains base loc.
- b. Tac HQ. Remains base loc
- c. BC 101 Bty airborne with CO 6 RAR in C and C ship during aslt. Rejoins 6 RAR Tac HQ on completion of fly-in.
- d. Radio. Freq for ac con 37.30.

e. Codes. 6 RAR additional Points of Origin:

160700H to 170700H

4963

Animal

5165

City

5067

Ocean

ACK

Lieutenant Colonel
Commanding Officer

Annexes P Area of Operations

Q Fire Plan DALBE HAT


#### Distribution

101 Fd Bty RAA (5)
103 Fd Bty RAA (2)
161 Fd Bty RNZ. (2)
Det 131 Div Loc Bty RAA
HQ Bty
1 Fd Regt LAD Tac HQ Regtl CP 6 RAR 1/83 US Arty HQ 1 ATF CO 2IC Adjt QM RMO IO RSO Sig Offr LO RSM (3) Comd's Diary File

# SEARCH AREAS - BORYS

ME 15: PICTOMAR SUPPLEMENT 1:25000

GRAEX PA IFOKET RAF OF O. SILT (DALBY) OF 15 FEE 61



ORIGINATOR....19......FIRE PLANDALBY.HAT...TASK IN SUPPORT..6BAB.H hr SHEET.....01......1 OPO 5/67

Ser Time		ime	Tgt No	Grid Ref & Ht or Description		Bty to Engage			Ammo	Rate	Remarks	Ammo	Exp	
_ Jer			18 0 110	GITA HET A	. no or rescription	101	103	3 161						
A	В	C	D		E	F	G	Н	J	K	L	M		
1	Н	+5	JM1946	50756480	15m	1	1	1		HE	S	a. 101-Superimp all serials	osed	
			* - */	5		1					b. 103-Superimposed. pri call to 5RAR for contacts on al		On	
2	+6	+10	JM1947	51 236 50 5	20m	1	1	1		"	"	for contacts serials	on a	11
												c. All timings	TOT	
3	+11	+15	лм1 948	51806430	25m	1	1	1		"	"			
4	+16	+20	ЈМ1 949	50406480	15m	1	1	1	-	"	"			
5	+21	+25	лм1 950	50406445	15m	1	1	1		"	"			
5	+26	+30	JM1951	50156430	15m	1	1	1		-	_"			

## CONFIDENTIAL

SPARET.

1 Fd Regt RAA NUI DAT 161700H Feb 67

OP 0 5/67 (Op RENMARK)

Maps: Vietnam Sheet 6429 I DAT DO Edition 1 AMS 1: 50,000
Vietnam Sheet 6429 IV VUNG TAU Edition 1 AMS 1: 50,000

#### 1. SIT

- a. En forces. Annex A.
- b. Friendly Forces.
  - (1) 5 RAR will conduct a search and destroy op in area centre of mass YS 4753.
  - (2) 6 RAR. Continues to patrol TAOR.
  - (3) A Sqn 3 Cav Regt. Ptls to EAST of 5 RAR AO.
  - (4) A B52 strike will be brought down on AO at 180600H Feb 67.
  - (5) Bty A 1/83 US Arty. In sp and at pri call to 5 RAR from 180600H.
  - (6) Timings. Op planned from 18 Feb to approx 24 Feb 67. Op ULMARRA starts when Op RENMARK ends.

### c. Atts and Dets .

- (1) Under comd from 180700H. One sec 5 RAR mors.
- (2) Remaining under comd. One FO 1/83 US Arty.
- 2. MSN. 1 Fd Regt RAA is to sp 1 ATF during Op RENMARK.
- 3. EXEC.
  - a. Gen Outline. 1 Fd Regt RAA (excl 103 Fd Bty RAA) remains base loc. 103 Fd Bty RAA remains in DS 5 RAR and is placed under comd 5 RAR for mov to gun area.
    - (1) Gp
    - 103 Fd Bty RAA remains in DS 5 RAR
    - 101 Fd Bty RAA remains in DS 6 RAR
    - 161 Fd Bty RNZA remains in sp 1 ATF

Under comd 1 Fd Regt RAA one sec 5 RAR mor pl.

(2) Ammo. 103 Bty RAA is restricted to current ASR.

# b. 101 Fd Bty RAA.

- (1) Gp. Remaining under comd. One FO 161 Bty RNZA.
- (2) Tasks. Remain base loc and in DS 6 RAR.

#### c. 103 Fd Bty RAA

- (1) Gp
  - (a) Remaining under comd:

One FO 161 Bty RNZA One FO 1/83 US Arty

- (b) Under comd and in loc 103 Bty (rear), one sec 5 RAR Mor Pl, from 180700H.
- (c) Under comd for mov to gun area. 1 Fd Regt Svy party, from 171700H.

#### (2) Tasks

- (a) Remain in DS 5 RAR
- (b) Under comd 5 RAR for mov from 180600H until in posn in gun area. (Guns to be towed by 22 ton trucks, NOT by Landrovers).
- (c) Provide one FO to A Sqn 3 Cav Regt (C/S 25)
- (d) Liaise A Sqn 3 Cav Regt for detailed protection Svy party during svy task morning D Day.

#### d. 161 Bty RNZA

- (1) Gp
  - (a) One FO remains under comd 103 Bty RAA.
  - (b) One FO remains under comd 101 Bty R.A.

#### (2) Tasks

- (a) Remain base loc
- (b) Remain in sp 1 ATF
- (c) Be prepared to provide radio relay station at DAT DO sub sector HQ at 477597 (C/S 37 on Regtl net).

#### e. Det 131 Div Loc Bty RA.

(1) Svy. Est BP in gun area by 181200H Feb. Svy party travel with gun gp 103 Bty. Return by air from FSB 181600H. Party limited to 15 pers and 900lb stores.

#### f. Mors

- (1) Gp. Under comd 103 Bty RAA (rear) for adm from 180700H.
- (2) Tasks.
  - (a) Est base plate posn 103 Bty (rear) at 180700H.
  - (b) Lst and maintain comms on Regt net. (C/S I 81)

#### g. Co-ord Instrs.

- (1) D Day. 18 Feb 67.
- (2) <u>Gun area</u>. 103 Bty gun area vic 479 564.
- (3) Protection. 5 RAR will provide one coy to protect 103 Bty gun area throughout op.
- (4) Safety.

- (a) AO. Annex P.
- (b) Crest clearances. While it is clearly the responsibility of the GFO/FDO to ensure that a particular target is not crested, (except in the case of obs such as tall trees which are not shown on the map and which must be reported by the FO), FOs should order HA in their initial orders whenever it appears likely that a target may be crested.
- (c) Dead Ground Trace. 103 Bty Dead Ground Trace, Annex Q.
- (5) Time to be ready. 103 Bty to be ready by 180730H.
- (6) Met. 103 Bty is to apply met in HA and LA at BC's discretion. Met will be provided from TF base area.

#### (7) Fire Plans

- (a) CB Fire Plan. To be issued.
- (b) DF Fire Plan. To be issued.

#### 4. ADM and LOG

- a. Ammo. 160 rds daily resup a.m. by CH-47, working on 103 Bty main freq MU 46.8. 103 Bty to be prepared to back load produce by CH-47 to Vung Tau without notice.
- b. Rats. 4 days to be taken initially.
- c. Resup. Daily demands to be submitted to 103 Bty rear. Mov by hel under arrangements hel in sp 5 RAR
- d. Tpt. 10 TCVs report 103 Bty not later than 17 500 hrs Feb.

#### 5. COMD and SIG

- a. RHQ. Remains base loc.
- b. Tac HQ. Remains base loc.
- c. Comd of base area. 103 Bty (rear) commanded by BSM 103 Bty.

#### d. Radio

- (1) Add to Regt Net. Sec Mor in loc 103 Bty (rear) C/S I 81.
- (2) Should comms fail bet 103 Bty (fwd) and 1 Fd Regt RAA base area, a rel sta will be est at DAT DO sub-sec HQ at 477597.
- (3) Svy Party. Joins 103 Bty net (main freq) (C/S 92)
- (4) Hel lift of svy party by UH-IB at 181600H will be on 103 Bty main freq (MU 46.8).
- (5) CH-47 daily ammo resup on 103 Bty main freq.

#### e. Codes

- (1) A new issue of codes comes into effect at 010800H Mar 67. Sig 0 is to liaise with Sig 0 5 RAR to co-ord distr.
- (2) 5 RAR nicknames, effective from 180600H until cancelled by a future issue:

#### NICKNAME

SQUARE DANCE
HASTY DEAL
SLOW DRAW
DUNKIRK SANDS
ROOT BEER
STICKY WICKET
FREE KICK
SCRUM BALL

TIMBER LINE

#### MEANING

Move/Moving
Clearing Ptls out
Clearing Ptls in
Stand to
Stand down
Ambush
Lift Ambush
Harbour
Cordon in Position

Lieutenant Colonel
Commanding Officer

#### ACK

#### Annexes

- A. En Forces
- P. A0
- Q. 103 Bty Dead Ground Trace.
- R. DF Fire Plan.

Distribution 101 Fd Bty RAA	No	of Copies
103 Fd Bty RAA 161 Fd Bty RNZA		8
Det 131 Div Loc Mor Pl 5 RAR	Bty RAA	1
HQ Bty 1 Fd Regt LAD		1
Tac HQ CP 5 RAR		1 1 1 2 3 1 1
1/83 US Arty HQ 1 ATF		2
CO		1
Adjt QM		1
RMO IO		į
RSO Sig Offr		1
LO		1
Comd's Diary Spare		1 1 3 3

#### EN FORCES

- 1. a. The LONG HAI penisular is astride the border between the two GVN districts of LONG DI N and DAT DO. This location coupled with the ruggedness of the terrain make it an ideal VC base, In addition the area dominates and provides easy access to the surronding rice, fish and salt producing areas.
  - b. The penisular is the centre of the VC district of LONG DAT.
- 2. a. VC Forces normally operating in the area are:

D445 Bn C25 Coy Tam Phuoc Guerilla Platoon Hoi My Geurilla Platoon Phuoc Hai Geurilla Platoon

- b. Latest reports indicate that D 445 Bn is now operating as independent companies and if this is so one company will certainly be based in the LONG HAI penisular area.
- c. The C25 Coy is permanently located in the LONG HAI mountains and recent activity suggestes that it is probably based in square YS 4752. It could however be based along the other main water source in the area in vicinity YS4655.
- 3. The heavily populated area astride Route 44 to the East of the penisular has been subjected to more VC activity in the last three months than any other area in PHUOC TUY Province. This commenced on 21 Nov 66 with a series of attacks and mortarings of the RF/FF outposts in the area by D445 Bn supported by C25 Coy. This series of attacks terminated on 17 Dec 66 but since that date there have been continual reports of VC activities in the area, and during the TET standown period there were several contacts and sightings of up to two VC coys. All these activities are believed to have originated from VC bases on the Eastern side of the LONG HAI mountain range.
  - b. Other significant VC activity in the area was on the night of 27 Jan 67 when a US Navy small craft received MG fire from YS480500 and YS472482. On the same night a large signalling fire was observed at YS480500 and VC signalling lights were seen between this location and LANG PHUOC HAI at YS 5153. These activities are thought to be part of a securing operation while a VC infiltration operation was conducted over the beach further to the East. It is possible however that the VC forces involved were providing early warning to other VC located in the LONG HAI area.
- 4. No FWMAF have operated in the mountains since June 66 and at that time local VC forces inflicted moderate casualties on friendly forces by sniping and booby trapping while suffering only light casualties themselves. During this operation the VC withdrew from their main bases near the creeks to caves in the mountains where they are believed to have hidden until the end of the operation. This action is likely to be repeated during any similar operation by ARVN or LWMAF. The numerous caves in the are are similar to those encountered in the NUI THI VAI Mountains.
  - 5. No mainforce VC are thought to be in the area and contact with main force is unlikely.

TO I FLUKeget RAA

OPO 5/37

OP FEMMARK XA YUNG TAU 6429 I XUYEN MOC 6430 III

Copy No. 3/ 1 Fd Regt RAA NUI DAT

221800 Feb 67

## Op 0 6/67 (Op KIRRIBILLI)

#### 1. Sit

- a. En Forces. Annex A.
- b. Friendly Forces
  - (1) 1 ATF will deny the en access to the base area.
  - (2) Concept of Ops
    - (a) Three coy sized rtls out to fd arty range.
    - (b) Armd ptls by day.
    - (c) Max ni aerial surv.
  - (3) 5 RAR. 5 RAR will provide:
    - (a) One coy ptl in area 3 (Annex P)
    - (b) 1 ATF res.
  - (4) 6 RAR. 6 RAR will provide:
    - (a) One coy ptl in area 1 (Annex P)
    - (b) One coy ptl in area 2 (Annex P)
  - (5) A Sqn 3 Cav Regt. Armd ptls, with inf and mors of 5 RAR under comd, will ptl areas 4, 5, and 6 (Annex P).
  - (6) A Btry 1/83 Arty will remain in sp 1 ATF
  - (7) A Btry 2/35 Arty has reverted to op con II F FORCE V.
  - (8) Air
    - (a) 161 Recce Flt will provide max ni surv by fixed ing ac.
    - (b) RAAF will provide two UH-IB on Kangaroo LZ.
    - (c) USAF will provide ni surv.
    - (d) TRAA will provide It fire team on Kangaroo LZ.
  - (9) Timings
    - (a) Ptls in areas 1 and 2 by 231200H.
    - (b) Ptls in area 3 by 231900H.
  - (10) Duration. Ptls in areas 1, 2 and 3 will remain in each area for five days.
- c. Atts and Dets
  - (1) One FO of 1/83 Arty remains under comd.
  - (2) Ses 81mm mors released from under comd.

- 2. Msn. 1 Fd Regt RAA is to support 1 ATF during Op KIRRIBILLI
- 3. Exec.
  - a. Gen outline. 1 Fd Regt RAA remains base loc.
    - (1) Grouping
    - 101 Fd Bty RAA remains in DS 6 RAR
    - 103 Fd Bty RAA remains in DS 5 RAR
    - 161 Fd Bty RNZA remains in sp 1 ATF but at pri call to A Sqn 3 Cav Regt from 0600H to 2000H daily.
    - (2) Ammo: ASR is not to be exceeded unless there is a tactical requirement. Expenditure for trg is to be kept to a reasonable minimum.

## b. 101 Fd Bty RAA

- (1) Gp. Remaining under comd. One FO 161 Bty RNZA.
- (2) Tasks.
  - (a) Remain base loc.
  - (b) Remain in DS 6 RAR
- c. 103 Fd Bty RAA
  - (1) Gp. Remaining unle\_ cond: One FO 161 Bty RNZA One FO 1/83 US Arty.
  - (2) Tasks.
    - (a) Remain base loc.
    - (b) Remain in DS 5 RAR.
- d. 161 Fd Bty RNZA. Tasks:
  - (1) Provide one FO under comd 101 Fd Bty RAA.
  - (2) Provide one FO under comd 103 Fd Bty RAA.
  - (3) Provide one FO under comd A Sqn 3 Cav Regt (C/S 33)
  - (4) Remain in sp 1 ATF but at pri call to A Sqn 3 Cav Regt from 0600H to 2300H daily from 23 Feb 67.
- e. Det 131 Div Loc Bty RAA. No change.
- f. Co-ord Instra

1.

- (1) FOs An FO (C/S 33) will be with A Sqn 3 Cav Regt, otherwise no change.
- (2) Area of ops. Annex P.
- (3) Fire Plans. Issued separately.

Admin and Log. No change.

5.......

## 5. Comd and Sig

- a. RHQ. Remains base loc.
- b. Tac HQ. Remains base loc.
- c. <u>Liaison</u>. No change.

ACK

Lieutenant Colonel Commanding Officer

## Annexes

A. En Forces P. Ptl Areas.

Distribution	No of Copies	Copy No
101 Fd Bty RAA 103 Fd Bty RAA 161 Fd Bty RNZA Det 131 Div Loc Bty HQ Bty 1 Fd Regt LAD Tac HQ CP 5 RAR 6 RAR A Sqn 3 Cav Regt 83 US Arty 1 1 ATF CO 2IC Adjt QM RMO IO RSO Sig Offr LO RSM Comd's Diary File	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	1-2 3-4 5-6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16-18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 21 23 21 23 23 24 25 21 23 24 25 26 27 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28
Spare	2	33-34

Annex A to 1 Fd Regt RAA OP 6/67 (OP KIRRIBILLI) dated 221800H Feb 67

#### EN FORCES

- Regt would move to the EAST probably to the area YS 5685. The purpose of this move was allegedly to join up with the VC 5th Div. but could be a purely defensive move to escape probable future US/FWMAF operations in the HAT DICH area.
- There was some confirmation of this move on the night 20/21 Feb 67 when a light aircraft twice observed a small number of lights SOUTH of BINH GIA (YS-4977). Closer observation of these lights with a Starlight Scope revealed approximately 250 lights on each occasion. The lights appeared to be moving to the east and were quickly extinguished when lightly engaed by heavy artillery.
- 3. A recent rallier, the political officer from THUA TICH (YS 6081) area, revealed that on 14 Feb 67 the comd of the VC 5th Div stayed overnight in the vicinity of his village. This is an unusual occurrence, but another reliable agent stated that an element of the 5th Div HQ has been in the vicinity YS 6286 since.
- 4. 275 Regt is known to have been in the same general area EAST of THUA TICH since some time after its unsuccessful ambush on Highway 1 on 2 Dec 60 when it suffered more than 100 KIA. The Regiment should have recovered from this incident by now and indications are that it could now be ready to resume operations.
- In his note book captured on 19 Oct 66 the Chief of Staff 174 Regt recorded the contents of a recently received message from 5th VC Div that future plans included combined operations between 274 Regt and 275 Regt. The fact that 274 Regt now appears to have moved to a location close to 275 Regt and elements of Headquarters 5th VC Div is the first indication that these forces may be preparing for a combined operation. A combined operation at this stage would probably be restricted to two separate but coordinated actions, such as an attack in one location followed by the ambush of a relief force. An operation of this sort specifically mentioned in the note book captured on 19 Oct 66. The targets were not named but the area given was Route 2 NORTH of the 1 ATF base camp and this must be considered a likely area. A VC operation against the 1 ATF base camp is possible whenever two battalions and supporting units are away on operations but is unlikely whenever the major part of the base camp is occupied.

#### SECRET

Annex A to 1 Fd Regt RAA OP 6/67 (OP KIRRIBILLI) dated 221800H Feb 67

#### EN FORCES

- A usually reliable agent reported that on 20 Feb 67 the 274 legt would move to the EAST probably to the area Y3 5685. The purpose of this move was allegedly to join up with the VC 5th Div. but could be a purely defensive move to escape probable future US/TWMiF operations in the HAT DICH area.
- 2. There was some confirmation of this move on the night 20/21 Feb 67 when a light aircraft twice observed a small number of lights SOUTH of BINH GIA (YS-4977). Closer observation of these lights with a Starlight Scope revealed approximately 250 lights on each occasion. The lights appeared to be moving to the east and were quickly extinguished when lightly engaed by heavy artillery.
- 3. A recent rallier, (YS 6081) area, revealed that on 14 Feb 67 the comd of the VC 5th Div stayed overnight in the vicinity of his village. This is an unusual occurrence, but another reliable agent stated that an element of the 5th Div HQ has been in the vicinity YS 6286 since.
- 4. 2/12 Regt is known to have been in the same general area MAST of THUA TIGH since some time after its unsuccessful ambush on Highway 1 on 2 Dec 60 when it suffered more than 100 KIA. The Regiment should have recovered from this incident by now and indications are that it could now be ready to resume operations.
- In his note book captured on 19 Oct 66 the Chief of Staff .74 Regt recorded the contents of a recently received message from 5th VC Div that future plans included combined operations between 274 Regt and 275 Regt. The fact that 274 Regt now appears to have moved to a location close to 275 Regt and elements of Headquarters 5th VC Div is the first indication that these forces may be preparing for a combined operation. A combined operation at this stage would probably be restricted to two separate but coordinated actions, such as an attack in one location followed by the ambush of a relief force. An operation of this sort specifically mentioned in the note book captured on 19 Oct 66. The targets were not named but the area given was Route 2 NORTH of the 1 ATF base camp and this must be considered a likely area. A VC operation against the 1 ATF base camp is possible whenever two battalions and supporting units are away on operations but is unlikely whenever the major part of the base camp is occupied.

PATROL AREAS.

MAP VIETNAM 1:50,000


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
XYEN MO: 6430 II

OP KIRRIBILLI ANNEX P 17d Regt RAA OP 0 6/67 of 121800H



4 2 7 7





SHORE

## AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

COPY No. 9

1 FD REGT RAA

HQ 1 ATF
NUI DAT

R670-1-2

6 Jan 67

Distribution: See below

## HANDLING AND PROCESSING OF PW WITHIN 1 ATF

#### INTRODUCTION

- 1. Australia is a party to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug 49. Ther are four separate Conventions.
- a. No 1 for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded, and sick of armed forces in the field.
  - b. No 2 for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea.
  - c. No 3 provides for the treatment of prisoners of war (PW).
  - d. No 4 provides for the protection of civilians.
- 3. Australia considers the armed conflict presently existing in Vietnam to be international in character. Accordingly, all articles of all four Geneva Conventions are applicable.

#### AIM

4. The aim of this instruction is to prescribe the methods of handling and processing of FW and other detainess within 1 ATF.

#### PW AND OTHER DETAINEES

#### Status

- 5. Categories. The responsibility for determining status of persons captured by Australain Forces rests with Australia. Persons captured are to be classified as belonging to one of the following categories.
  - a. PW.
  - b. Suspects.
  - c. Returnees.
  - d. Civil defendants.
  - e. Doubtful cases.

#### Definitions

- 6. Classification is to be determined by the following definitions:
  - Geneva Convention for the treatment of PW reproduced at Annex A. In addition, the following persons in Vietnam shall be extended the protection of the Geneva Convention for the treatment of PW.
    - (1) Persons who are captured while actually engaging in combat or a belligerent act other than an act of terrorism, sabotage, or spying against the Republic of Vietnam or US and other Free World Military Assistance Forces.

../(2) Any

#### GHOREST

- (2) Any captive member of the North Vietnamese Armed Forces or of the main force Viet Cong, wheher captured in combat or not, except a terrorist, saboteur, or spy.
- (3) Persons detained as suspects who later are determined to fall into categories (1) or (2) above.
- b. Suspects. Persons who when detained were not openly engaged in combat and whose status may be either that of an innocent civilian, returnee, PW or civil defendant.
  - c. Returnce (Chieu Hoi). Persons who voluntarily return to the Government of Vietnam control after having actively supported the Viet Cong in some form of political or military activities.
  - d. Civil Defendants. Persons who are suspected of being spies, saboteurs, terrorists or criminals and who do not qualify as TW as defined in sub paragraph 5. a. above.
  - e. Doubtful Cases. Persons who have committed a belligerent act and whose entitlement to status as a PW is in doubt.

#### Treatment of PW

- 7. General. On capture, all PW are to be given humane treatment. No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercien may be inflicted. PW may not be threatened, insulted or exposed to any unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind. Wounded and sick PW are to be collected and cared for,
- 8. Conditions. The principle governing the treatment of PW is that their conditons should be no worse than those provided for our own troops. This includes:
  - a. Transportation.
  - b. Medical.
  - c. Accommodation.
  - d. Hygiene.
  - e. Rations.
- 9. Personal Equipment and Possessions. All arms, dangerous articles, military equipment and military documents are to be taken form PW on capture. PW are to be permitted to retain:
  - a. All other articles of personal use.
  - b. Metal helmets and similar items issued for personal protection.
  - c. Clothing and articles used for feeding.
  - d. Identity documents.
  - e. Badges of rank, decorations and any items having a personal or sentimental value.
  - f. Money unless it is removed on the orders of an officer, in which case an official receipt is to be given.
- 10. Separation. Known PW are to be kept separate from suspects and females are to be segregated from males.

../11. Chain

- 11. Chain of Evacuation. The chain of evacuation is:
  - a. PW. Unit/1 ATF collection point, Nui Dat/RVN PW compound, Long Binh.
  - b. Suspects and Doubtful Cases. Unit to 1 ATF collection point, Nui Dat. Dependent of the finding of the 1 ATF tribunal, evacuation is then to be made to either the RVN PW compound, Long Binh or the RVN Sector HQ, Baria.

#### c. Others.

- (1) Where the number of detainees is less than six Unit/1 ATF collection point, Nui Dat/RVN District HQ, Hoa Long.or RVN Sector HQ, Baria.
- (2) Where the number of detainees is six or more Unit/RVN Sector HQ, Baria.
- 12. Period of Detention. Normally a PW or other detainee is to be held at the 1 ATF collection point for a period of less than 24 hours. Where a longer period of detention is required for interrogation, it is not to exceed 48 hours.

## 13. Responsibilities.

- a. Unit. The capturing unit is to tag each person detained with a Captive Card (MACV Form 340) Annex B. The unit is responsible for the escorting and movement of FN and other detainees to the 1 ATF collection point. When directed by G (Ops), HQ 1 ATF, the unit is to move and escort large groups of civil defendants or returnees direct to the RVN authorities, Baria.
- b. HQ 1 ATF. HQ 1 ATF is responsible for the:
  - (1) Movement, escorting, control and supervision of all PW until delivered to the RVN PW Compound, Long Binh.
  - (2) Movement, escorting, control and supervision of other detainess until delivered to the RVN authorities, Baria,
  - c. HO'AFV. HQ AFV is responsible:
    - (1) For all PW once delivered to the RVN PW compound, Long Binh.
    - (2) To advise 1 ATF of any change of status of PW delivered to Long Binh.
    - (3) To maintain a duplicate PW list.
    - (4) To make the necessary financial arrangements to defray RVN expenses in maintaining PW and other detainees at Hoa Long or Baria on behalf of 1 ATF.

## Procedures Within HQ 1 ATF

- 14. Tactical Operations Centre. When advice of PW or other detaineds is received, the duty officer is to:
  - . Inform G (Int).

#### SECRET

- b. Arrange for the evacuation from the unit as show in paragraph 11.
  - c. Inform Det Comd, 1 Div Pro Coy and advise point at which provest are to accept PW, eg, 1 ATF collection point, Kangaroo LZ, etc.
  - d. Inform OC Det 1 Div Int Unit and advise point at which interrogation is to be conducted - viz, 1 ATF collection point or RVN Sector HQ, Baria.
- 15. HQ Coy. HQ Coy is to provide rations and additional guards as required by Det 1 Div Pro Coy.

## Det 1 Div Pro Coy

The duties and responsibilities of Det 1 Div Pro Coy are listed in Annex C.

#### Det 1 Div Int Unit

- Det 1 Div Int Unit is responsible for:
  - The interrogation of all detainees. a.s
  - b. Classifying all detainees in the catagories defined in paragraph 5.
  - c. Referring cases to the 1 ATF tribunal. Only in cases where a person has committed a belligerent act and the status of the person is doubtful will the case be referred to the 1 ATF tribunal.
  - The compilation and despatch to 11 FFV of the Preliminary Interrogation Report.

#### 1 ATF Tribunal

- Composition. The 1 ATF tribunal is to consist of: 18.

  - DAAG, HQ 1 ATF. OC 1 ATF CA Section. b.
  - DADLS, HQ 1 ATF.
- 19. Procedures. The tribunal is to make such procedural rules. consistent with the Geneva Conventions, as are deemed necessary for a full and fair enquiry into the matters before them.
- 20. Function. The tribunal is to apply the provisions of the Geneva Convention in determining the legal status of each person before them with special attention to:
  - a. Articles 4, 5 and 7 of the Geneva Convention for the treatment of PW.
  - Articles 4, 5 and 8 of the Geneva Convention for the protection of civilians.
- 21. Recording. Every decision is to be:
  - Recorded serially. a.
  - Supported by a brief written statement if PW status is not granted.
  - Submitted in duplicate to HQ 1 ATF for concurrence or non-concurrence by the Comd 1 ATF.

## CONCLUSION

This instruction is to be effective from date of receipt. 22.

> 1030une (0. D. Jackson) Brig Comd

A. Definition of PW by the Geneva Convention.
B. Captive Card.
C. Duties and responsibilities - Det 1 Div Pro Coy. Annexes: A.

## Distribution:

List B

Copy to:

HQ AFV


ANNEX A TO HQ 1 ATF R670/1/2 DATED 6 JAH 67

## DEFINITION OF PW BY THE GENEVA CONVENTION

- 1. Article 4 of the Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of PW states:
  - "a. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention are persons belonging to one of the following categories, who have fallen into the power of the enemy.
    - (1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.
- (2) Members of the militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those rganized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfil the following conditions.
  - (a) That of being commanded by a person responsible for his sulordinates.
  - (b) That of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance.
  - (c) That of carrying arms openly.
    - (d) That of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.
    - (3) Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power.
    - (4) Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof, such as civil members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, members of labour units or of services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces. provided that they have received authorization from the armed forces which they accompany, who shall provide them for that prupose with an identity card similar to the annexed model.
    - (5) Members of crews, including masters, pilots and apprentices of the merchant marine and the crews of civil aircraft of the parties of conflict, who do not benefit by more favourable treatment under any other provisions of international law.
    - (6) Irhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war.
    - b. The following shall likewise be treated as prisoners of war under the present Convention.

- (1) Persons belonging, or having belonged, to the armed forces of the occupied country, if the occuping power considers it necessary by reason of suballegiance to intern them, even though it has originally liberated them while hostilities were going on outside the territory it occupies, in particular where such persons have made an unsuccessful attempt to rejoin the armed forces to which they belong andwhich are engaged in combat, or where they fail to comply with a summons made to them with a view to internment.
  - (2) The persons belonging to one of the categories enumerated in the present Article, who have been received by neutral or non-belligerent Powers on their territory and whom these Powers are required to intern under international law, without prejudice to any more favourable treatment which these Powers may choose to give and with the exception of Articles 8, 10, 15, 30, fifth paragraph, 58 67, 95, 126 and, where diplomatic relations exist between the Parties to the conflict and the neutral or non-belligerent Power concerned, those articles concerning the Protecting Power. Where such diplomatic relations exist, the Parties to a conflict on whom these persons depend shall be allowed to perform towards them the functions of a protecting Power as provided in the present Convention, without prejudice to the functions which these Parties normally exercise in conformity with diplomatic and consular usage and treaties.
- c. This Article shall in no way affect the status of medical personnel and chaplains as provided for in Article 33 of the present Convention."

FHIEU TU BINH PHIEU SO HO VA TEN CAP BAC HOAC CHUC VU DOM AI CHUYEN MON TUOI SINH QUAN NGAY GIO BI BAT DIA DIEM BI BAT TRUONG HOT BI BAT VU KHI TAI LIEU DON VI BAT



## DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES - DET 1 DIV FRO COY

- 1. Det 1 Div Pro Coy is responsible:
  - a. To receive and escort PW and other detainees at the point nominated by the 1 ATF Tactical Operations Centre.
  - b. For the control and supervision of all PW received from 1 ATF units until they are delivered to the RVN PW compound, Long Binh.
  - c. To compile Detainee Report Forms in triplicate Appendix 1.
  - d. Maintain PW Lists.
  - e. Provide accommodation facilities and rations for PW and other detainees.
  - f. To guard and escort FW and other detainess received from 1 ATF units until handed over to RVN authorities. Where necessary, additional guards are to be obtained from HQ Coy, HQ 1 ATF.
  - g. To obtain any transport required for the movement of PW and other detainees from the 1 ATF Tactical Operations Centre.
  - h. To ensure each PW transferred to the RVN PW compound at Long Binh is accompanied by:
    - (1) A Captive Card (MACV Form 340), fully compiled on the English side.
    - (2) Three Detainee Report Forms (MACV Form 343), fully compiled except for line 12, and signed by the OC Det 1 Div Int Unit.
    - (3) One copy of the Preliminary Interrogation Report prepared by Det 1 Div Int Unit.
    - (4) A cortificate from the GC Det 1 Div Int Unit that the person is a PW and entitled to PW status.
  - j. To obtain a signed receipt for all PW delivered to the RVN PW compound at Long Binh.

Appendix: 1. Detainee Report Form.

FORM	
REPORT	Action a cantilland
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#### DETAINEE'S INDEX FINGERPRINTS

- 1. A REGULAR STAMP PAD MAY BE USED TO INK INDEX RINGERS.
- 2. LAY LEFT EDGE OF INKED FINGER ON LEFT SIDE OF " APPROPRIATE BLOCK BELOW.
- 3. ROLL FINGER TO ITS RIGTH EDGE AND WITHDRAW FROM CARD.

RIGHT INDEX FINGER

1 Fd Regt RAA E/

31 Dec 66

HQ 1 ATF (Attn G3)

#### ARTILLERY STATISTICS

- 1. The following information was requested for Commander's report.
- 2. Total number of rounds fired by 1 ATF Artillery, including reinforcing Artillery, from 6 Jun 66 to 30 Dec 66: 63,743. Ammunition break-up was:

105mm 103 Fd Bty RAA 161 Fd Bty RNZA 101 Fd Bty RAA 105 Fd Bty RAA	17,003 13,913 10,262 8,567
155mm A Btry 2/35 US Arty	12,683
175mm A Btry 1/83 US Arty	329
8 in A btry 1/83 US Arty	986

Total number of missions fired from 6 Jun 66 to 30 Dec 66: 6075

Type of missions were:

1 Fd Regt RAA (including A Btry 2/35 US Arty up to 12 Dec 66)	H & I 4880	Destruction 507	Others 268
1/83 US Arty (including A Btry 2/35 US Arty from 12 Dec 66	339	18	63
	5219	525	331

la Ilmus Caft

Lieutenant Colonel Commanding Officer

## Copy to ...

101 Fd Bty RAA
103 Fd Bty RAA
161 Fd Bty RNZA
TAC HQ
CP
LO
RSM
Commander's Diary
Spare

## MESSAGE FORM

Precedence Action Precedence Info Date/Time Gp
ROUTINE 31 0 20 Z

From: 1 Fd Regt RAA

To: List C

Security Classification
UNCLAS
Originators Number
G 33

Commanding Officer's Minutes . All papers of file RMCC of 1965 and 1966 are cancelled and are to be destroyed

Drafters   KARAS	Name Office Adjt	Tel No
Releasing	Officer's Sig	& Rank
a	1600	Capt

#### RESTRICTED

1 Fd Regt RAA NUI DAT Feb 67

AHQ (DRA)

#### OPERATIONAL REPORT NUMBER SIX JANUARY 1967

Map: VIETNAM 1:50,000 series

#### General

This report covers the period 1-31 Jan 67. Reports have not been submitted for the period 1 Nov 66 - 31 Dec 66.

#### Operations

- 2. WOLLONGONG. This operation was designed to confirm 1ATF domination of the TAOR. Both Battalions, A Sqn 3 Cav Regt and the Task Force Artillery deployed at various times in support of a series of company size patrols. The operation commenced 11 Jan 67 and was suspended on 28 Jan 67. Results: 1 VCKIA (confirmed) 2 VCKIA (possible).
- 3. SEYMOUR. This operation arose out of Operation WOLLONGONG. It commenced 28 Jan 67 and terminated 31 Jan 67 and was a search and destroy operation centering on YS 3869 mounted as a reaction to heavy VC contact encountered by one company of 5RAR. The following troops were deployed: one company 5RAR, three comapanies and battalion HQ 6RAR, A Sqn 3 Cav Regt and Task Force Artillery. 101 Fd Bty RAA deployed to support this operation. Results 2 VC KIA, 3 VC WIA.
- DUCK II. This began 27 Dec 66 and terminated 5 Jan 67. 101 Fd Bty RAA deployed in support of 6RAR for this operation. Briefly DUCK II involved 1ATF in securing Highway 15 between PHU MY (YS2574) and BARIA (YS3860) for the move of the newly arrived 199 Light Infantry Brigade (US) from VUNG TAU (YS2744) to BEAR CAT (YS1699).
- of HOA LONG (YS4264) on 17, 18 and 19 Jan 67. The various phases involved 5RAR, 6RAR, A Sqn 3 Cav Regt and Task Force Artillery. In phase two 101 Fd Bty was deployed in the Infantry role. Result: 11 detainees.
- 6. CALOUNDRA. On 10 Jan 67 5RAR, elements A Sqn 3 Cav Regt and Task Force Artillery completed a cordon and search of BINH BA (YS4574) Result: 14 detainees.

## Techniques/Policy Introduced

- 7. The following policy on Correction of the Moment and Prediction has been adopted within the Regiment.
- (a) Met Telegrams are produced daily as follows:

0800 hrs for period 0900 - 1500 hrs. 1400 hrs for period 1500 - 2100 hrs 2000 hrs for period 2100 - 0300 hrs 0200 hrs for period 0300 - 0900 hrs.

- All targets are predicted before firing according to appropriate technical procedures, save that impromptu HA targets need not be predicted unless specifically ordered.
  - a. C of M graphs are prepared for charges2,3,4,5,6 and 7 (-) in LA: HA graphs are only prepared when specifically ordered.
  - b. DF(SOS) targets are always kept up to date for met and are issued on gun programmes.
  - c. DF targets are not kept up to date unless ordered as "special"
  - d. Passage of Met Telegrams is by.

(1) Line

(2) R5223, or

(3) Regimental Net

#### Ammunition

- 9. Attached as Annex A are extracts giving general information on the CARTRIDGE 105mm ANTI PERSONNEL XM546 with fuze MT563 E1. The extracts were prepared by Captain I WILLS ATO HQ AF; from TMT-1300-203 change 13, the US manual for the anti-personnel round.
- 10. Very limited quantities of this ammunition are now available. The Regiment presently has an allocation of thirty rounds per month.

#### Ammunition Scalings

- 11. The following scaling of 105 mm ammunition has been adopted.
- 12. The Basic load of ammunition for the Regiment is that maximum amount of ammunition which is to be held in the Regimental area. Battery basic loads are 1/3 the Regiment basic load.
- 13. The basic load in RPG is as follows:

HE M5;	345	FUZES		
Smk WP	25	CVT	-	50
Smk White	10	MTSQ	-	50
Illum	10	CENT S		500
Coloured Smk	10			
	400			

The basic load should not fall below 300 rpg at any time in the base area.

#### Ammunition Expenditure

Ammunition expenditure (all types) for the period was as follows:

101 Fd Bty RAA \ - 2244

103 Fd Bty RAA - 2368

161 Fd Bty RNZA - 2403

- 16. Of the above figures only 486 rounds were used for H&I fire. The majority of the H&I targets reported during the month were outside 105mm gun range and so were undertaken by 1/83 Artillery. Additionally, the emphasis on close TAOR patrolling limited H&I fire from our guns.
- 17. Cumulative totals for ammunition expenditure (all types) now

101 Fd Bty RAA - 12,959

103 Fd Bty RAA - 19,666

161 Fd Bty RNZA - 41,585 (includes BIEN HOA period)

#### Policy Directives

- 18. Attached as Annex B is an instruction dealing with Fire Support to the Task Force, issued by CO 1 Fd Regt as Task Force A tillery Commander.
- At Annex C may be found the minutes of a 'G' Staff Conference on Jan 67 in the Regiment.

## mraining .

- 20. Four three hour courses on CH47 (CHINOOK) employment, loading techniques and safety were held in Mid-January. Each sub-unit (HQ Bty, Det 131 Div Loc Bty and LAD were combined) provided up to twenty five students. Instruction was given by members of the 147th Aviation Company (US).
- 21. Although all Batteries were fairly heavily committed to operations during January a number of informal training sessions were held within each Battery. Such courses covered.

Layer training
Signals training
Command Post traing
Use of the starlight scope
Refresher training on the M60, and
Course shooting

#### Personnel

22. Ten persons arrived in January to join the Regiment. They were:

Lt M L GALLAGHER - Sec Comd 103 Fd Bty WO2 R HARDMAN - BSM HQ Bty and eight gunners.

23. During the same period six members returned to AUSTRALIA from the Regiment. These were:

WO2 R L BILSBOROUGH WO2 B J TAYLOR WO2 D C NOLAN, and three junior NCOs

#### Medical

24. The Monthly Sick Report may be found at Annex D. The following comments on the report are offered by the RMO:

Hospital Admissions: At twenty three the number is not exceedingly large as a number of these were for elective operations e.g. circumcisions etc.

Injuries: These were frequent but the majority were of a minor nature. There was an increase due to the festivities over Christmas and New Year.

Skin Diseases: Reasonable at present, as the figures include some chronic cases.

VenericalDisease: The figures are the worst for any month since arrival in-country. The increase is probably due to increased opportunities to contact the disease provided by increased leave and swimming parties over the Christmas and New Year period.

Other Diseases: There was no remarkable change in incidence.

#### Visitors

- 25. Three representatives of the Defend Australia Committee visited 1ATF on the 9/10 Jan. The three, Messrs MOUNT, BROWNING and HORWOOD visited the Regiment and Mr BROWNING remained overnight with the Regiment.
- 26. Lt Col R J GARDNER Commanding Officer 4 Fd Regt RAA visited the Regiment 18-21 Jan.

#### Civic Action

- Eight MEDCAPS were held in BINH GIA (YS4977) during the month. Our RMO in each case attended for one half day while two medical assistants attended each time for the complete day.
- Some progress was made in the construction of four perimeter bunkers but the shortage of sandbags and tin limited progress.
- 29. A storage shed has been constructed in the village to hold supplies etc prior to distribution. During the month 2000 lbs of food were distributed. Holdings of clothing and toys were retained so that a special showing could be made during TET.
- The Regiment civic action team in the village has developed a strong "after hours" sick parade and are called upon in great faith by the villagers on the least pretext.
- 31. Unfortunately, work on the early stages of the dispensary has suffered because of a lack of materials. Presently work is held up by lack of form work for the concrete floor but when this becomes available progress should be reasonable.
- Final plans for the dispensary call for three tropical huts in a "H" configuration. The first stage will be the central hut and this will initially cater for the MEDCAPS. Later stages will allow for two wards, dental surgery and storage rooms.
- 33. Work on the school buildings has been brought to a halt by lack of cement with which to fabricate the necessary building blocks. It is not known when further supplies will become available.

#### Det 131 Div Loc Bty

The Dotachment's Operational Report is attached\_Annex E . 34.

#### Annexures

- The following annexures are attached 35.
  - Cartridge Anti Personnel XM546 b.
  - 1 ATF Fire Support instruction Minutes of "G" Staff Conference-1 Fd Regt RAA C.
  - d.
  - Sick report for Jan 67 Operational report of Det 131 Div Loc Bty RAA for Jan 67

Lieutenant Colonel Commanding Officer

## EXTARCT FROM TMT-1300-203 CHANGE NO 13 CARTRIDGE. 105 MILIMETER: APERS-T. XM546.W/FUZE. MT. XM563E1

#### General

1. This cartridge (fig 36.1) is designed for antipersonnel use in 105mm howitzer cannon M2A2, M103. The complete round consists basically of an M14 series cartridge case containing propelling charge XM121 and percussion primer M90; mechanical time fuse XM563E1; and a projectile containing a base charge, a spotting charge, a tracer, and a payload of 8,000 steel wire fragments (flechettes).

#### Description

- 2. a. The M14 series cartridge cases used with this round are the M14 (brass), the M14B1 (steel) and the M14B4 (spiral-wrapped steel)
  - b. Propelling charge XM121, a two increment charge(zones 6 and 7) is located in the cartridge case. The viscose rayon increment bags are designed so that the charge does not intrude into the hollow base of the projectile. The bags are loaded with propellant M30E1; increment No 6 contains 33.7 ounces and increment No 7 contains 16.1 ounces. Increment No 7 should be used for maximum effectiveness in direct fire.
  - c. Percussion primer M90, also located in the cartridge case, consists of a perforated steel, paper lined tube containing approximately 380 grains of benite strands, and a brass head assembly consisting of a primer, a firing plug and a battery cup. The primer is closed at the forward end by a brass closing plug. The entire percussion primer assembly is 13.26 inches long.
  - d. The projectile consists of a two piece aluminium body, an aluminium fuze adapter, and a steel hollow base. The body is loaded with 8,000 flechettes arranged in tiers. Each flechette weighs 8 grains and is fabricated in a low-drag, fin stablised configuration. A base charge assembly consisting of 35 grams of flake propellant M9 in a polythene bag is located immediately above the projectile base. The fuze adapter contains a marker charge consisting of a pyrotechnic-composition pellet, four detonatorsM31A1, a flash tube, and a relay and detonator assembly consisting of detonator M49 and relay M7. The detonator M31A1 contains a lower charge of 4.16 grains tetryl an intermediate charge of 3.85 grains a side, and an upper charge of 2.31 grains ignition mixture. The relay M7 contains 1.54 grains lead a side. A central flash tube, formed from section (spacers) of steel tube tubing, extends from the projectile base to the detonator of the fuze adapter. Projectile tracer M13 is assembled in the hollow end of the base. The tracer consists of a steel cup containing approximately 5.7 grams tracer composition and 1.8 grams igniter composition.
  - e. Mechanical time fuze XM563E1, designed for use in flechette loaded cartridges, is issued set for muzzle action. However, it can be set for time functioning from ^.5 seconds. See paragraph 195.1 for detailed description.

#### Functioning

3. When the weapon is fired, propelling charge XM121, ignited by percussion primer M90, propels the projectile out of the weapon. The fuze begins arming immediately and functions either as soon as the projectile leaves the weapon (if set for muzzle action) or at the preset time. The action of the fuze ignites the spotting charge, relay M7, and four detonators in the fuze adapter. The explosive force of the detonators rips open the forward skin of the ogive, dispersing the forward tiers of flechettes by centrifugal force. The relay initiates detonator (M49) which ignites the base charge in the projectile. In burning, the base charge activates a piston which propels the rear tiers of flechettes out of the projectile. The tracer which defines the early stages of projectile flight, is ignited by the propelling charge. The apotting charge (ignited by the fuze detonator)

burns for approximately 15 seconds and falls in the centre of the flechette pattern, allowing a forward observer to adjust fire for maximum effect.

## Preparation for Firing

4. a. After removing the cartridge from the packing materials, check visually for damage to fuze, driving band, propelling charge, primer, and cartridge case which might cause malfunction.

#### WARNING: DO NOT FIRE FAULTY AMMUNITION

b. For firing full charge (propelling charge XM121.7 zones) adjustment of the propelling charge is not required. NOTE: The propelling charge must be fired full charge when the fuze is set for muzzle action. Also all cartridges from ammunition lot number WC-10 assembled with propelling charge XM121 will be fired full charge only.

FIGURE 36.2 (Added)
Setting of fuze

- c. For firing with less than full charge remove the undesired charge as necessary.
- d. For muzzle action, no setting of the fuze is necessary since the fuze is issued set for muzzle action. For time action, turn the lower fuze cap in a clockwise direction with fuze setter M63 to the desired setting.
- e. (1) To set the fuze for whole-second increments, use the fuze setter to turn the lower cap until the figure on its scale is opposite the "O" on the fuze body vernier scale.
  - (2) To set the fuze for fractional-second increments (tenths), first proceed as indicated in (1) above, then continue to move the lower cap until a line on the lower cap scale lines up with the line on the vernier scale which represents the desired fractional second. For example, if the desired setting is 5.5 seconds, set the "5" on the cap scale opposite the "0" on the vernier (A,fig 36.2) then turn the "5" off the "0" mark until a line on the cap scale is opposite the "5" line on the vernier scale (B,fig 36.2)

NOTE: The marking on the lower cap of the XM563E1 fuze begins with the number "1" instead of "0" as indicated in figure 36.2. However the vernier scale marking in the fuze is identical to that illustrated.

If set time and not fired, reset the fuze to the original MA setting by continuing to turn the lower cap in a clockwise direction.

f. Arc widths at various time and distance settings are illustrated in table 1/1 Arc widths at muzzle action are shown in table 1.2.

#### repared for Firing but not Fired

5. If the cartridge has been prepared for firing but not fired return the cartridge to its original condition and packing. Rounds prepared for use but not used should be used first in subsequent firings.

## Precautions in Firing

6. a. Precautions stated in AB385-63 should be followed carefully.

WARNING: If fuze is set for muzzle action, personnel shall avoid the area immediately in front of end and to the sides of the weapon. Overhead firing is prohibited.

#### Packing and Marking

7. a. The projectile and the cartridge case are packed together in fiber container XM472, with the projectile in end of the container and the cartridge case in the opposite end. Two fiber containers are packed in reverse order in a packing box The projectile cartridge case fiber containers and packing boxes are marked in accordance with TM9-1900 and TM9-1300-206.

#### Data

8. Complete round weight 38.25 lb
Complete round Length 34.15 in
Projectile weight 28.5 lb
Projectile length 23.06 in
Cartridge case weight 5.5 lb
Cartridge case length 14.64in
Muzzle velocity (Charge XM121) 1800fps in M105, M137
1700 fps in M2A2
Firing temperature limits -65 F. to +140F

#### RESTRICTED

R746/1/1

1 Fd Regt RAA NUI DAT 18 Jan 67

## 1 ATF FIRE SUPPORT

Reference: A. R746-1-1 dated 5 Nov 66.

- 1. Enclosed are instructions on Fire Support for 1 ATF. These instructions include:
  - a. Duties of the Artillery Commander.
  - b. Duties of the GSO2 (Air).
  - c. Allocation and Control of Fire Support.
  - d. Function of Artillery Tactical Headquarters.
  - e. Safety of Own Troops and Aircraft.
- 2. These instructions are effective forthwith. They will be included in TF SOPs in due course.
- 3. Reference A is cancelled (NOT to all addressees).

Lieutenant Colonel
Commanding Officer

#### Distribution

101 Fd Bty RAA 103 Fd Bty RAA 161 Fd Bty RNZA HQ Bty 1 Fd Regt CP	(6) (6) (4) RAA
Tac HQ	{2} {4}
A Sqn 3 Cav Regt 1 Fd Sqn RAE 5 RAR 6 RAR 3 SAS	(2) (2)
3 SAS 161(Indep) Recce HQ 1 ATF CO 2IC	Flt (2) (6)
TFAIO LO Comd's Diary Spare	{4} 4}
Copy to: 4 Fd Regt RAA School Of Artille DRA (AHQ)	
DRA (AHQ)	(2)

## FIRE SUPPORT OF THE TASK FORCE

## \_ DUTIESO OF THE ARTILLERY COMMANDER

The duties of the artillery commander at each level are generally similar and may be considered under two headings; those of an advisory nature to the task force (or unit) commander and his staff and those which concern command and control of the artillery grouped with or alloted to the task force.

## Duties in an Advisory Capacity

- 2. The artillery commander advises t e task force commander on all matters concerning the artillery at his disposal, in particular
  - Employment of the artillery rescources.
  - b. The operational fitness of all artillery units in the task force.
  - The allocation, command and control of the task force and supporting artillery.
  - Ammunition expenditure including the allocation and availability of specialized ammunition.
  - States of readiness of artillery units.
  - f. Counter bombardment policy.
  - g. The integration of artillery support with that provided by naval or air forces.
  - The manner in which artillery fire and effort should be applied both for specific targets and missions and in fire plans.
  - j. The inverging force headquarters. The intergration of his own headquarters into the task
  - Air defence in the task force area should this become necessary.

## Duties Concerning Commando and Control 1 0 01

- 3. The artillery commander exercises such powers of command and control over the artillery grouped with his task force for specific periods or operations as are authorised by the task force or higher commander. In this capacity he implements the task force artillery plan including the ffollowing:-
  - Grouping, employment, allocation of effort and movement of the artillery.
  - Logistic support.
- 4. Control is exercised through pre-planned and impromptu allotment of artillery, fire orders and orders regarding ammunition expenditure. The duties of the artillery commander include:
  - a. Planning of artillery fire and subsequently issuing orders for tasks to the artillery comcerned.
  - Implementing, on boulf of the commander, procedures connected with the e-agement of targets, including provision of safet measures to protect aircraft which could provision of safet measures to protect aircraft which be endangered by artillery or mortar fire.

    c. Control of fire including delegating authority for impromptu a port

DUTIES OF THE GSO 2 (AIR)

#### ALLOCATION AND CONTROL OF FIRE SUPPORT

#### Pre-planned Fire Support

- 9. When an operation is being planned at task force level. The normal procedure will be as follows:
  - a. The commander assisted as necessary by his staff and the artillery commander will plan the operation in outline.
  - b. The commander will issue orders to nits to take part in the operation. These orders may be written or verbal, and will include details of the fire support available in terms of guns and ammunition and air strike availability. If verbal orders are given it will be usual for the artiller commander and GOZ (Air) to give the details of the fire support availability.
  - c. Unit commanders, who should be attended by their own artillery commanders if verbal orders are given by the commander, will then plan their operation and fire support requirement in detail. In this they should be assisted by their direct support battery commander.
  - d. The direct support battery commander will then bring, or transmit by the lest means available details of the firsupport plan to Artillery Tactical HQ (Arty Tac) where the artillery commander under the direction of the task force commander and assisted by the CSO2(air) will complete the fire laplan.
  - e. The artillery commander will then issue the necessary orders to all artillery units to take part in the operation. At the same time the GSO2(Air) will issue the necessary requests and instructions to produce the necessary air support.
  - f. It will be normal for the artillery commander and the GSO2(Air) to remain at Arty Tac thoughout the operation to co-ordinate and modify the fire plan as required by units taking part.

#### Quick Fire Plans and Impromptu Fire Support

The same principles as stated in para 9 above apply. In this case a call for fire beyond the capacity of the direct support battery, or from a unit not having artillery observers or from outside the task force will be received in the task force CP and/or Arty Tac where the commander or his representative advised by artillery and air representatives will make an immediate allocation of fire support if required. This in no way alters the normal process of artillery observers calling for regimental or other concentrations, but provides additional fire support backing where necessary. Here again the artillery commander working under the direction of the task force commander and assisted by the GSO2(Air) will co-ordinate the application of artillery and air support.

#### FUNCTION OF ARTILLERY TACTICAL HEADQUARTERS

- 11. The function of Arty Tac HQ is to assist the artillery commander in carrying out the duties shown in preceeding paragraphs. Arty Tac HQ will form an integral part of HQ TF and will include:
  - a. CO of the fiel regiment together with his BC HQ by and IO.
  - b. TFAIO

12.

- c. LOs as neces ary.
- d. Communications and start to all will be convier-

13. In periods of high activity the full staff will probably be required on duty but in quiet periods it will be  $n_0$ rmal for HQ to be manned by a duty officer with the necessary communications staff.

## SAFETY OF OWN TROOPS AND ATROPAGE

- 14. Whilst it is important that friendly troops and aircraft and friendly civilians are not endangered by artillery or mortar fire it is equally important that the time taken to ensure their safety does not delay the delivery of fire on the target.
- 15. Arrangements necessary to ensure the safety of friendly troops, civilians and aircraft fall into two broad categories:
  - a. Prevention of guns or morters firing at targets in areas occupied by friendly troops or civilians. This process will be known as "ground clearance".
  - b. Warning to aircraft which might otherwise fly into the trajectories of projectiles. Although this amounts to a warning to aircraft, it will to known as air clearance!

#### Ground Clearance

- The task force TAOR is subdivided into areas of responsibility for each battalion and into areas which remain the responsibility of HQ task force. The lines of demarkation may change from time to time to suit the tactical situation. In addition, there will be periodically superimposed on these areas, "No fire" areas, which will be known as 'Special Clearance Zones'.
- 17. Responsibility for giving ground clearance is as follows:-

Serial	Location of Target !	Authority for Granting Ground Clearance
1	AO but not within a	HQ of the battilion in whose area the target lies, Clearance will be passed eby the DC of the direct support field battery who will report to the originator of the fire mission and to the CP/FDC/ base plate position controlling the Fire "Gridclear from ground troops" or "Grid negative ground clearance" as appropriate.
2	Within area reserved by HQ TF	The task force CP. Clearance will be passed to the originator of the fire mission and to the CE/FDC controlling the guns by Arty Tao in the form of "Gridclear from ground troops" or "Grid negative ground clearance" as appropriate.
3	Within Special Clearance Zones	As for Serial 2
4.	Outside the task forc	eArty Tac will obtain the ground clearance from Sector or whichever other authority may control the area of the target and will pass the clearance message as in Serial 2. Where the target lies in the area controlled by the originator, ground alterance is implied and will be

nowlified by Arty Tac to the CP/FDC controlling the guns.

Note Where a target lies so close to a boundary that troops on the opposite side of that boundary could be endangered, the originator must also seek ground clearance from the appropriate authority having responsibility for that area.

#### Air Clearance

- All air clearance will be notified by Arty Tac to the originator of the fire mission and to the CP/FDC controlling the guns in the form of "Grid.....clear from air" or "Grid..... negative air clearance" as appropriate. Should a temporary delay be imposed by aircraft operating in the line of fire, Arty Tac will report "Grid..... Negative Air Clearance delay figures.....". When clearance is available the report "Grid.....clear from air" will be passed. The latter unqualified report must be received before guns or mortars are allowed to fire. (See also para 24 below).
- 19. Calls for fire on the regimental net will be monitored by Arty Tac which will acknowledge in the form of "Rodger" at the appropriate time after the CP/FDC has checked back the fire orders. Should the originator not be on the regimental net, the CP/FDC receiving the call must relay to Arty Tac for clearance.
- 20. On receipt of a call for fire Arty Tac will immediatly notify JADE, KANGAROO and if heavy guns are to be used PARIS controls of the impending fire mission in the following form:
  - a. FIRING FROM

b.	AZIMUTH		_	_		_	_	_degrees
C.	MAXIMUM	ORDINATE	_	-	-			_feet
d.	MAXIMUM	RANGE	_	-		_	_	_metres

- e. FIRING INTO
- f. TIME : FROM----TO

Note Only (a), (c), (e) and(f) passed to PARIS control.

21. Upon receipt of details of a fire mission, JADE and KANGAROO Controls are to broadcast immediately the pertinent information, specified in para 5, to all aircraft. Immediately following this broadcast, the JADE and KANGAROO operators are to advise Arty Tac that the warning has been passed to aircraft. This broadcast normally constitutes air clearance for the particular fire mission. Should an aircraft ask for a delay in direct response to the broadcast this will be passed immediately to Arty Tac.

#### General

- 22. The responsibility for not firing until both ground and air clearances have been obtained ultimately rests with the CP/FDC controlling the guns or mortars. Clearances will be given by the authorities set out above direct on the regimental net or relayed through an intermediate station, but whichever way they are passed, the CP/FDC must receive them before fire is opened.
- 23. Not withstanding the responsibility stated in para 22 it always remains the responsibility of the detachment commander or crew chief of a weapon not to fire if an aircraft visible to him appears likely to be endangered.
- 24. The time taken to obtain clearances will usally be less than the normal reaction time of the guns. However, in genuine cases of operational emergency, the originator of a fire mission may order guns to fire without clearance but will then be required to justify his action.

Tile: R220/1/7

Annex C to 1 Fd Regt Operational Report 1-31 Jan 67

#### MINUTES OF A G STAFF CONFERENCE HELD AT 1 FD REGT RAA ON 6 JAN 57

Present:

Commanding Officer Second in Command BC 101 Fd Bty RAA BC 103 Fd Bty RAA BC 161 Fd Bty RNZA BC HQ Bty Adjutant

1. Aim. To determine a standard Operational Procedure on various points.

Action By

#### 2. Firing of guns in local defence of Gun Positions

- 103 Bty will conduct trials on 7 Jan 67 on:
  - (1) MTSQ, using varying QE and Fuze settings.
  - MTSQ, using constant QE and fuze setting but varying charges
  - (3) Newly received anti-person el round XM546.

The aim is to determine the simplest and most effective method of using the guns in local defence.

103 Bty

GPOs

b. It was noted that another method, that of using PD M51 set to "Delay" and bounced off the ground at a point selected by the gun No 1 so that the round burst about 15 ft in the air and as close as 110 metres, had been tried by 161 Bty and could be used as a last resort.

#### 3. C of M and Prediction

a. All targets are to be predicted before firing according to appropriate technical procedures, except that:

HA targets, (impromptu), need not be

predicted unless specifically ordered	Adjt
b. C of M graphs are to be prepared for charges 2,3,4,5,6,7(-) in LA. HA graphs need only be prepared when specifically ordered.	GPOs
c. DF(SOS) targets are to be always kept up to date for met and issued on gun programmes.	GPOs
d. DF targets need not be kept up to date for met unless they are ordered as "special"	GPOs FOs

#### 4. DFs

a. Past policy has been to allow temporary DFs, nicknamed Tin Trunk, to lapse automatically at 0800 hrs the day after being initiated. This meant that they were no longer kept up to date for met. This policy is now cancelled (See . CPs FOs Adjt para 3d above)

IO

b.	There	are.	no long	ger a	utomatic	cancellat	ions	
of I	F targo	ets,	or any	othe:	r target	. Wherever	er	FOs Adjt
targ	ets are	e uns	ale or	are .	origina	r required	tney	Adju
21100	CLU DO	carree	TTOU N	ATTO	Ow TO THE CO	4.4		

#### Fire Plans

- a. Six figure grid references may be used by originators in preparation of the Tiddler, AB 545
- b. Heights need not be sent by originators.
- 8. Regimental Targets (and higher)
  - a. When height is not given by the originator it will be circulated by the adjusting battery, or the senior battery if the target is not recorded by firing.
  - b. Direction GT will be circulated by the adjusting battery, or by the senior battery GPOs
- 7. DFs Scale of Fire. There is a discrepancy in both authorisation and scales, between the present SOPs of 1 Fd Regt, 5 RAR and 6 RAR. 1 Fd Regt RAA will prepare a suggested paragraph for inclusion in TF SOPs
  - 8. Fire Planning Conference
    - a. There is to be a daily TF fire planning conference at 1500 hrs. Permanent tasks will be the preparation and co-ordination of H & I programmes and air strikes for the twenty four hours beginning 1800 hrs that day
    - b. The IO will issue the area and time block for the H & I programme to the Regt and Bty CPs/FDCs following this conference. The information will also be promulgated at the TF Comd's conference at 1630 hrs
  - 9. Clearances. The CO has prepared a new paper on the system of clearances. This will be issued Adjt shortly, in draft form, for comments
  - 10. SOPs. SOPs are ready in draft form at present
    They will be published following the issue, in the near
    future, of new TF SOP.

    Adjt

Captain Adjutant

#### Distribution

List E (less serials 6, 17, 13, 20)

Annex D to 1 Fd Regt Operational Report No 5 1-31 Jan 57

#### MEDICAL IN CONFIDENCE

File: R526.1.1

1 Fd Regt RAA NUI DAT

## MONTHLY SICK REPORT MONTH ENDING 31-1-67

ILLNESS	HQ Bty	101 Fd Bty	103 Fd Buy	161 Fd Bty	Det 131 Div Loc Bty	APC Sqn	LAD	TOTAL
INTESTINAL	4	1	9	3	1	4		22
EYE			3	1		3		7
EAR	6	5	8	4	4			27
NOSE OR THROAT	10	3	2	3	3	4		25
SKIN	12	11	31	2	4	2	1	63
RESPIRATORY	6	2	25	3	10		3	49
PUO	1				2			3
PSYCHIATRIC								
VD	11	1	7	5	4	9	3	40
BATTLE INJURIES								
INJURIES	17	15	24	5	12	10	2	85
HOSPITAL ADMISSIONS	10	5	5	3	2	12	1	38
MISCELLANEOUS	6	5	2	2	4	4	2	25
TOTALS	83	48	116	31	46	48	12	374

RMOs Comments: See attached

COs Comments:

Distribution CO HQ 1 ATF (for SMO)

Copy to
RMO

HQ Bty (Extract only)

101 Fd Bty RAA " "

103 Fd Bty RAA " "

161 Fd Bty RNZA " "

Det 131 Div Loc " "

Bty RAA

LAD " "

1 APC Sqn " "

Comd Diary (4)

Tile (1)

# OPERATIONAL REPORT 1 JAN - 31 JAN 67 DET 131 DIV LOC BTY RAA

#### ACTIVITIES

1. SURVEY.

Seven gun positions were surveyed in during the month Two positions were placed in by direct lines as control in the area was very good. Three positions required lengthy traverses but due to good protection parties and good field pairs these were completed in one day. The remaining two positions presented a problem. A map rece was NOT good enough and due tolack of control in the area theatre orientation only was initiated. Local crests interfered with traversing schemes and because these crests were VC controlled and the protection partyrequired was NOT acceptable to the Commander fixation was NOT provided to Div standards. however a scheme was completed which gave provisional information. In all seven cases it was found that the maximum party required was five pairs, and stores were manpacked without difficulty

#### 2. ARTY INT

#### a. Technical

The period was quite, with NO en motar activity in the base area. The LPs continued to provide reports on activity in the HOA LONG and adjacent areas:

Training has been introduced by way of shell reports being submitted on all friendly artillery mainly H&I serials, serial F only, greater accuracy resulted in this training. This is being continued. On two occasions LP1 adjusted fire on tgts from his position fired by 1 FD REGT RAA.

#### b. Tactical

The situation remains unchanged tactically, with the Arty Int Sec and LPs being keyed for action in the event of En artillery activity. LP4 was closed down to bolster the numbers of LP1, 2. and 3, and will be reopened when 161 Indep Recce Flight move to LUSCOMBE airfield. Improvements continue to be carried out on the local defence of the remaining sec areas.

#### RADAR

#### a. Equipment

The computers are still NOT functioning however B set is capable of tracking. And C systems are now ready and are awaiting computer repairs.

#### b. Construction and Tasks

(1) Alpha position

Improvements have been done to:

(a) Living quarters

......2

- (b) New local defence works have been carried out the placing of more wire etc and consequent covering of this obstacle by a heavier automatic weapon
- (c) All sandbags have been painted with liquid cement for preservation.

## (ii) Bravo position

- (a) Construction and completion of command post and generator pit completed.
  - (b) Construction and errection of stores tent
    (iii) Training

A radar operators course started on the 31 JAN 67 this course will be promulated and trade tests conducted at the conclusion. Course reports are to be submitted and PORs made out.

GENERAL

- A&Q tasks have been carried out with a view to having a smooth and efficient hand over. To this end the following has taken place or is planned for.
- a. All vehicles and trailers painted and given a 12000 mile servicing
- 5 b. All stores given workshop test. This includes telluromet -res, theodolites and radios.
  - c. 100% stock check to be carried out and indents etc ...itted(planned for 10 Mar 67)
- d. Shelving in Q tent completed. There is NO estimate of time when permanent accommadation will be available.
- e. Personal documents and innoculations brought up to date.

#### SOCIAL

5. No organized activities were undertaken, but several slide afternoons and taping sessions were a means of relaxation for the Detachment.

#### Health and Morale

6. Health remains fairly good with the exception of some personel spending time in hospitial with minor injuries eg; stranied muscles stomach trouble etc. With the advent of new constructions and the radar course time passes swiftly thus boosting morale to some extent.

#### Future Activities

- /. It is proposed to do the following.
  - a. Move LP2 to a better listening position in the 1/83 Arty Bn area. The present position has now been made useless with the addition of a generator in close proximity
    - b. Alpha radar Command Post is to be built below ground leval to a presimilar to BRAVO position. This will entail a lot of work but it is hoped this will be completed by the end of MARCH.

c. Stregthening of LP1 position is to be completed by MARCH. This position has had to be refurbisted due to weather and age affecting the sand bags and timber.

## CONCLUSION

8. There is a great deal of work to be done but is hoped this will be completed by the end of April to allow the new Detachment to take over with out any excess construction needed.

OC DET 131. DIV LOC BTY RAA

#### RESTRICTED

1 Fd Regt RAA NUI DAT

网络新疆河

AHQ (DRA)

## OPERATIONAL REPORT NUMBER 7 FEBRUARY 1967

Maps: VIETNAM 1:50,000 series

## General

1. This report covers the period 1-28 Feb 67.

#### Operations

- 2. CAMDEN (1-2 Feb). This operation was a cordon and search of portion of HOA LONG YS 4264. 5RAR, A Sqn 3 Cav Regt, TF detachments and Sector troops took part. TF artillery supported the operation from base location. Over tooo villagers were processed and of this number five females were detained. As follow-up action a barbed wire fence was built about the village to restrict VC movement into the village.
  - Regt and 161 Fd Bty RNZA in search and destroy operations east and north east of DAT DO (YS 4960). The operation resulted in minor contact only with the VC and these contacts were with small groups. Cverall VC casualties were: Four VC KIA, one VC KBA and one VC WIA. Additionally, a quantity of rice was recovered as well as one CHICOM rifle. Misfortune befell the operation when on 6 Feb 67 artillery fire from 161 Fd Bty RNZA fell among Delta Company 6RAR causing, finally, four Aust KIA and sixteen Aust WIA.
  - 4. BEAUMARIS (13-18 Feb). 5 RAR, A Sqn 3 Cav Regt and TF artillery (operating from base location) did a cordon and search of XA AN NHUT (YS 4659). Eleven hundred villagers were interrogated resulting in the detention of four female and two male VC cadre members, twelve VC suspects and five active VC sympathizers. During the search phase the APCs conducted a limited sweep operation in the foothills of the LONI HAI mountains, vicinity YS 4656. The detonation of an ARVN boody trap caused the deaths of the OC and 2IC Charlie Company 5RAR and Captain Peter WILLIAMS, RNZA. There were a further form and WIA as a result of this accident.
  - 5. DAIDY (16Feb). A limited search and destroy operation involving a heliborne assult into the area between DAT DO YS 4960 and NUI DAT (II) YS 4868. A Sqn 3 Cav Regt and 10t Fd Bty supported (from base location). The operation which resulted in one VC WIA and four detainees.
  - 6. BRIBIE (17-18 Feb). Early on the morning of the 17 Feb the VC attacked PHOUC HAT YS #152. Tollowing later contacts by Sector troops claring the area, the Gomd later launched this operation to destroy the VC element remaining in the area. 6RAR conducted a heliassault and made immediate contact with an estimated battalion force supported by heavy weapons. 101 Fd Bty was moved to DAT DO YS-4960 with one company of 5RAR as protection. A Sqn 3 Cav Regt operated in intimate support of 6RAR. Contact was maintained until darkness when the VC moved east and north east, clearing the battle-field as they departed. In an attempt to seal the VC off-2/47 Bn

- of DAT DO. VC casualties were six VC KIA and an estimated one hundred KIA. Aust casualties were eight KIA and twenty four WIA.
- 7. RENMARK (18-22 Feb). A search and destroy operation in the LONG HAT mountains (YS 4752) mounted as a follow up to a B52 strike in the centre of the AO which was requested on the strength of firm indications that the LONG DAT district Company and, possibly, elements of D 445 Bn were in that area. 5RAR, A Sqn 3 Cav Regt and TF artillery participated in the operation. 103 Fd Bty RAA deployed to three separate gun areas in support of the operation. On the 21 Feb an APC detonated an anti-tank mine. This destroyed the APC and caused two Aust KIA and one fust WIA. Troops moving to assist detonate an anti-personnell mine resulting in five Aust KIA and twenty four Aust WIA. The operation netted one VC KIA.
- 8. <u>KIRRIBILLI (initiated 23 Feb 67)</u>. Designed to deny the VC access to our base area by using company size patrols. This operation is expected to continue for a considerable time.

# TECHNIQUES DEVELOPED

9. Attached as Annex A is a report on firing trials of the 105mm cartridge anti-personnel XM546.

#### EQUIPMENT

- 10. RVEs have been submitted requesting that the Fd Bty entitlement to RC 292 aerials be increased to five and that of HQ Bty to six. Briefly, this would allow for the CP and BC to maintain communications on both Regimental and Battery nets (as well, it places the BC in an excellent position to act as relay station between OPs and the CP). The fifth aerial allows for a rear admin link when the Bty is deployed Similarly, provision must be made in HQ Bty for TAC HQ and the Regt CP-to have two aerials apiece so that they can split as necessary for operations. A total of six in HQ Bty will also allow the establishment of a pool of two aerials for relay stations and LOs.
- 11. Approval has also been sought for the issue of a SWITCHBOARD SB/86P on the grounds that the present switch (linked SB22s):
  - (a) restricts certain phones to a party line basis,
  - (b) the SB22 is an operational store and as such accompanies the Regiment on deployments, and
  - (c) the SB22 is not designed for the continuous heavy use it receives in base location.

# AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE

12. A total of 6,398 rds 105mm ammunition were fired during the month. This figure includes all types.

101 Fd Bty RAA 1892 rds
103 Fd Bty RAA 1846 rds
161 Fd Bty RNZA 2660 rds
TOTAL 6,398 rds

13. Cumulative totals now stand at

101 Fd Bty RAA 14,851 rds 103 Fd Bty RAA 21,412 rds

161 Fd Bty RNZA 44,245 rds (including BIWN HOA period)

4. Of the 6,398 rds 105mm ammunition fired, only 617 rds were spended for H&I tasks. The remainder were used for actual fire missions and course shooting but it is not possible further to divide the figures.

I among the sales of

- 15. For interest, in the same period 1/83 Arty (a composite battery of two 8 inch hows and two 175mm guns) expended the following amounts of ammunition:
  - 8" 1482 rds (H&I 487, other, 995rds).
  - 175mm 1546 rds (H&I 994, other, 592rds).
- 16. From the above it is clear that the majority of our H&I tasks are now undertaken by the heavy guns (and at ranges well outside that of the 105mm gun). This represents the present pattern of VC activity. The H&I totals for 1/83rd include those missions fired at the direction of II Field Force VIETNAM (IIFFV).
- 17. H&I missions for both the field and heavy artillery began to increase towards the end of the reporting period and this trend will be reflected in the figures for Mar 67.
- 18. A Bty 2/35 Arty (155s) reverted to TIFFV control on 19 Feb and moved north west of SAIGON to positions near the CAMBODIAN border to participate in Operation JUNCTION CITY, so ammunition statistics in support of 1 ATF are not available. This battery is expected to return to 1 ATF base location at the conclusion of this operation.

#### POLICY DIRECTIVES ISSUED

- 19. A conference on technical matters was held during the TET cease fire period in order to determine and dissemminate information on technical procedures to be used in the Regiment. The conference occupied two afternooms and was attended by all officers not on essential duties. The conference agenda and minutes are to be found in annexes B and C respectively.
  - 20. At annex D may be found the minutes of a debriefing held after Operation BRIBIE. Similar debriefings are now to be held after any operation that has required significant artillery participation.

#### TRAINING

21. When operations permitted, informal training sessions were held in all batteries and covered:

Command Post training

Layer training

Signals training

Small arms practice, and

Course shooting

- 22. Five 50 calibre machine guns were received in the Regiment and a course was rin on these. These weapons now form part of our perimeter defences.
- 23. With the arrival of the M2A2 equipment in late February conversion training of 161 Fd Bty RNZA commenced under WO1 I N BROWN. The training programme, with comments, prepared by the Master Gunner may be found at Annex E.
- 24. Advantage was taken of the TET cease fire period to adopt the ABCA artillery fire orders procedure. Three-hour practice sessions were conducted on each of the four days. Few problems were experienced and the end result reflected the prior training carried out in the batteries.

#### ECREATIONAL TRAINING

25. The decision was made during the month to establish a beach campat VUNG TAU, capable of accomodating 120 men, to allow members to relax for short periods in a secure area with something other than rubber trees to gaze at. The scheme is to commence in early March 67.

#### PERSONNEL

26. The following casualties were sustained during Feb:

Capt P WILLIAMS RNZA KIA

Gnr R W CLIFF KIA

Gnr G BENTLEY WIA

L/Bdr P R JONES WIA

Capt WILLIAMS died when an ARVN booby trap was detonated during Operation BEAUMARIS. Gnr CLIFF died as a result of wounds received during the accidental shelling of Delta Company 6RAR during Operation TAMBOURINE. Gnr BENTLY was wounded in the same incident while L/Bdr JONES was wounded while participating in Operation RENMARK.

27. The Regiment has proposed that one FO (Lt) be added to each Field Battery and that two LOs (Lt) be added to HQ Bty as a theatre increment. The reasons behind these proposals are that the battalions insist on each Fifle company having an FO and in the type of operations such a request is fully justified. Notwithstanding, such a requirement does mean that the gun areas must suffer. Also, there is at times a requirement to provide FOs with APC and ARU patrols, and Liaison Officers.

#### ARRIVALS /DEPARTURES

28. Capt D HAYES, Capt P ASPINALL and three Gumners returned to AUSTRALIA during February. Capt D GILDAY and three Gunners arrived to join the Regiment.

#### MEDICAL

- 29. The monthly sick report is at Annex F. The RMO's comments are offered below:
  - (a) "Battle injuries are not shown on the monthly sick report, as these were taken direct from the field to VUNG TAU. During the month of February battle casualties accounted for 1 KIA, 2 WIA, (plus 161 Bty 1 KIA).
  - (b) As February was the hottest and driest month experienced, there were no new respiratory discases. Also, all types of sickness fell quite markedly during February with one exception, VD.
  - (c) VD. Figures were the worst for any month since leaving AUSTRALIA. Excluding 161 Battery and A Sqn 3 Cav Regt, there were 34 new cases of VD this month. Of these cases approximately half came from VUNG TAU and half from out of country R & R. This is a most alarming figure in view of the proximity of RTA. At present I im giving a lecture on Venereal Diseases to each battery, hoping to provide some sort of insight of VD and its possible consequences.
  - (1). Of all cases of illness I saw at the RAP last month approximately half were fresh or recurrent VD or review of VD. This gives some idea of the size of the problem".

#### VITS

- 30. OC Det 131 Div Loc Bty visited IIFFV on 26 Jan 67. His report on this visit is at Annex G.
- 31. 1ATF has inaugrated a scheme whereby selected officers may visit allied formations to further their military knowledge. Basically it is restricted to those officers returning to Army schools, planning appointments etc. At this stage the Regiment has made no bids for such visits as the officers, though interested, cannot be spared.
  - 32. The following officers visited the Regiment in Feb.

Maj Gen D VINCENT, Comd AFV - 5 Feb.

Lt Col A J MILNER, CI-designate School of Inf - 5 Feb.

Maj Gen CLYNE, DGMS- 8 Feb.

Lt Col L W WRIGHT, Director RNZA and Director Army Avaition 25 Feb - 1 Mar.

Additionally, two CMF officers visited the Regiment for approx imately three week periods:

Maj PATMORE, 6 Fd Regt RAA

Maj L R BAILEY, BC 23 Bty, 15 Fd Regt RAA.

A report submitted by Maj BAILEY on his visit is attached at Annex H.

# ENEMY PROBE 10 FEB 67

- 33. On 10 Feb two small parties of VC probed 103 Fd Bty perimeter. The Following report was submitted by Maj M E P BURGE, BC 103 Fd Bty:
  - (a) "103 Bty standing patrol, YS 436660 reported noise to their south at about 2000 hrs 10 Feb 67. It was reported as being possible movement. The noise continued for some time, up to 20 minutes, without a positive sighting of en taking place.
  - (b) To facilitate obsm a starlight scope was taken out to the patrol but visibility was very poor, there being no moon.
  - (c) The patrol commander on his own initiative and because he felt his position had become insecure due to movement and noise withdrew 150 metres North to 103 Bty outer wire.
  - (d) About 30 minutes later a grenade was thrown into the area of their vacated position. The standing patrol was then ordered to return to the base area through the wire. Some ten minutes later a further grenade was thrown about 20 metres into 103 Bty area and 50 metres forward of a pit which engaged the area from which the grenade was thrown with M60 fire.
  - (c) When the patrol had returned illumination was called for and further movement was observed and engaged at the top of the paddy at YS 434661. This was engaged by .50 cal from No 6 pit.
  - (d) No 4 and No 2 gun also engaged the standing patrol position YS 436660.
  - (e) Due to the proximity of 161 Bty standing patrol and also earlier, the standing patrol's position, claymores were not fired but were armed.

- (f) A search of the wire the following morning revealed no tampering. Both grenades are believed to have been US M26 type, the one thrown at the original standing patrol landed 6 feet from their position and would probably have caused casualties.
- (g) Bdr A A THOMPSON who commanded the standing patrol exercised good control, keeping his CP in the picture and also undoubtedly saved his patrol from casualties by using initiative and skill in moving his men back from their original position to an alternate position, obviously without the ememy being aware of the withdrawl.
- (h) It is estimated that two en parties of not more than three men probed 103 Bty perimeter".
- 34. 6RAR has recently had two returnees (VC who have voluntarily returned to the government and attended an indoctrination course) in for a "question period". Transcripts of both interviews are at Annexes I and K.

#### EQUIPMENT

35. In a recent report OC 1 Fd Regt LAD made the following points on equipment and vehicles.

#### HOWITZER PACK L5

- 36. The following major components and/or assemblies have caused repair tasks:-
  - (a) Mount Telescopes have maintained a high failure rate due mainly to lack of spare parts. Most mounts are at or close to the end of possible adjustments without replacing parts.
  - (b) Sights Dial L1A1 and Telescopes Panoramic repairs have continued to be hampered by NO maintenance scales or spare parts being available. The LtA1 failures have been mostly mechanical with certain weaknesses becoming obvious in the optical system.
  - (c) The failure of an elevating gear pinion shaft after 950 EFC has still to be fully investigated to ascertain the cause.
  - (d) The failure of the mount telescopes housing on five guns indicates a probable life of this part in the order of 1500 EFC.
- 37. General wear in the carriage has continued, the most noticeable being on the slides and slippers. It is considered that the five oldest guns in the Regt and one in ALSG should be returned for base overhaul and measurement on the arrival of the six new guns.

# INTERCOMMUNICATION SET GUN CONTROL

38. 101 and 103 Fd Btys have fully working systems, 161 Bty still has deficiencies.

#### VEHICLES

39. Vehicle standards have improved due to replacement of the poorer vehicles from the tre stocks, but there are still vehicles in use which have been in theatre almost two years and are due for replacement. Almost all FFR vehicles are at best classed 3B.



#### VIC ACTION

- 40. The Regiment found it necessary to seek release from the requirement to provide a part time CA officer for BINH GIA as the time spent on CA tasks occupied the officer for two full days each week. This was proving too great a drain on our already depleted HQ. As well, emphasis is being placed on HOA LONG for CA with consequent decreases in the flow of stores to other areas and this has underlined the uneconomic position of mis-employing a sorely needed officer.
- The Regiment still, however, retains a strong interest in Two MEDCAPS are run each week and two members of the Regi-BINH GIA. ment work with the Australian advisor allocated to BINH GIA. Until recently this team lived with one of the village families but recently, to afford them greater security, they were moved by order of the Senior Advisor (US) to the compound at DUC THANH YS 4877.
- 42. Work on the dispensary described in the last report is still held up for want of construction materials.

#### DET 131 DIV LOC BTY

43. The detachment's Operational Report is attached - Annex L.

#### Annexures

- 44. Report on firing trials of the Cartridge 105mm Anti Personnel XM546.
  - Agenda for Technical Conference. b.
  - Minutes of Technical Conference held 9 and 10 Feb 67. C.
  - Minutes of debriefing Operation BRIBIE. d.
  - 161 Fd Bty RNZ1 Conversion to M2A2 Training Programme. e.
  - Monthly Sick Report Feb 67. f.
  - Report on Liaison Visit to Long Binh by Capt B CAMPTON. g.
  - Report by Maj L R BAILEY, visiting CMF Officer. h.
  - Returnee Report (HUYNH VAN HOA). j.
  - Returnee Report (VO VAN LONG). k.

Lieutenant Colonel

Commanding Officer

draft approved by Gommanding Officer

AnnexA to 1 Fd Regt RAA Operational Report No 7 dated

R1300/1/9

1 Fd Regt RAA AAF VIETNAM AFPO 4 C/- GPO SYDNEY

Margarette.

HQ AFV

Copies to
HQ 1 ATF
AHQ (DRA)
School of Artillery

# REPORT ON FIRING TRIALS OF THE CARTRIDGE 105MM ANTIPERSONNEL XM546

#### General

1. On 5 Feb 67 103 Fd Bty carried out trials in firing of guns in methods useful for local defence of gun area. Part of the trial was to fire ten rounds of Cartridge 105mm Anti-personnel XM546. This firing was carried out before this regiment received instructions not to fire this particular ammunition.

# Fuze Settings

- 2. Since the ammunition is designed for the US 105mm How M2A2, some degree of trial and error (based on known MVs) had to be used to achieve a reasonable fuze setting. Only two charges, 6 and 7, are supplied and Charge 6 was used as it was considered that Charge 7 might cause damage to the gun carriage. At this time the provisional firing tables had not been received.
- It was found that a fuze setting of 0.5 produced a burst less than 20m from the muzzle. This produced an excellent effect over the area immediately in front of the gun and there was no evidence of flechettes to the rear of the burst or outside the flank limits given for the projectile contents. However it is considered that a muzzle burst (for which the round, when received, is set) may be dangerous for the detachment particularly when guns are not fitted with shields as is the general practice in this theatre.
- 4. A fuze setting of 0.8 and 0.9 produced good results down range with the bursts occurring 150-200m from the muzzle and the apparent effect of the flechettes extending 400-450m from the burst.

#### Effect on the gun

Although the steel driving band had the effect of leaving a different colouring in the bore compared to the usual driving band, an extensive LAD check, carried out immediately on completion of firing, revealed no damage to piece or carriage.

6.....

It is stressed that only ten rounds were fired and undoubtedly sustained firing of this ammunition would cause some damage to the gun. However, tactically, there would be no need for continued sustained firing in the local defence role.

#### Conclusion

- 7. This round is invaluable to the defence of gun areas and would be, without doubt, the quickest and most effective means of repelling an attack
- 8. The cartridge XM546 is now under a total ban for use with the L5. It is recommended that, as a matter of urgency, acceptance trials be completed as soon as possible.

Lieutenant Colonel Commanding Officer

# AGENDA FOR TECHNICAL CONFERENCE

# 1. Command and Control

- a. Orders
- b. Reconnaisance
- c. Grouping of Artillery resources
- d. Rear elements
- e. General

# 2. Communications

- a. Radio
- b. Line
- c. Liaison
- d. Security
- e. General

# 3. Fire Support

- a. Contact drills
- b. DFs
- c. H & I
- d. Fire plans
- e. Clearance and safety
- f. Fire discipline
- g. C of M and prediction
- h. Target records
- I. General

#### 4. CB

- a. CB planning
- b. Mortreps lightreps and flarereps
- c. Retaliation
- d. General

# 5. Movement

- a. Unit transport
- b. TCV
- c. APC
- d. UH ID
- e. CH 47
- f. General

# 6. Local Defence

a. General

# 7. General

- a. Ammunition mulfunctions
- b. CP log books
- c. Other points

# MINUTES OF A TECHNICAL CONFERENCE HELD AT 1 FD REGT RAA ON 9 AND 10 FEB 67

All Regimental Officers (less those required on duty) Present: plus:

Capt H WARREN LO 1/83 US Arty Bn

RSM

Acting Svy Offr Acting Sig Offr

Action By

#### Command and Control

#### a. Orders

1.

(1) There is a requirement for the agency moving guns to be allotted to the Regiment (normally In Sp) in TF orders for an operation CO

(2) There is a requirement for co-ord between TF, Inf Bns and Regiment, on the use of codes, CO nicknames, and clear radio messages

# b. Reconnaisance

(1) FOs should always report on possible gun areas. (Need for ground recce before a mov is not neg ted by such reports).

FOs

# c. Grouping of Artillery Resources

- (1) RHQ will deploy whenever two or more Fd Btys are deployed together.
- (2) One radar will normally be deployed with a fire support base (leaving one in base area) as soon as radars are working.

#### Rear Elements

(1) There is a requirement for substantial increase in the unit establishment in order to provide for adequate simultaneous operation and defence of both an operational fire support base as well as the TF base area. Amendment toestb will be submitted

2IC BKs

#### Communications

#### a. Radio

(1) Two types of lead are still required in order to make PRC T25 radios complete. Follow up of QM indents is required.

103 Bty There is a requirement for a larger pool of Adjt PRC 25 sets. RVE to be submitted.

(3) Previously submitted RVE for 292 aerials requires follow up action.

Adjt

#### b. Line

- (1) More telephones are required to equip both BKs base area and fwd operational areas. Further RVEs Adjt required.
- (2) Aust field telephone does not withstand service Sig O. conditions. Defect reports should be submitted. BKs
- (3) Switchboards A new type of switchboard containing more jacks has been requested for installation in base area allowing normal switchboard to be deployed. Follow up action is required
- (4) Procedure Regtl switch has a bad name for courtesy and response. Improvement is required. Sig 0.
- (5) New name is required for Regtl switch Adjt
- (6) Permanent Lines Re-arrangement is required, to provide:
  - (a) A Bty-2/35 US Arty removed from Regtl Fire Orders line.
  - (b) A Bty 2/35 US Arty to be included on a local defence line from Regtl CP.
  - (c) TF Arty fire orders line between Arty Tac Hq, 1 Fd Regt CP and 1/83 FDC

# Sig O.

QM

#### c. Liaison

- (1) Arty Tic HQ should relay fire orders BC from outside sources to either Regtl CP or 1/83 HQ Bty
- (2) When working adjacent to other formations Arty LOs with own communications need to be exchanged in order to simplify inter formation calls for fire and clearances.

# d. Security

- (1) Use of the term "Foxhound" as an arm indicator is to cease. "Foxhound" is to be used as an All appointment title only, and "India" as the arm indicator for all infantry.
- (2) Use of the appointment title "Sunray" is to be in accordance with STAA pam 7. (i.e. "Sunray" refers to the commander at any level and may be qualified by use of "My" "Your"" "His" "Our" "Their"
- (3) Use of PLUTO code for H&Is will be reconsidered. CO Meanwhile PLUTO code remains operative.
- (4) DFs and other targets to be recorded by firing are to be sent in clear, not code.
- (5) Targets once engaged are to be referred to All
- (6) Locstats Use of all others in base loc is breach of security
- (7) Mass requests from stations to close down on return from Ops gives away useful information. Stations are to seek this permission by line

Gen	eral		
(1) addr	Loc	stats are to be read back by the first d-others acknowledge.	All
(2) with	Ser "ou	ials of tidlers are to be answered back t" not "over" as in packets of fire orders.	All
(3) will	The	question of whether passwords are required taken up with HQ 1 ATF.	Adjt
(4) Bns	The and	need for common nicknames between TF, Inf Regt will be taken up with HQ 1 ATF	Adjt
(5) on re	Ope adio	rators and users are to speak more slowly nets	All
(6)	SOT		
(0)	52 (0)	Distr to be increased to 18 per Bty	Sig O.
	(b) fre thi	At present in TF, callwords apply to a quency, NOT to a unit. It is felt that s is wrong and matter will be taken up h 1 ATF	Adjt
(7)	join	A Procedures. Where an FO or other station is a foreign net he should retain his imental callword rather than Bty callword	All
Fire	Sup	port	
	for	Contact Drills. Sitreps are preferred to mal contact reports. The Sitrep should e all the available info.	FOs
	ъ.	<u>DFs</u>	
		(1) Encoding. See para 3d above	30
		(2) A target which is moved after recording by firing is to be given a new tgt number. The previous tgt (with its tgt number and grid reference) may then be retained or cancelled as desired.	FOs
	e. West	Survey. Datum points are to be established tof NUI DAT for calibration checks ASP	OC 131 2IC
	d.	H & I Fire	
		(1) Gun-posms should be added to the H & I programme after vacation.	IO
		(2) Circulation. The Regtl CP will circulate areas and timings to Bty CPs. Bty CPs inform FCCs for clearances to Arty Tac	(Adjt GPOs BCs
	e.	Fire Plans.	//w navotra-
		(1) Tiddler forms are to be headed "Btys to engage" not "Tps" or "Guns"	Adjt GPOs FOs
	70	(2) Fire unit for mors is to be confirmed as either a pl or sec	BCs Adjt
	f.	Clearance and Safety	
		(1) US pattern non oil-filled compasses are to be withdrawn. Report stating that these compasses are unsatisfactory is to be submitt	BKs QM ed

4.

(2) Suggested amendment to Sec Comd's drills will be prepared to include comparison of QEs on the guns.

# g. Fire Discipline

- (1) It is to be clarified whether timings in a fire plan refer to time of firing or TOT.

  (Pam 2 Part 4 para 42 refers).
- (2) "Ready" is to be used in accordance with Fire Discipling Pam 2 Part 1 para 90. The previous Regimental instruction on reporting "Ready" is cancelled.

# h. Target Records

- (1) 5RAR mortars fit in with the Arty system of target numbering. 6RAR-who do not fit in should not use mortar numbers which resemble Arty numbers (i.e.four figures)

  BC
  101
  Bty
- 5. <u>CB</u>
  - a. Mortreps. To be sent in by all, quickly and accurately. Regiment is too blase.
  - b. New Lightrep/Flareup pro-formas were issued. Old pro-formas are to be destroyed.
- 6. Movement.
  - a. Amendments to Unit SOPs are to be prepared. A working group will be assembled for this purpose chaired by the 2IC and including BKs.
  - b. APC maximum weights are to be clarified 2IC
- 7. Local Defence. Local defence in the base area is to be continually improved. In particular every soldier is to know his position at stand to, his task, arcs of fire, and a munition resupply etc.

Captain Adjutant

# MINUTES OF DEBRIEFING, OP BRIBIE, HELD AT 1 FD REGT RAA 20 FEB 67

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4	œ	0	2001	·	1 2

Commanding Officer Second in Command Battery Commander 101 Fd Bty RAA Officers of 101 F1 Bty RAA Adjutant

Action by

#### 1. Communications

A frequency is required for the Regiment for Adjt air/ground communications in both movement and resupply

b. During air movement and resupply, the station at the PZ is to use (where applicable) the name of 2IC the PZ as his callsign. e.g. A resupply from 101 Base area to 101 Bty (fwd) would have C/S "KOALA" at the PZ and C/S 10 being 101 Bty (fwd) BKs

c. Pending altocation of new Regimental frequencies
TF will be asked to rearrange the present allocation
within the Regiment so that SOIs will show as Regimental Adjt main that frequency which the Regimental net is in fact using.

#### 2. Fire Support

#### a. Close Tgts

- (1) Attention is drawn to the "Close" Target procedure FOs laid down in AT Vol III Pam 2 1966 Part 3 Section 18, GPO in particular Part C, "Procedure at the Gun Position"
- (2) Clinometer laying is to be used for all "Close" GPOs missions in future.

#### 3. Movement

2IC a. Regiment is to be prepared to mov by Caribou BKs as well as other means of air tpt (CH-47, UH-ID)

b. TF will be asked to establish (or expand) helicopter refuelling point in order to allow for CH-47 refuelling to eliminate requirement for CH-47s to return to VT in mid Adjt deployment.

Four sets of goggles for sub-units (101, 103, 131, Adjt QM HQ Bty) are required to equip hook-up teams for CH-47 movement.

Adjt d. A set of illuminated panels for marking of IZs by night is required in each sub-unit (101, 103, 131, HQ Bty)

#### 4. Administration

a. All resupply is to be directed through the 2IC not direct from Bty (fwd) to Bty (rear) 2IC BK 101

b. A unit commodity code is to be introduced

2IC

# 161 FD BTY RNZA-CONVERSION TO THE HOWITZER LIGHT TOWED 105mm M2A2 TRAINING PROGRAMME

- 1. The timings allocated to training are 0900 hrs to 1145 hrs and 1330 hrs to 1600 hrs daily. These timings have generally been adhered to throughout the course, interupted only be the engagement of fire missions.
- 2. The outline training programme for phase 1 of the conversion is as follows:

Day 1 and 2 Battery surveyor training Day 3 and 4 Equipment 105mm M2A2 Equipment-inspection, servicing and preventive Day 5 maintenance. Day 6 and 7 Gun Drill Day 8 Sight tests Day 9 Gun drill Officer training and CP exercise Day 10 Day 11 Gun drill Battery drills. To exercise CP teams and Day 12 gun detachments

- 3. Phase 2 of the conversion programme consists of a calibration check by firing, preparation of MV correction tables and a Battery test-firing practice.
- 4. The date for commencement of phase 2 depends on the arrival of the RAEME Test and Servicing equipment. Until the RAEME tests have been completed none of the 105mm M2A2 equipment can be fired.

The outline programme for phase 2 is as follows:

Day 1 Calibration check by firing, of the standard gun with both Aust and US ammunition.

Day 2 Calibration check by firing, of the remaining guns against the standard gun using US ammunition.

Day 3 and 4 Preparation of MV correction tables in Mils and metres for Low angle and High angle for all charges.

Day 5 Battery test-firing practice.

#### MEDICAL IN CONFIDENCE

Annex F to 1 Fd Regt Operational Report No 7

F. 3: R526.1.1

1 . .

1 Fd Regt RAA NUI DAT

#### MONTHLY SICK REPORT MONTH ENDING 28 Feb 67

ILLNESS	HQ Bty	101 Fd Bty	103 Fd Bty	161 Fd Bty	DET 131 DIV LOC	APC SQN	LAD	TOTAL
INTESTINAL	2	1	2	1	Bty		2	8
EYE			1	1	1	2	1	6
EAR	1	2	5	4	1	2		15
NOSE OR	2			1				3
SKIN	4	6	2	3	2	2	1	20
RESPIRATORY								
PUO								
PYSCHIATRIC		1					2_	3
AD	12	9	8	7	2	5	3	46
ATTLE REVIEW VD	16 21	13	8 7	10 1	8 2	7	5 5	67 52
INJURIES		7	3	3	2	3		18
HOSPITAL ADMISSIONS	6	2	4	4	3	3	1	23
MISCELLANEOUS	3	5	2	2	2	3	2	19
TOTALS	67	57	42	37	23	. 32	22	280

RMOs Comments:

See attached

COs Comments :

"VD figures are far too high. Bty Comds are to devote attention to improving this position and in particular control the number of personnel allowed into Vung Tau. Members contracting VD will not RTA until completely cured.

Lieutenant Colonel Commanding Officer

# Distribution CO

HQ 1 ATF (for SMO)

# Copy To

The state of the s			
RMO			
HQ Bty	(Extract	only)	
101 Fd Bty RAA	( tt	11	
103 Fd Bty RAA	( 11	11 )	
161 Fd Bty RNZA	( "	11	
Det 131 Div Loc			
Bty RAA	( 11	11 )	
1 Fd Regt LAD	( "	# )	
1 APC Sqn	( "	11 )	
Comd Diary (4)			
File (1)			

# REPORT ON LIAISON VISIT LONG BINH BY CAPT B CAMPTON

- 1. The officer left NUI DAT 0830 hours on 26 Jan 67, and flew to BIEN HOA by RAAF courier. On arrival at BIEN HOA, a visit to the mapping and intelligence section of the Engr Sqn was carried out.
- Significant points obtained from this are:
  - a. SVN is being re-mapped systematically by the recovery of 1st order trig points and the consequent checking of all other trig points. Any information of trig points or obvious survey marks found by our patrols would be appreciated.
  - b. Experiments are being carried out with various printing processes, e.g., Ink on to plastic paper, to make more durable maps. No progress at this stage.
- 3. During the latter part of the morning and the early afternoon, some time was spent with the 8/25 TAB (Target Acquisition Bn).
- 4. This TAB is made up much the same as our Div Loc Bty, with the exception of an Arty Int Section. The only section I could visit was the survey section, and the Survey Information Centre (SIC), equivalent to our SRC. At this stage, the section was out in the field doing survey from III Corps into IV Corps. It is interesting to note that this section is equipped with MRA1 Tellurometer and their standard is equal to the Div Loc Bty.
- 5. PM 26 Jan 67 was spent at 66 Engr Sqn (Topo) operations. The officer was taken through the complete process of map making:
  - a. Field survey work
  - b. Air photographic interpretation.
  - c. Other sources which go to make up maps, e.g. Vis recce, recce reports, etc.
  - d. Air photo mosaics.
- 6. This data was then processed and put onto plates for printing. Whilst only the brief details have been mentioned, readers may be aware of the main principle of printing.
- 7. Lt Col BENTON, US Army, gave a briefing on PHOTOGRAMMETRIC survey. This typeof survey, once all problems have been sorted out, will be invaluable for target area survey. To this stage, trials have been conducted and target area survey. has been calculated to within 8-12 metres. I feel that this would be accurate enough for prominent points on the ground, e.g. DF or areas to be engaged, but not good enough for registration of a point.
- 8. The equipment used to place in control points is NOT in service within this theatre, viz., strong magnification instruments, however the Topo Svy Det is equipped with a stereoscope which may be used but NOT to any degree of accuracy. A precis with more detail is to be written at a later date.

- Complete briefing on the H and I programme instigated by IIFFV.

  The sources of informatical with which the targets are decided on, are similar to ones used by us, e.g. SLIR, SPAR, agents, Red Haze, etc. All these H and I targets are prepared by the S2 Branch (Int) and passed to the FSCE for firing. Clearances to fire are obtained through group artillery and co-ordinated at the FSCE/TOC.
- 10. The officer then visited the TOC, which is concerned with current operations only. Planning was carried out in staff sections outside the TOC. The TOC was set up in one large building. In this building, the following was carried out:
  - a. Operations branch supervising and having staff responsibility for co-ordinating and intergrating all current plans for fire and movement.
  - b. As part of the G2 Ops element were, Int and FSCE.
- in one from facilitated co-ordination as it was only a matter of reaching over a table and talking to arrange fire support. It was found that the primary function of the FSCC was to co-ordinate all supporting fire onto surface targets. Amongst those surface targets co-ordinated were:
  - a. Those targets from air support element.
  - b. Trail dust.
- 12. G2 Air came to the FSCC for co-ordination of air support, and with the minimum of effort all fire support was co-ordinated.
- 13. The officer returned by road to SAIGON, and air to NUI DAT.

B CAMPTON Capt

# REPORT BY MAJ L R BAILEY VI IT NO CMF OFFICER VID: HQ I STRUCTION 877/R1/45

## 1. PERSONAL PARTICUL RS

I am 352355 Maj L R BAILEY, Battery Commander of 23 Bty, FRANKSTON, VICTORIA, a sub unit of 15 Fd Regt RAA DANDENONG. Except for one 12 month posting to CSTU Southern Command for promotion coaching I have held Field Regimental postings during the whole period of my commissioned rank.

# 2. MOVEMENT AND ADDITISTRATION

The frustrations incountered in being documented and moved from Southern Command Personnel Depot to RICHMOND RAAF Base prior to air= lifting to VIETNAM were disturbing. I was medically examined at the combined Recruiting Centre Malbourne (loss of ½ a day of work) I made 2 trips to Southern Command Personnel Depot (40 mile round trip on each occasion and loss of 1 day's work) to be photographed and issued with a rain coat and clasp knile. Had it not been that one of my employers is the Commander of 4 Task Fonce I doubt whether I could have obtained the time. When I finally a rohed into Southern Command Personnel Depot (a 4 dollar taxi fare) more delays occurred as the necessary paper work it that centre was extremely vague. I was then taken to the RTO at Speancer Strong Station MTLBOURNE where I was issued with a rail warrant for a truit leaving 4 hours later for SYDNEY. Next day was spent at Eastern Coun and Personnel Depot where in half an hour I was kitted out—the rest of the cay was free time. The next morning I was taken from ECPD to I HMOND RAAF Base for airlift on the RAAF "Courier".

It would have siving if my unit could have arranged for kitting-out and obtaining of the reil warrant to get me to ECPD in time for only an overnight say prior to leaving on the RAAF Courier on the next morning.

#### 3. AIM

To study Fire C a rol Centres at Battalions, the Arty Tac centre at Task Force an lattery Routine in a Fd Regt in SOUTH VIETNAM, Dealing with each in tuni-

a. FCC'S The CC's at 5 and 6 Bns RAR were quite different to the ones currently creanised in exercises in AUSTRALIA.

The tendency seems to be to incorporate the FCC as part of the Bn CP which up to about 3 years ago was standard practice. I agree that the advantages of having the one entity far out—weigh the disadvantages. The chief advantages are the saving of staff and equipment and the CO's of the Bns apparently realized this very early when their units commenced operations in this theatre.

b. Arty Tac There is little I can comment upon. On each occasion when I visited the centre operations were relatively quite but the explanations of procedures given to me by the duty officers and the confident manner in which the staff reacted to day to day work left one with an impression of cool efficiency.

c. Bty Routine My study of routine on the gun position was more detailed. On the gun position of 101 Fd Bty, to which sub-unit I was attached during my visit, the position had been systematically developed to almost the ultimate level of desirability. Rosters were such that shooting could be undertiken at moment's notice with minimum delay at any time but without interference with adm and maintenance programmes. The standard of CP staff and gun numbers was extremely good and efficient not withstanding wastage of personnel on leave, sick and postered for adm tasks. Stand to's were observed strictly and methodically and were impressive to watch. Recreational and relaxation facilities were good and continual efforts were being made to improve these essential facts all the time.

# 4. OBSTRVATIONS OF OPERATIONS

ability to put accurate rounds on the ground at all times was maintained. Movement of guns was by road and by section of 3 guns at a time. The deployment I witnessed on this particular occasion was not smooth, probably due to the fact that the APC escort of infantry and guns seemed to take some time to get organized. Only rudimentary digging was attempted at each gun position but this was due to the continuous number of fire missions which were being fired and also to the fact that the Bty in the field was manned by only approximately 60 personnel. The rest of the Bty was required back at base for adm and local defence tasks. In the field local defence of the gun position was augmented by a Coy of infantry, a standard practice in this theatre, but which rarely seems to be available on exercises in AUSTFADIA.

- Whilst observing this particular operation I also witnessed an efficient casevac by helicopter and an air strike.

3 sections of infantry, an MFC with a mortar section mounted in 2 APC's and an Arty FO. Technically the sucep was probably good but due to policy the APC's were restricted in their movement due to possible enemy anti-tank weapon sites and one could not help having the feeling that an enemy battalion could have missed being located by this means had it so wished.

The noticebly surprising thing about the operations was the apparent lack of concern of a possible nortar attack. At one time I counted 24 vehicles, 6 guns and about 150 personnel in a 100 metres radius. Equipment was also strewn around in this space. When I enquired about t is, the answer given was that enemy mortars had not been used against Aust forces in operations for some considerable time.

#### 5. CENERAL OF SERVATIONS

a. Church services appeared to be patronised by an unusually high percentage of all ranks.

b. I attended a memorial service at 6 En and witnessed a memorable spectacle.

c. I was briefed on the work of the Civil Affairs section and taken on a short tour to see the results of some of its work. Civic aid occupies a large space in AUSTRALIAN press reports but I did not see unit or individual Civic aid programme to which the press has given prominence. From what I have seen I loubt whether there is manpower or time for Task Force to unlertake my large Civic Aid programme.

- d. All Regimental Officers, WOs and senior NCOs gave me maximum assistance answering a continual barrage of questions and making underserved efforts to get information and maps to assist me to pass on my observations to officers in AUSTRALIA who receive very little information relating to the AUSTRALIAN effort in SOUTH VIETNAM. Without their co-operation my aim could not have been achieved.
- e. The lack of a pass-word for safety reasons to me was unique and sensible.
- f. Trouble experienced in wear of gun components (chiefly sight brackets and elevating gear) could be overcome by having a component life similar to the system adopted for gun barrels. From the experience of 101 F1 Bty guns the sight bracket life would be 1500-1600 EFC's.

## 5. CONCLUSIONS

- a. Apart from the fact that this visit gave me an insight into tactical techniques employed in this theatre, it enabled me to make a comparison between my own sub-unit and the ones operating here. This gave me a clear indication as to what is required in training to bring my sub-unit up to a comparable standard.
- b. Because there is always a requirement to leave a number of personnel in base for essential tasks when a unit goes out on operations, there would appear to be a good case for carrying a supernumary strength in each unit for this purpose. In a field battery an additional officer and 40 men would be required before it would be practicable to put a complete battery in the field on operations.
- c. The light scale allocation of vehicles to a bty in this theatre puts a heavy strain on Bty transport particularly when movement is by road. The maintand supplement of 4 x 2½ ton vehicles to a Bty would ease the problem of moving by road. The light scale is not designed to move the complete Bty personnel and equipment but because tactical requirements demand it on regular occasions, the vehicles are often seriously overloaded. In addition there is a need for load carrying transport for Bty base administration.
- d. Looking at the scheme of bringing CMF officers to this theatre as observers in an unselfish manner, one cannot help but feel that more junior officers (Lieutenants and junior Captains) would get greater value out of a visit than a sub-unit commander. Observation of those with operational experience would put all the text-books into their right perspective for these officers. I would therefore recommend that consideration be given to including these officers in future visits.

Subject:

# RETURNEE FROM VC D445 BATTALION

# 1. INTRODUCTION

- A. On 20 Feb 67, Huynh Van Hoa a mile aged 21 years was interviewed at this unit. He had left his unit, D445 Battalion approximately one month ago and had spent the time interval recovering from a severe attack of malaria and assisting ARVN forces.
  - B. After years of indoctrination Huynh left his birth place of Hoi My (YS5055) at the age of 18 years and joined the VC. He openly admits that it was the glamour of being a guerilla that attracted him more than anything. However the deciding factor was hearing a bugle call from D445 nearby one day. This appears to have been part of a recruiting drive by this battalion. After a short period of training he was assigned to a mortar crew (60mm). He did not stay long in this position however as he was not, at that stage, very strong and found it difficult to carry parts of the equipment. He was therefore posted to C1 Coy of D445 as a riflemen.
  - C. When he rallied Huynh was an assistant squad leader of 9 squad, 3 platoon, C1 Coy. He states that he rallied for several reasons:
    - (1) The VC life was not as he imagined it would be although he enjoys soldiering.
    - (2) Living conditions are poor with no leave being granted because the officers foor that members would rully whilst on leave. In fact Huynh was allowed to visit his parents on one occasion but was escorted all the time he was absent from the unit.
    - (3) Pay was poor: the allowance being 4 Piastre per day for rice and 15 Piastre per month for cigarettes. However he has not received any pay for several months.
    - (4) He suffered from a severe bout of malaria and was refused medical aid. He was told that if he wanted any medical supplies he would have to arrange for his parents to bring them to him.

#### 2. GENERAL IMPRESSIONS

- A. Huynh was little nervous at first but later when he was more relaxed, he appeared to be a keen infantryman, intelligent and had considerable ability and leadership. This borne out by his position after only 3 years with the VC.
- B. When talking of tactics he became most enthusiastic but had the usual infantrymens couldn't care- less attitude to A and Q matters. He was immensely proud of having been a member of D445 saying that they were by far the best troops in the area. This attitude was encouraged in order to obtain as much information as possible. During the interview both the 175mm and 155mm artillery fired but the rallier did not flinch at all. This cannot be said for some Australians who have been here 9 months or more. Physically he was larger than the average South Vietnamese and had plenty of meat on him. He could read and write and appeared to have no difficulty with a standard 1 50,000 map.

#### 3. COMMUNICATIONS

- a. D445 has one AN PRC 10 set per Coy but cannot always use them because of the extreme shortage of batteries. They have no set frequencies, but prior to an operation they are usually issued with two frequencies to use during any subsequent battle presumably main and alternative frequencies.
- b. 5 Division has at least one 25 set to his knowledge.
- c. On radio intercept: he stated that D445 do not attempt this. Not only have they no eq ipment but no one in the bastalion speaks English.
- d. A lot has been said on the firing of warning shots. As far as D445 is concerned, one or two shots mean nothing as it may be someone hunting. Three shots mean "enemy in the area", four shots mean "enemy leaving the area, and five or six shots mean "enemy SAS/LRRP patrol in the area".
- e. D445 do use bugles to communicate between Coys. Huynh does not know what these are, he thinks that it is any old note just to let one company commander know where the other company is situated. He did know the calls for "attack" and withdraw". The music for which is attached as Annex A. A tape recording has been made of these as they would sound using the type of bugle used by D445. This recording is available on request.
- f. Communications as to camp locations, booby traps etc are only by word of mouth except camp areas or possible ambush sites where a notice in Vietnamese is placed saying, "Danger, keep out" sometimes just a drawing of a skull and crossbones suffices.

# 4. AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY - D445

- a. D445's area of responsibility has been defined generally as the LONG HAI penisular exclusive of the mountain range. The northern boundary being LTL 23 excluding DAT DO and extending as far as the SONG RAI (generally YS 60 Easting).
- b. There are no safe areas but "Q" elements with stores of rice ammunition and supplies were situated in the scrub/jungle area commencing at YS 5157 and extending generally NE in a strip approx 1000 metres wide to the YS 55 Easting. These consist of several dumps with only a few gaurds but Huynk doubts if they will still be there now.
- c. There are two squads, each of about ten men, of local guerillas operating in the general Grid Squares YS 5456, 5457, 5556, 5557, 5657. The river to the immediate North of this area (Song Ba Dap) being known as the "VC River". D445 do have a very small number of men acting as observation post personnel in the Long Hai mountains.

#### 5. TACTICS

- General (1) The company commander has given orders that if contact is made with Australian troops the company will withdraw irrespective of numerical superity. Huynh was opposed to this but thinks that this order is from the battalion commander. There appears to be a tremendous respect and fear of the Australian soldier in the battalion
- (2) It is a standing order to follow any Australian patrols but will not follow closely as it is believed that Australians circle back on themselves to prevent this.

- -(3) When a patrol from D445 moves, the last man is ordere to sweep the track with a brush to prevent any tracks being left. They stick to tracks and very rarely move off them as navigation then becomes a major difficulty.
- (4) On being questioned as to why, in the past, members of his battalion had fired one or two rounds of SA at aircraft Huynh stated that it was by impulse of the soldiers themselves and that these actions angered the commander. The soldiers concerned had been punished.
- (50) Airstrikes, except B52, do not worky the battalion as they maintain that they have plonty of warning, giving them time to get under cover. This is reasonable as the FAC makes several circuits prior to a strike and the strike aircraft are easily heard. The whole battalion fears H & I artillery this is because they have no prior warning.

#### b. CAMOUFLAGE

No great precautions are taken by the battalion. They do not camouflage against being seen by ground forces, only from air. This is done by each man cutting and carrying a small bush or branch. When an aircraft passes overhead they just crouch or kneel down holding the bush or branch above them. Ende remain perfectly still.

# c. ATTACK

The principles of attack are as taught. They have the usual firm base, extensive reconsissance, main attack force and reserve. Nothing new was learned.

#### 1. DEFENCE

The had no experience of defence work apart from pits and trenches we already have had experience of. Apparently the policy of D445 is always to withdraw from camps leaving enough of a delaying element behind to ensure the safe evacuation of supplies and equipment.

# e. WITHDRAWAL

- (1) were, he explained, two types of withdrawl: the hasty and the planned. He clarified this by explaining that a hasty retreat was nothing more than a survival of the fitest. Far removed from this was the planned withdrawl.
- (2) This is done by first positioning troops to form an effective delaying element of usually squad size to be used only if absolutly necessary. The battalion then withdraws by companies at 15 minute intervals, in single file. Not as previously thought, in smaller groups. Various groups are assigned to carry their dead, wounded, weapons and equipment and because of this, he continued, they had to take many rests and progress was slow.

# 6. TRAINING

- a. There are no ranges as we know them, for two reasons: the first is because of the noise factor, the second the shortage of ammunition. Recruits do however have to practice constantly bringing their weapons to a ready to fire position at a given target.
- b. They had a small amount of bayonet drills but this was ordered at squad level only and was not effective
- c. All recruits are made proficient in all arms, machine guns and mortars to complete their basic training.

# 7. PRISONERS OF WAR

However he has seen PW's. Many months ago he saw two American: prisoners but could not remember where. ARVN prisoners he has been told, are given lectures and if they consequently support the VC they are released. He stated that they shoot any ARVN officers captured.

# 8. RESUPPLY FACILITIES

D445 have many storage locations in the area already mentioned (YS 5157 and extending generally NE in a strip 1000 metres wide to the YS 55 Easting) this being known as DAP TAU. He believes this area to be heavily booby-trapped. Rice, foodstuffs and other supplies are provided from the villagers of HOI MY (YS 5156) and XA PHUOC LOI (YS 500570) and surrounding areas. The supplies etc are taken by ox cart to the area by the villagers, between 0900H and 1700H and the loads are concealed under dried grass or matting. However, during holiday periods groups of armed VC soldiers from D445 visit the villages and collect their own food. There is no water resupply therefore, as is already known, the VC are never far from water.

# 9. STRENGTH AND RECRUITING

At the time of rallying D445 had just in excess of 300 men. Recruits are obtained mostly from the LONG DAT peninsular area ie DAT DO, PHUOC LOI, HOI MY, PHUOC HAI etc.

# 10. MORALE

a. Up to the battle of LONG TAN the morals of the battalion was very high. However, although most of the battalion did not take part in the battle, morale dropped considerably and has gone steadily downhill since. Most of the soldiers wish to rally but are prevented from doing so by threat to both themselves and their families by the Political Officers and Hard Core members. Hughn suggested that if the battalion was located, Australian forces should commence a sweep through the area and at the same time have an aeroplane broadcast to the VC telling them to sling their weapons pointing downwards when they saw the Australians. He felt that most of the soldiers would then rally. They would not do so before seeing the Australians as the Political Officer would shoot them.

b. There must be a great fear within the battalion of the soldiers rallying as leave is not allowed.

# 11. MEDICAL TREATMENT

a. D445 has four fully trained medical orderlies each better trained than our own orderlies but no where near the standard of a trained doctor.

b. He stated that when a man had to be taken to their hospital it was at least two days walk away. He indicated that the hospital was in the area of XUAN SON (YS 5777) but could not exactly locate it.

# t2. TAX COLLECTION

D445 do collecttaxes, mainly from farmers. If a farmer does not pay his taxes he is prevented from farming his land. This is hearsay as Huynh has never collected taxes.

## 3. NG TAN

The version of the LONG TAN battle that he knows is as allows.

- D445 minus heavy weapons and a small protective element, were ordered out of the area and went into the vicinity of YS 5668. Both 5 and 9 Divisions came into the area and the plan was to mortar 1 ATF base and lure a Battalion out into their area. They would then annihilate this battalion. The mortaring took place but the plan did not eventuate as thought. (It is the writers opinion that the Aust Force were to have been led past the area of LONG TAN and engaged outpof gun range. The enemy force at LONG TAN being used to cut of my retreat).
- b. The reasons for not attempting to attack the Australian base were that they would loose too many men in capturing it. When they had done this the Americans would surround them and they would be trapped.

Of course this imformation cannot be relied on but it does give food for thought.

#### 14. GENERAL

- a. D445 has often described itself as a mechanised battalion. Huynh confirmed that they had no vehicles but the term "mechanised" referred to the fact that they had crew served weapons.
- b. He also stated that, to the best of his knowledge, no one in D445 carried AK or SKS weapons.
- c. He had not seen any reinforcements from NORTH VIETNAM with the battalion but states that often there are parties of up to squad size of VC from 9 Div in the area. On talking to them they said that 9 Div had no permanent location but was "centralised". He did not know what they meant by this.
- d. The battalion moves normally in company sized groups.
- e. They do not have any mistresses with the bittalion but there are women cadre who are fairly free with their favours. However if the Bn CO hears of any involvement between the sexes he posts one or the other away and may take disciplinary action.
- f. During operations this battalion and SAS patrols have noticed that some trees have large notches cut in them and a peculiar liquid is collected. Hughn says that these trees are known as off-trees. The liquid is used to replenish their oil lamps. There is a second reason for this also: if the night is really dark and there has to be a big movement a guide goes on shead and lights these trees which give a dim light and light up a definite route. The last man in the column extinguishing the lights as he passes.

#### 15. CONCLUSION

a. Talking to an ex-enemy has been a very enlighting experience. It has helped tremendously in learning how he thinks, his prides, training, jealousies and general attitude. It is felt that talking to more ralliers can give us a better understanding of our enemy.

Annex K to 1 F Regt RAA Operational Re ort No 7

Intelligence ction 6RAR

Subject:

# RETURNEE FROM D445 BATTALION

# 1. INTRODUCTION

a. On 25 Feb 67, VO VAN LONG, a male was interviewed at this unit. He had rallied on 12 February 1967 and had spent the intervening time assisting the ARVN or at the CHIEU HOI centre in BARIA.

- b. VO was born and brought up in the hamlet of XA LONG MY (YS-4955). There used to be an ARVN post there but after repeated attacks, in 1960/61, the ARVN left. The VC immediately occupied the hamlet and commenced recruiting. The theme used was that the young men of the village would be conscripted into the army by the GVN. That they would be posted far from home and possibly killed. If they joined the VC they would stay in the vicinity of their homes and as for the possibility of being killed; had n't they chased the ARVN away. VO fell for this line and in October 61 joined the VC (cover number 25) and was assigned to a production cell. About October 1965 he transferred to D445 Bn as a rifleman and at the time of rallying he was a section 21C of A3/B2/C2 of that battalion.
- c. His rallying was due to a general dissatisfaction: the VC did not grant him leave. His pay, which was supposed to be one pound of rice and some dried fish each day, was always short and he was constantly hungry. There was a lack of medical attention. He rallied whilst he was still ill and therefore did not bring a weapon as the VC store weapons of members who are ill.

#### 2. GENERAL IMPRESSION

- a. The whole attitude of this man apeared to be false. He very skillfuly avoided answering important questions in most cases. He apeared to be quite intelligent but when asked important questions he invariably changed the subject. He says that he is not able to read a map and no amount of coaxing would get him to even try and understand one. His knowledge of tactics seemed poor and most unenthuisastic. He says that he has no knowledge of any battles and knows nothing of the battle of LONG TAN. This seems unlikely for a man who professes to read and write. He has also been a member of a rifle squad in C2 D445 for some time yet he says he knows nothing of any contacts with the Australians. This is possible but most unlikely as both B and C companies of this battalion were in contact with his company on Operation HOBART on 25 July 1966. It was in this battle that his Coy Commander was killed. He stated that his Coy Comd was killed by artillery but when it was put to him that his commander was only injured by artillery and was shot in the head by VC, he shrugged and said that was possible as he was not a popular man. (At the time it had been thought that this had been done to stop the Coy Commander from giving us information).
  - b. The initial interrogation report states that VO gave several six figure grid references to various places he had mentioned ie DAP THAU FOREST=YS 518577 etc. See preliminary interrogation report 18/2/2 (53). It is impossible to see how he could have done this as he could not do it when interviewed.

He maintains that he could not read a map. It is relised that skilled Vietnamese interrogators had elicited this information, so this point was especially laboured but without results. Thus easting grave doubts on the accuracy of the locations previously given.

#### 3. COMMUNICATIONS

- a. It was confirmed that D445 had one AN PRC 10 set per company.
- b. That they conducted no radio intercept as no one speaks English.
- c. That D445 does have various set calls on the bugle. Vowas more flusical than the previous returnee HUYNH and was able
  to provide the full tune of the attack call. In fact HUYNH had
  only given the first two bars. VO stated that bugle calls
  were only used for "attack", "withdraw" and "victory" (or regroup after victory) calls. There was a "reveille" but this
  was only used in "safe" areas and was now virtually non
  existant. The music for these four calls is attached at Annex
  a and his been recorded on tape which is available on request.
- d. VO stated that he knew nothing of booby trap or camp location markings.

#### 4. AREA OF REPONSIBILITY

VO confirmed that D445's area of responsibility was generally the LONG Halpeninsular and in particular C1 of D445 was reponsible for the general area between DAT DO (YS 4960) and PHUOC LOI (YS 5057) whilst C2's responsibility extended from PHUOC LOI to PHUOC HAI (YS 5153). Of great interest was the point that C3 Coy is always with C4 Coy (known as the artillery Coy). As the Commander of C3 was killed in a recent battle near PHUOC HAI the question might well be asked "Was C3 protecting the withdrawl of C4's heavy weapons in this battle".

# 5. TACTICS

- a. General:
  - (1) Contrary to HUYNH's statement (HUYNH was with C1 Coy) C2 have no instructions to Withdraw from any conatct with Australian troops. Therfore it is not a battalionorder as was thought.
  - (2) Australian patrols are followed. .
  - (3) In C1 Coy troops do not move on formed tracks but through the bush, (borne out in Operation HOBART to some extent).
  - (4) VO knew no one in his company who has fired at any aircraft.
  - (5) All airstrikes (alth ugh he says they are inaccurate) are feared but not as much as artillery.
  - (6) The company moves in single file with three men about fifty metres thead of the main body. In the event of contact these three men are to engage the enemy whilst a plan of action is made. If the enemy are in large numbers the main body will withdraw. If not the main body will move to a flank and attack them.
  - (7) Because of the shortage of ammunition they will avoid all contact with the enemy except planned attacks.

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#### b. CAMOUFLAGE:

- C2-cimouflages the same as C1 except they do camouflage their equipment.

c. ATTACK, DEFENCE, WITHDRAWAL.

Nothing new was learned.

#### 6. TRAINING

a. Training is poor with only training on individual weapons (completely different to HUYNH's statement).

b. Figure targets are used but no shots are fired due to security and shortage of ammunition.

# 7. PRISONERS OF WAR

- - VO had seen PW's-(only-ARVN) but did not know where theywere kept or who kept them.

## 8. RESUPPLY FACILITIES

VO avoided answering any questions on this subject. No amount of questioning could elicit any information from him.

#### 9. STRENGTH AND RECRUITING

VO did not know the strength of the battalion (his company strength being 90) and stated that recruits do come from the LONG HAI peninsular. However there are quite few men in his company who come from "Central VIETNAM".

#### 10. MORALE

Morale is low. The reasons are the same given by HUYNH; most of the battalion appear to want to rally if they were allowed to.

#### 11. MEDICAL TREATMENT

Poor facilities and few stores. He had no knowledge of any hospital.

#### 12. TAX COLLECTION

- VO knew of no-tax collections made by the battalion. He had never collected taxes himself.

#### 13. LIGHTS

VO states that lighting of fires is strictly controlled. His statement agreed with what HUYNH said although he did not mention the lighting of the "oil trees" to blaze a trail on dark nights. He did add that lights were used for night movement. When asked who would light 100-250 lights in an area he said that he did not know but it would certainly not be VC.

#### 14. GENERAL

a. VO has often seen a group of six Vietnamese attached to his company. They wore khaki dress and three carried AK assualt rifles whilst three carried SKS SLR rifles. He was not able to talk to them and said that he did not know where they came from.

. He also said that C4 Coy had two smiper scopes fitted o Mossin Nagant rifles and were used with the machine guns. us was not understood but he could give no reason for this.

The battalion has a very healthy respect for the stralian soldiers. They say that the Australians are very air. That they treat prisoners well and bury VC dead with conour.

- d. V0 maintained that SAU CHANH was still CO of D445 (once again a contradiction to the initial interrogation report).
- e. D445 have no safe areas.
- f. His company does not set any booby traps.
- g. There are no women with his company.

# 15. CONCLUSION

The information given by this man is suspect. He had clean, well manicured hands without callouses. His feet were not really ingrained with dirt as are other recent VC ralliers. He reacted to H & I artillery fire and SA test firing but was a little slow doing it and was thought to be just an act.

6. Once again it has been a very interesting and rewarding experience talking to this man. However he does not appear to be genuine and should not be trusted.

Intelligence Officer 6RAR

#### RESTRICTED

1-1e R569/1/1

1 Fd Regt RAA NUI DAT

26 Dec 66

# STANDARD OPERATIONAL PROCEDURE 1 FIELD REGIMENT RAA

COPY No. 26

1. Attached is 1 Field Regiment RAA SOP, Section 5, Movement.

a Kans Capt

Lieutenant Colonel Commanding Office

Distribution	Copy No
101 Fd Bty RAA 103 Fd Bty RAA 161 Fd Bty RNZA Det 131 Div Loc Bty HQ Bty 1 Fd Regt RAA 1 Fd Regt LAD TAC HQ Regt CP 1 APC Sqn HQ 1 ATF HQ 1 ATF (for G2 Air) CO 2IC Adjt QM RMO IO A Adjt RSO RSM Tpt Offr	1 - 4 5 - 8 9 - 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
Commander's Diary Spare (20)	30 31 - 33 34 - 54

#### DEPORTE CHODE

# STANDARD OPERATIONAL PROCEDURE 1 FIELD REGIMENT RAA

# Section 5 Movement.

#### Ceneral

- 1. The procedures detailed below are designed for the movement of a Field Regiment equipped with the 105mm L5 Pack Howitzer and are set out as follows:
  - a. Part 1 Movement by Road
    - (1) Unit vehicles.
    - (2) Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC)
  - b. Part 2 Movement by Helicopter
    - (1) Iroquois UHID
    - (2) Chinook CH47
  - c. Annexures
    - Annex A Standard Loads
    - Annex B Loads and sequence of Deployment by M113 APC
    - Annex C Loads and sequence of Deployment by ... Iroquois UHID.
    - Annex D Loads and sequence of Deployment by CH47 Chinook.
    - Annex E Movement by Helicopter briefing sheet.
    - Annex F Duties in connection with helicopter movement.
    - Annex G Marshalling Signals
    - Annex H Helicopter Emplaning and Deplaning Drills
    - Annex J Construction and Marking of Landing Sites
- 2. Standard loads have been produced which with few exceptions are satisfactory for movement by any of the above means. Tactical and resupply considerations may result in some modifications of these loads.

# Part 1 : Mov by Rd

- 1. General Concept. Mov by rd is to be avoided when ever possible.
- 2. In RVN, all rds will be considered BLACK and the correct precautions carried out for all mov outside the TF base area( Vide paras 17 19).
- 3. If hels are not aval then protection elms should be arranged from either Armd or Inf units, and APC s or TCV s requested in that order of pri for mov of walking pers. It is highly likely that the Regiment will be placed under Gomd for Mov of the unit sup the protection elms. The Regtl or Bty Convoy Comd must liase with the overall convoy Comd regarding method of conducting the move.
- 4. Rd Mov can therefore be broken into two major divs;
  - a. Pers not carried in unit vehs walking; and
  - b. Pers not carried in unit vehs carried by APC, TCVs.
- 5. Rd Classification. BLACK Rds: The following instrs apply to the mov of all vehs:-
  - (1) All ranks are to be armed with their personal wpns irrespective of the type of veh used or the purpose of the journey.
  - (2) No mov at ni except on ops.
  - (3) Mov of single, soft skinned vehs is not permitted.
  - (4) Every veh is to carry one armed man in addition to the dvr.
  - (5) Tropp convoys are responsible for their protection but use is to be made of escort veh when available or ordered.
  - (6) Non op convoys are only to be moved by auth of RHQ who will arrange escorts.
  - (7) On BLACK roads vehicles are to mov close enough to render mutual assistance in cases of emergency but NOT so close that a small ambush is likely to catch several vehs.
- 6. WHITE Rds. Rds upon which there is considered to be only limited risk of ambush. The following instrs apply to the mov of pers and vehs:
  - (1) Vehs may move singly but are to carry at least one armed man in addition to the dvr.
  - (2) Convoys are to move at normal density in packets of 4 to 6 vehs.
    - (3) An armed escort veh is NOT essential.
- 7. Loading of Wpns. In a black area, weapons are to be loaded and the safety catch applied. In a RESTRICTED or WHITE area full magazines are to be carried but the weapons are not to be loaded. Loading and clearing of weapons are to be supervised by packet commanders.
- 8. Convoy Definition. A convoy is a group of two or more vehs.

h. Ensure that all packs are stowed under the seats.

# 15 Escort/Lookout Men.

- a. In TCV s 4 men will be posted. 2 at the front and 2 at the rear. These men will be armed with automatic wpns and smk grenades (preferably WP). The sentries in the forward end will cover an arc of 1600 m from the direction to the sides, and the sentries in the rear will cover 1600 m from the rear to the side.
- b. They will assist in the control of the convoy, by informing the veh comd if the fol veh halts or drops back.
- c. They will cover the evac of the veh by firing at the en from their veh posn should this be necessary. They are to leave their veh only as soon as all troops have debussed.
- d. They are to be alert at all times and provide early warning of enemy action.

# 16. Dvrs

- a. Dvr of the lead veh, who should be the senior dvr, is responsible for the maint of convoy speeds.
- b. Dvrs are responsible for the maint of convoy intervals.

#### 17. Speeds

- a. The average speed for convoy mov is the number of miles travelled in one day, calculated over the whole journey, incl specifically ordered halts. Average speeds vary due to types of terrain and are at the convoy comds discretion.
- b. Maximum speed 40 mph in unrestricted areas. Strict compliance of all speed limits.
- c. GTV's have specified maximum speeds, Convoy comds must take this into consideration when assessing their average and maximum speeds.
- Densities.50 metres between vehs. When the packet system is used 300 metres between packets. Packets will be of 4 to 6 vehs.
- 19. Canopies and Tailboards. TCV's will NOT move with their canopies in posn. Tailboards will be down, and back to back centre seating provided where possible.
- 20. Armoured Escorts. When armoured escorts are aval their mov and posn is to be incl in orders and briefing by the convoy comdr, who will usually be the senior rep of the armoured detachment.
- Signals. The convoy comd and his deputy will ensure they have possession of a copy of the current SOIs. Manpack radios will be evenly distributed amongst vehs throughout the convoy, by the convoy comd.
- 22. Alertness. The maximum degree of alertness is to be maintained and every man in the convoy must be ready for instant action at all times. Packs will be taken off and placed on floor. Wpn mags on, but wpn NOT loaded or ready to fire.
- Protection at Halts. When a veh halts for any reason and it is NOT moving within five minutes, the fol action is to be taken:
  - a. All troops are to debus.
  - b. An all round def posn is to be adopted.

- d. Action when some troops clear ahead of the danger zone and others are halted short of it. When groups of a convoy are split by an ambush, confusion may arise as to which group should mount the attack against the en and valuable time may be wasted in getting the attack under way. It is the responsibility of the party halted short of the danger zone to put in the attack. If, in the opinion of the comd present they are NOT capable of mounting the attack, he will advise the comd on the forward side of the ambush immediately.
- 29 Baling out Drill. The method of debussing where a veh is forced to stop is detailed below and is to be taught and practised as a drill.
  - a. The veh comd is to shout "DEBUS RIGHT" or "DEBUS LEFT" to indicate the direction in which troops are to muster.
  - b. Lookout/Escort men are to throw smoke grenades and open fire immediately on the en posn.
  - c. Troops are to debus on both sides of the veh and run in the direction indicated. To lessen danger of injury during the debussing troops should not wear packs during mov.
  - d. As soon as troops are clear of the vehs sentries are to debus and join the remainder.
  - e. At this stage the comd is to-collect the fit men as a formed body for offensive action. Wounded troops are to be dealt with after this action has been taken.
- 30. Orders for Rd Mov when NO APC's/TCVs are provided. Irrespective of how the mov is protected, whether by picquetting the rd by armd/inf vangds the unit will be org to provide its own close security and counter ambush force. The unit will move tactically from bound to bound as selected by the Adv Gd Comd and the move controlled by prior selection of report lines.
- 31. Assuming approx 80 men in a gun bty (not incl R party) a bty will adv org as follows:-

will adv	org as follows:-		*	A
		Point Sec S-10 pers 1 x AR 2 x OMC		
Flank Gd 6-8 pers 1 x AR 2 x OMC	Comd Adv Go Sig ANPRO 9 1 X AR 12 X 15 per		Flank Gd 6-8 pers 1 x AR 2 x OMC	Adv Gd 30-35 pers
	Gun Gp Comd Sigs 1 ANPRC 25 Protection Elm		Vehs and Dvrs	
			Approx 300-400m	Main Body
	Rear Gd  1 Offr or WO 1 Sig AN PRC 4 x ARs 30 pers (Approx) in 3	secs	Main Body	depending

NOTE: The adv gd or rear gd will act as a counter-ambush force depending on whether the front of the column is hit.

#### Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC)

- 32. General. This section assumes movement of entire sub-units, including ammunition by APC. Standard loads are shown at Annexure B.
- 33. <u>Command & Control</u>. The duties of convoy and vehicle commanders shall normally be performed by RAAC personnel and control of the convoy on the move shall be achieved over armoured communications.
- 34. <u>Liaison</u>. It is essential that a liaison officer from the APC unit visits the sub-unit to be moved at least twenty four hours prior to the time of movement. The liaison officer should cover the following points with the gunner representatives.
  - a. Number of APC available.
  - b. Number of personnel, guns, stores and ammunition to be moved.
  - c. Time to report for loading.
  - d. Whether APC are available for pre-loading of ammunition.
  - e. Route to be followed in battery base area.
  - f. Order of march
  - g. Departure timings
  - h. Any load limitations by weight or volume.
  - j. Loading points.
- 35. An RAAC officer should accompany the recce party so that he can advise the vehicle commanders of the main group the method of occupation and track plan before they arrive at the gun area.
- Bequipment. It is assumed that the L5 Howitzer shall be loaded in the APC in the assembled configuration. The following stores are required to prevent movement of the gun during transit and to ensure that the allowable floor pressure is not exceeded:-

2 pieces of lightweight PSP 5 ft in length.
30 ft of lashings minimum diameter ½ inch.
10 half filled sandbags for chocking and padding.

#### 37. Embussing - Debussing

- a. Embussing and debussing shall only be on the order of the vehicle commander.
- b. The decision as to whether personnel shall be carried inside or on top of the APC shall normally be made prior to the move by the convoy commander who shall be influenced by the enemy threat and the type of terrain to be travelled.
- c. When personnel are carried inside the APC packs only shall be removed, personnel carrying automatic weapons shall be seated nearest the ramp and personnel carrying wireless sets shall ensure that rod aerials are replaced by whip aerials before embussing.
- 38. Identification. Each No 1 or NCC IC party must be able to identify the APC carrying his gun or stores. He may do this by noting the call sign of the APC which is marked in large white letters on the ramp at the rear of the APC.

#### Counter Attack

a. The counter attack drill on ambush is as for movement by unit vehicle from the time that the APC has halted and the ramp lowered.

/b.....

. Supporting fire shall be given by the APC crew.

RESERVED

#### PART 2 - MOVEMENT BY HELICOPTER

- 1. General. Movement by helicopter shall be regarded as no al. The types of helicopter most likely to be encountered in this theatre are the US Army's IROQUIOIS UHID, and the CH 47 CHINOOK.
- 2. <u>Unit Emplaning Officer</u>. The unit emplaning officer is the 2IC. He is responsible for air movement.

#### Definitions

- a. Landing Zone (LZ) A goegraphic area, designed for command and Control purposes; normally containing a number of Landing Sites. It is not marked, LZ normally conforms to a unit area.
- b. Pick Up Zone(PZ) A tactical landing site utilized to pick up troops and/or cargo.
- c. Landing Sites (LS) An area where one or more helicopters can land. It may be marked by a Code Identifier or coloured smoke. It contains one or more landing Points.
- d. Landing Point(LP) A point within a Landing Site where one helicopter can land.
- e. Crew Chief A member of the helicopter who is responsible to the Aircraft Commander for all activity in the cargo/passenger compartment including the emplaning and deplaning of troops and in flight safety procedures.
- f. Flight Engineer. A member of the CHINOOK crew who is responsible to the Air craft Commander for the operation of the ramp and all activities concerned with external loading including "talking" the pilot over loads to be picked up.
- g. Pathfinders. A specialist detachment of 1 Officer and 13 ORs who are an integral part of an Aviation unit equipped with CHINOOKS and whose function includes the provision of navigion assistance to army aircraft, the provision of ground to air communications and assistance to the unit being lifted in the preparation and positioning of loads and marking of PZ and LZ.
- h. Allowable Cargo Load(ACL). The total weight and/or number of troops that can be lifted under existing conditions by one aircraft in one load.
- j. Slick Term for passenger carrying helicopter (UH ID) carries six or seven combat troop.
- k. Gunship. Armed helicopters of various types for protection of air convoy.
- 1. C and C Ship. Command and Control Ship. Helicopters fitted with radio console for comms with ground and air units.
- m. H Hour. Time when lead helicopter touches down in LZ.
- n. Element. A number of slicks taking off and landing at the same time.

Movement by IROQUOIS UH-1D

4. Aircraft Description. The IROQUOIS is a single rotor utility helicopter powered by a turbo-jet engine and designed to transport personnel, equippment and supplies both internally and externally. The following are relevant details:-

Overall Length

63 ft (main rotor fore and aft

Overall Width

48 ft (main rotor abeam)

Cabin Dimensions:

Max length Max Width Max Height

92in 97½ in 52 in

ACL

1500 lbs (approx) or 7 personnel in field order

NB. Dependant on density altitude.

- 5. Loads. External loading shall be regarded as normal. However shortage of slings may result in gun ammunition having to be carried in fibre canisters internally.
- 6. Standard Loads See Annex 'A'.
- 7. Deployment. For sequence of deployment and summary of Loads see Annex 'C'.
- 8. The number of chalks involved is based on a strength of eighty four in a gun bty area, the carriage of six hundred and sixty (660) rounds of gun ammunition per bty. RHQ is considered separately.
- 9. Preparation for Move. The object of preparation must be to ensure that no delay occurs at the LS in the loading and unloading of personnel, guns and equipment.
- 10. Personnel are to be grouped in "Chalks" numbering seven to ten personnel the actual number carried shall vary from operation to operation and must be determined in the pre-operational briefing. The senior member of the "Chalk" shall be appointed "Chalk Commander". Chalks are to be held in an assembly area adjacent to the LS by the Landing Site Commander or his assistant.
- 11. Guns and stores are to be prepared by their detachments and parties at a point on the LS designated by the Landing Site Commander or his assistant. Loads shall be prepared in accordance with the Standard Loads listed in Annex 'A'. Particular attention is to be paid to the following points:
  - a. The slings employed for lifting the basic gun are to be of the approved pattern only and are to be fitted so that the 8 ft slings are on forward suspension points and the 9 ft slings on the rear suspension points.
    - b. The A22 cargo container is to be used for all other external loads, gun ammunition excepted. Every effort should be made to ensure that no portion of the load protrudes outside the plywood base board, and that the load is balanced.
    - c. Each gun number one is to mark his gun and stores with a distinctive colour patch or other means of identification.
    - d. The NCO in charge of the detachment or party packing stores or fitting slings to the gun shall check his load to ensure that the following points are correct:
      - (1) Slings are attached to the correct suspension points and are free of twists.
      - (2) The clevis bolt is secure.
      - (3) All straps and canvas are secure.
    - e. On completion of the above checks he will report his load ready for movement to the Landing Site Commander.

- 12. Briefing of Air Crew. It is essential that the sub-unit liaises with the Aviation unit allotted the mission of lifting the bar ery prior to each operation. The BK shall normally represent a barrery for this purpose.
- 13. The briefing of air crew should be designed to cover the points outlined in the Briefing Sheet shown at Annex 'E'. In addition the following points should be clarified.
  - a. Number of personnel in each chalk.
  - b. System of external load hookup, i.e. crew guidance, OR guidance by a Marshaller.
  - c. System for indicating set down points for external loads.
  - d. The number of aircraft to be used.
  - e. The availability of cargo nets from the Avn Coy.
  - f. The order of fly in of guns.
- 14 <u>Duties in connection with a Helicopter Move</u>. The following duties are essential in any helicopter movement:-

#### a. Landing Site Commander

(1) The requirement is for two per battery and should be filled by the following appointments:-

Despatching LS - BSM Receiving LS - Bty Guide (RP Sgt for RHQ)

- (2) An assistant is to be appointed for each landing site comd, this is particularly important when a large number of helicopters are employed.
- (3) The duties of the Landing Site Commander are detailed in Annex 'F' and the signals used by him to direct a helicopter to a LP are shown in Annex 'F'.

#### b. Marshaller

- (1) A marshaller will ONLY be required when crew guidance in "Hooking up" is NOT used.
- (2) His duties involve the guidance of the helicopter to a point above a load so that a "hook up" can be affected. The signals employed by the Marshaller are the same as those for the Landing Site Commander.
- c. Chalk Commander. The senior member of each chalk will be designated "Chalk Commander", his duties with regard to the control, emplaning and deplaning of his Chalk as detailed in Annex 'G'.
- d. Hooking Up An NCO and one other member from each detachment and party are to be appointed "Hooking Up Team". The duties and responsibility of this team are detailed in Annex 'G'
- 15 Emplaning and Deplaning Drills. All personnel must be familiar with emplaning and deplaning drills. These drills are detailed in Annex 'H'.
- 16. Communications. Communications between the receiving and desp atching LS and the supporting aviation unit are essential for the following reasons:-

- a. To slow down or speed up a move as required.
- b. To change the load sequence if required.
- c. To notify receiving LS if loads fall out of sequence, due to engine failure or other reasons.
- d. Notify pilots of any danger from fire of own or enemy forces
- 17. Construction and Marking of Landing Site. Dimensions and marking of LS for both IROQUOIS and CHINOOK are shown in Annex 'J'.
- 18. RESERVED
- 19. RESERVED.
- 20. RESERVED.

### Movement by CH-47 CHINOOK

21. Aircraft Description. The CE 47 CHINOOK is a twin rotor heavy lift helicopter powered by two turbo jet engines and designed to transport personnel vehicles, equipment and supplies both internally an and externally The following are relevant details:-

Overall Length 98 ft 3 in Overall Width 51 ft

Cabin Dimensions:

Max length 336in Max width 90 in at aft ramp doors Max height 78 in at aft ramp door.

ACL 8000 lbs (approx) or 33 personnel in field order.

NB: Dependant on density altitude.

- 22. Loads. External loading shall be regarded as normal except for the carriage of vehicles and gun ammunition. Gun Ammunition shall be palletized and loaded by forklift or from low bed trucks by roller conveyors.
- .23. Standard Loads. See Annex 'A'.
  - 24. <u>Deployment</u>. See Annex 'D'.
  - 25. The number of chalks is calculated on a strength of 75 in in the gun area, and the carriage of 576 rounds of gun ammunition.
  - 26. Preparation for Move, Is as for movement with the IROQUOIS UHID except that chalks shall be grouped in accordance with the loads listed in Annex 'D'. Particular care must be taken on the following points:
    - a. All pieces of equipment laying loose on the ground or on vehicles should be secured to prevent the CHINOOK rotor down wash from blowing this equipment into personnel, aircraft.or vehicles and causing injury or damage.
    - b. Extra equipment carried in vehicles and trailers must be securely stowed, aerials are to be removed, canopies dropped and the fuel tank three quarters full. In addition the centre of gravity is to be plainly marked.
  - 27. Briefing of Air Crew. The pathfinder detachment shall normally brief the air crew, and will liaise with the sub-unit prior to the commencent of the movement.

- 28. The points covered in para 13 of SECTION 1 MOVEMENT BY IROQUOIS UHID are relevant.
- 29. <u>Duties in Connection with Movement by CHINOOK</u>. As for movement by IROQUOIS except that a MARSHALLER is NOT used. The directions to the pilot in positioning his aircraft over the load are given by the Flight Engineer inside the aircraft.
- 30. Emplaning and Deplaning Drill. Except for minor variations which are detailed in Annex 'H' these drills are the same as for movement by IROQUOIS.
- 31. <u>Communications</u>. As for movement by IROQUOIS except that communications with the aircraft will normally be provided by the path inder detachment.
- 32. Construction and Marking at Landing Site. See Annex 'J'.
- RESERVED.
- 34 RESERVED.
- 35. RESERVED.

# STANDARD LOADS

## FIELD BATTERY

STANDARD LOAD 1 - 105MM PACK HOWITZER COMPLETE (les	s CES)(	Tt Lbs)
STANDARD LOAD 1 - 105MM PACK HOWITZER COMPDETE (200		2569
STANDARD LOAD 2 - BASIC GUN	(	Wt lbs)
Cradle and Lower Recoil System Rear Trail Secs (both) Wheels (both) Saddle Stub Axle Supporting Arm (both) Front Trail Secs (both) Saddle Support (both) Saddle Support (both) Balancing Springs (both) Firing Lever Knife Spades Paulins Lightweight 20' x 16'	TOTAL	268 224 251 136 120 194 187 46 5 42 35 1508 1bs
STANDARD LOAD 3 - GUN COMPONENTS AND GUN STORES	4 4	(wt lbs)
Gun Components  Upper Recoil System Breech- Ring and Block Barrell Slipper Covers Intermediate Trail Secs (both) Muzzle Break	TOTAL	211 227 241 245 10 92 -70
Gun Stores Qty		(Wt lbs)
Axe Single Bit Telephone Set 'K' Torches Hand Electric 2 Stoves Gasoline Burner 2 Cookset Field, 3 Piece Apparatus Cable Laying No 6 1 Sheets Ground 1 Box Sights 1 Gun Rule in Case 1		552649885 19885
Paulins Lightweight 20' x 16' Parelleloscope Stands Instrument No 27 Shovels GS Aiming Posts Sets Staves End and Intmed Oil OM 58, Gals Grease, Tin Oil OM 13, Gals Rags Cleaning Hammers Sledge Pick Hoad Helve		35 17 13 10 12 5 96 95 12 8
Pick Head Helve Box Local Pattern Containing Gun Stores  /2.		30

un Stores Contd	Qty	(Wt lbs)
Shovel, RE	1	6
A22 Container Complete and Clevis Indicators Fuze in case	1 1	100 24
Loudspeaker Gun Inter-Com Set	1	10 442
		m +-3 W-4-b+ 1639 31

Total Weight 1538 lbs

# STANDARD LOAD 4 - COMMAND POST STORES

	Qty		(wt lbs)
Plotters Lightweight Computor Conc and Lin Tgt De Slide Rule 10" RA Mils Axes Single Bit 4½ lb Pick Digging With Handle Telephone Set 'K' Radio Set ANPRC 25 Torches Hand Electric Light Extension Chairs Folding Cans Water Plastic 5 gal Stoves Gasoline Burner Cookset Field 3 Piece Slidex Comprising Cards 1, 5 Whistles Ball Arty Pliers Sidecutting 8" Panel Distinguishing Sets Shovels GS Tables Light Weight Tubs Washing Plastic Boxes Amm 219 Plus Proformace Director No 70 Thermometer Bi-Metal With Cardines 11 x 11 Lightweight Cable Electric D10 Twisted is Stands 17A Boxes Spare Set 25 Batteries Batteries 12V for Lighting Sets RC 292 Aerial Ammunition 1st Line Reserve Paulin L/Wt 20' x 16' Intercommunication Set Gun Control with Batteries *A22 Container Complete with Clevis	2 1 4 3 2 2 3 6 2 2 3 6 2 2 1 1 4 2 2 1 4 2 2 1 4 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1	Total Weight	25 21 52 15 37 30 6 4 1 1 20 40 2 40 8 23 1 67 108 20 40 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 10
Radio Set A 510 Reeling Machine RL 31E Telephone Set 'K' Torch Hand Electric Cans Water Plastic Stoves Garoline Burner Cookset Field 3 Piece Reels Cable RL 159/4 Hydrometer Sec Cell Shovels GS Tubs Washing Plastic Cable D10 Twisted 5 mile	Qty 1 16 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 1		(Wt 1bs) 41 27 30 1 110 6 4 44 1 10 2 108

	TANDARD LOAD 5 - R PARTY Cont'd	Qty		(Wt lbs)
	Pliers Sidecutting with Carrier	3	*	3 97
	Charging Set 300W 24V	1 "		3
	Telephone TA/PT - 1 Batteries 25 Set	2 box as		112
	Gloves Cable Laying Prs	1		1
	Tape Insulating Rolls	6		1
	Batteries Dry Cell Type C-D=E Box	xes 3		3
	Picks Digging with Handle Paulins Lightweight 20' x 16'	1		35
	Switchboard 22/PT	. 1		26 100
	*A22 Container Complete and Clevi	1S I	Total Weight	Secretary Property lies
	STANDARD LOAD 6 - BK AND Q PARTY	Qty		(wt lbs)
	BK Party			- Toll so
	Axes Single Bit 42 lbs	1		5 16
	Pick Digging 51b Shovels GS Aust	2 2 1 2 2 1		10
	Table Lightweight 48" x 30"	ī		20
	Cans Water Plastic 5 gal	3		165
	Basin Plastic Round Buckets Shower Canvas	1		8.
	Cookset Field 3 Piece	2		4
	Stoves Gascline Burner M1950	2		2 8 4 6 67
	Tents L/Weight 11' x 11' Torch Hand Electric GP	2		2
	Chairs Folding Aust No 2	1		13 1
	Panels Distinguishing Sets	1		4
*	Tubs Washing Round 32 gal A22 Container Complete with Clev	ris 1		100
	NZZ OON WALLIEL OOMPACOO WAS IN		Total Weight	423 lbs
	Q Party			62
	Box Gin Instruments	1		
	Box Gun Spares Indicator Fuze Cased	1		9
	Gun Rule Cased	1 -		9
	Aiming Post	1 set 1 set		5
	Staves Tarp L/Weight 30' x 28'	1		40
	Poles 5'8.	9		20
	Star Pickets 2'6"	9		12
	Showels GS Axe Felling	1		5
	Picks Digging	2		16
	Spare Handle Pick	3		3
	Stool Camp Folding Table Camp Folding	i		20
	Box Expense	2	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	60
	Torches Hand	9 4 1 2 3 1 1 2 24 48		8
	Batteries for Above D Cels	48		109 99 125 40 18 125 16 43 20 60 28 8 42 63 33 201
	OM 13	4 gal		42
	Grease	5 kb		33
	Box Smoke Grenades 7.62mm Ball Cart	2520		
	9mm Ball Cart	3000		106
	Basin Plastic	(3)		

Q rty Cont'd	Qty	(wt lbs)
Bucket Plastic Bucket Shower Canvas Cans Water Plastic Stove Gas Burner Cook Set Field 3 Piece * A22 Container Complete wi	10	2 8 330 3 2 100 1257 lbs

0.1	STANDARD LOAD 7 - KITCHEN STORES	Qty	2	wt lbs)
	Cooking Outfit Field Small Containers Cooking 3 Gal Containers Food Insulated Cooker Deep fryer Cans Water Plastic Tables FS Paulins Lightweight 20' x 16' Shovels GS Jerricans Petrol Axes Single Bit 4½ 1b Torches Hand Electric Food Turner Egg Bowles Hand 4 pint Forks Cooking Knives Cooking 9" Machine Tin Opener Hand	3 3 2 1 1 1 2 3 1 4 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1		255 34 1 6 20 660 60 35 10 126 5 2 1 4 2 1
*	Expense Stores A22 Container Compete with clevis		Total Weight	100 1445 lbs

N.B This load is supplementary only and would normally be included in the first resupply.

# STANDARD LOADS

# RHQ

mile			
STAN	DARD LOAD RECCE PARTY		
		7	Weight
a.	Personnel		
	2IC RSO RSM		
	B/Man (2IC) Dvr Op (2IC) B/Man (RSO)		
	4 x svyrs	Total	2200 lbs
ъ,	Stores		050
	2IC Personal stores and tent 1 x ANPRC 25		250 30 20
	Clearing Tools *A22 Container and Clevis	Total	100 400 lbs
		Total Weight	2600 lbs
ST	ANDARD LOAD SURVEY PARTY	Qty	(Wt lbs)
	mi Banderoles (including 1 Stad	ia	30
Ro	A)	12	5 2
m <sub>o</sub>	pes Steel 100 metre iver w/- Arrows Survey	1	-10
~	markation Eall Dileit	1 2 1	100
TIP	reodolites and Stands		152
Co	omputation Box	Total	7.1
5	x personnel	Total Weight	1100 1252 1bs
			(Wt lbs)
21	TANDARD LOAD COMMAND POST	Qty	7,12
a	. Stores	1	4 50 68
	Clock Mech Sig Centre Lighting Sets Local Pattern	1	68
	The Box Toch District	1	
	Ammo Box Stat Stores	2)	40
	Slidex Pliers Side Cutting	2)	
		12)	
	Batteries Dry Cell 3V Torches Hand Electric	3)	3
	CHATTOR ITMS	2	5
	Cooking Set 3 Piece	1	10
	Axe Picks	. 2	4
	Shovels RE Entrenching Tools	2	6
	#53 or W.1.(3) 11N	4	67会
	Radio Sets 27 dia 11	1 1 1) 2) 12) 12) 12) 3) 2 2 1 2 2 2 4 3 1 1 1 2 2 2	3 2 5 10 . 8 4 6 67 4 3 4 46 87
	Antenna 292 Multi Meter	1	-34
	Control Groups 3344	2	87
	Dispenser D10 Tent 11 x 11 plus extension		
	The state of the s		

C MAND POST Cont'd	Qty	(Wt lbs)
Tables FS Portable Chairs Canvas Light Flourescent Duplicator Machine Battle Map Board Cans Plastic Water Batteries Wet Cel 6V Batteries Dry Cell 25 * A22 Container complete with clevis	4 4 1 1 1 4 4 24 2	60 16 6 17 36 200 100 72 200
	Total	1400
b. Personnel		
Adjt Batman Sig Sgt Operators (4) Clerks (2) Driver/Op (1)	Total	2200 lbs 3600 lbs
STANDARD LOAD RAP	Qty	(Wt lbs)
Tent L/weight 11 x 11 Stretcher Amb(US Patt) Containers Water Full Pannier Regt (with stores) Box Conwood (with stores) Haversack RMO (with stores) Table Folding Stool Camp Folding Chair Camp Folding Bucket Metal Tub Washing *A22 Container complete with clevis	1 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Total	118 20 150 90 25 30 20 8' 7 1 100 660
5 x personnel	Total	1100 1760 lbs
STANDARD LOAD RP PARTY  Rolls Barbwire (25 lb) 200 Bundle Sand Bags 850 Box 7.62 800 Box 9mm Signs TAC Smoke Grenades Coloured Grenades Hand M26 Box Stationery Assorted * A22 Container complete with clevis	Qty 7 5 1 1 20 20 10 5	(Wt lbs) 196 400 70 60 30 20 10 5 100 691
4 x personnel	Total	880 1771 1bs
STANL D LOAD LINE PARTY	Qty	(Wt lbs)
Switch Board 22 Pt Switch Board 18 GT Radio Set 25A and CES Batteries 25A Batteries 1.5	1 4 1 1 box 24	10 8 11 25 2

/3.

Time Ponty Comtid	Qty	(Wt lbs)
Lira Party Comt'd	24	3
Batteries 3 Batteries Wet Cell 12V	2	30 50
Charging Set 300W Cans Water Platic	4	160 180
Cable D10 (6 miles) Drums RL	12 disp 2	20
Apparatus Cable Laying	1	15 30
Tent 2 Man Belt Linesman	1	2
Clibing Irons Pick	1	15 30 2 4 6 4
Axe	1	2
Shovel Tools Entrenching	2	3 100
* A22 Container and clevis	Total	665
Personnel		
5 x personnel		1100
) x personner	Total	1765 lbs
STANDARD LOAD Q PARTY	Qty	(Wt lbs)
Cans Water Plastic	15	720
Shower Buckets Canvas Tubs Washing Round	15 5 4 5 30	20 20
Stoves Burning Gasoline	5	10
Mattress Sections Pneumatic Cakes Soap Toilet	40	30
Razor Blades Shovels GS	80	14
Tools Entrenching Cans POL (Full)	2 2	100
*A22 Containers and clevis	1 Total	100
	20 000	250_
1 x 1 personnel	Total	1350 lbs
STANDARD LOAD KITCHEN		/ V
a. Stores	Qty	( <u>Wt lbs</u> )
Stoves 15/40 (Complete) Jerry Cans Petrol (Not quite full)	2	250 150
Immersion Heater (Complete)	2 3 1 1 2	50 50
Tea Urn (Multipot) US Pat Hot Boxes (Complete)	2	60
Water Jerry Cans Meat Safes	10 2	500 50
Expence Stores	qty	50 50
Table Cooking Utensils	1	50 50 5 5 5 5 5 5 100
Axe Shovel	1	5
Wahing Tubs Pauline 20' x 16'	1 2 1	35
*A22 Container and clevis	1 Total	1460
1. Demonsoral		
b. Personnel		440
2 x personnel	Total	1900 lbs

# itchen Cont'd

NB. This load is supplementary only and would normally be included in the resupply.

Annex B to 1 Fd Regt RAA Movement SOP

Dec 66

# LOADS AND SEQUENCES OF DEPLOYMENT BY M113 APC

#### Field Battery

1.	Summary of Stores and Equipment Moved
	6 x 105mm L5 Howitzers 6 x Det Stores 1 x CP Stores 1 x R Party/KParty/Q Party Stores 80 x Personnel 600 x rds ammunition
2.	Summary of Weights
	105mm L5 Howitzers 2569 lbs Det Stroes 442 lbs CP Stores 1500 lbs R.K/Q Party Stores 2225 lbs Personnel 220 lbs Ammunition - 2 rds boxed 120 lbs
3.	Sequence of Deployment and Loads

Load	Description	Weight lbs Remarks
	3 x personnel	1760 Recce Party 1760
2.	2 x personnel 1 x CP Stores	440 1500 1940
3 - 5	10 x personnel	2220 3 Gun Detachment incl six 2220 Nos 1 and Balance of CP pers
6 - 8	1 x 105 mm L5 Howitzer 1 x Det stores	2569 442 3011
9.	1 x R/K/Q Party Stores	2225 2225
10.	25 x boxes ammunition	3000 3000
11 - 13	10 x personnel	2200
14 -16	1 x 105 mm L5 Howitzer 1 x Det Stores	2569 442 3011
17 - 26	25 x Boxes ammunition 1 x personnel	3000 220 3220
27.	25 Boxes Ammunition	3000

#### Notes

- a. The total of 27 APCs may be reduced by having the personnel in loads 3 5 and 11 13 ride on top of loads 6 8 and 14 16. The terrain, undergrowth and enemy threat must be considered when making this decision.
- b. Personnel in loads 3 5 may accompany load 1 as a protection party if infantry protection is not being provided.
- c. Guns shall be placed in the APC complete except for muzzle brake, intermediate and end trail sections. WARNING the gun must be fitted with ITALIAN tyres, if LANDROVER type tyres are fitted the gun cannot be placed in the truck in its assembled configuration.
- Stores required for packing the gun are as follows:
  2 pieces of 1' x 4' lightweight PSP.
  30 ft of ½" lashings

Quantity of half filled sandbags for padding and chocks.

# LOADS AND SEQUENCE OF DEPLOYMENT BY M113 APC

#### RHQ

1.	Summary of pers and eqpt moved Recce Party	Pers 10	Wt of stores
	2IC Party and Stores	1	400
	Svy: Party	5	152
	CP	10	1300
	RAP	5	660
	RP Party	3	891
	Line Party	5	665
	Q party	40	1100 5168 lbs
	Kitchen	2	1460 lbs

NB. Kitchen is a supplementary load only, Normally sent out in resupply.

### 2. Sequence of Deployment and Loads

Load	Description	Weight	Remarks
1.	10 pers	2200	Recce Party
2.	8 pers Svy Stores	1760 152 1912	
3.	5 pers CP Stores	1320 1300 2620	
4.	6 pers RAP stores 2IC Stores	1320 650 400 2380	
5.	4 pers Line Store RP Stores	880 665 891 2436	
6.	7 pers Q Stores	1540 1100 2640	

# LOADS AND SEQUENCE OF DEPLOYMENT BY IROQUOIS UHID

#### FIELD BATTERY

1.	Su mary	of Stores	and E	quipment	Moved
----	---------	-----------	-------	----------	-------

6 x guns 6 x Det stores

1 x CP 1 x R Party Stores 1 x BK Party and Q Store 25 x Water Cans 660 x Rounds Gun Ammunition 77 x Personnel

#### 2. Summary of Weights.

Basic GUN	1508	The
Gun components and Det Stores	1538	lbs
CP Stores	1500	lbs
R Party Stores	775	1bs
BK Party and Q Stores	1480	lbs
Water Can.	55	lbs
Personnel	220	1bs
105mm Round (in Fibre Pack)	45	lbs
Average lift capacity of IROQUOIS UHID	1500	lbs

#### 3. Sequence of Deployment and Loads

Load/Chalk	Internal .	External	Total Weight		REMARKS
1 - 8	7 x personnel		1540 1	.bs	Recce Party incl in Inf elements
9		1xCP Stores	1500 1	bs	Slung in A22 Container
10		1xGun Compon ents & Store	1538 1	bs	Slung in A22 Container
11		1xBasic Gun			Slung with 8' and 9' Straps
12		As for Load As for Load			
14	1	As for Load	10		
15		As for Load	11		
16	-	30 rounds gu	n <sub>1350 1</sub>		May be carried int- ernally if cargo slings NOT available
17		As for load	10		-
18		As for load	11		
19		As for load	10		-
20		As for load	11		
21		As for load	10		
7.2		As for load	11		
23		As for load	16		
24	-	R Party Store	es 775	lbs	Slung in A22 Containers
25		BK and Q Party stores	1480	lbs	Slung in A22 Conts
26	25 water cans		1375		
27-29		As for loads			
30-49		As for load	16		

# LOADS AND SEQUENCE OF DEPLOYMENT BY IROQUOIS UH -ID

#### RHQ

#### Summary of personnel and eqpt moved 1.

Pers	Wt of stores
7	
3	400 (1)
5	152
10	1300 (1)
5	660 (1)
4	891 (1)
5	665 (1)
1	1100 (1)
2	1460 (1)
42	6628
	7 3 5 10 5 4 5 1

Note:

(1) Includes A22 container and clevis
(2) Recce party normally moves with inf elms
(3) Mitchen normally moves with resupply, not initial move.

2. Sequence of Deploy	ment a	and Lo	ads
-----------------------	--------	--------	-----

	delice of populyments ca.		
Load/Chalk	Internal External 7 pers	Total Weight 1540 lbs	Remarks Recce Farty.Normally included in inf elms
\$	5 pers & Svy stores	1252 lbs	Svy party carry stores by hand
3.	3 pers CP stores	1360 lbs	Slung in A22 containers
4.	3 pers CP stores	1360 lbs	Slung in A22 containers
5.	4 pers RAP stores	1540 lbs	Slung in A22 containers
6.	3 pers RP Stores	1551 lbs	Slung in A22 containers
7.	4 pers Line stores	s 1545 lbs	Slung in A22 containers
8.	1 per Q stores	1350 lbs	Slung in A22 containers
9.	5 pers 2IC stores	1500 lbs	Slung in A22 containers
10.	5 pers	1100 lbs	

De 3 (5

#### LOADS AND SEQUENCE OF DEPLOYMENT BY CH 47 CHINOOK

#### FIELD BATTERY

#### 1. Summary of Stores and Equipment

6 x guns 6 x Det Stores 1 x CP Stores 1 x R Party Stores 1 x BK Party and Q Stores 1 x 3 ton GS landrover and trailer ton 75 x personnel

#### Summary of Weights 2.

576 x rds gun ammo

Gun 2569 lbs Gun Stores 442 lbs 1500 lbs 220 lbs 3921 lbs 850 lbs 775 lbs 1480 lbs CP Stores Personnel 3 ton Landrover GS ton trailer R Party 775 lbs
BK and Q Party Stores 1480 lbs
Average lift capacity of the CH 47 CHINOOK 8000 lbs

#### Sequence of Deployment and Loads 3.

Load/ Chalk	Internal	External	Weight	Remarks
1:	33 x personnel 17 x cans water	Tota	7040 935 7975	Water cans carried by personnel Incl Recce party
2 7	4 x personnel 36 x boxes ammo	1 x gun Tota	2569 800 4320 7769	Slung with 8' and 9' straps 3 pallets each of 12 boxes
8.	1 x 3/4 Landrover GS 1 x 2/2 ton trailer 3 x Gun Stores 8 x personnel 2 cans Water	Tota	3931 850 1326 1760 110 1 7977	1Det gunsteres invel 2 Det gun stores in tlogen store Carried by personnel
9.	10 x personnel 36 x boxes ammo	3 x Gun Stores Tota	1326 2200 4320 1 7846	Slung in A22 Containers 3 pallets each 12 boxes
10.	36 x boxes ammo	1 x CP store 1 X K pty stores 1 x BK store & Q Party Stores	775)	Slung in A22 Containers

# LOADS AND SEQUENCE OF DEPLOYMENT BY CH - 47 CHINOOK

#### RHQ

Summary of personnel and equipmen		Wt of stores
2IC Party and Stores Svy: Party CP RAP RP Party Line Party Q Party	3 5 10 5 4 5 1 33	400 152 1300 660 891 665 1100 5168 lbs
Recce (1)	7	
Kitchen (2)	2	1460
	2IC Party and Stores Svy: Party CP RAP RP Party Line Party Q Party Recce (1)	Svy. Party CP RAP RAP RP Party Line Party Q Party  Recce (1)  Recce (1)  5 10 5 4 5 4 1 33

- Note (1) Recce party will normally travel with inf in adv.
  - (2) Kitchen is a supplementary load only and will normally come with resupply.

#### 2. Sequence of Deployment and Loads

Load/ Chalk	Internal	External	Total weight	Remarks
1.	20 pers Svy Stores	Cp Stores RAP Stores	7112	a. Includes Svy Party, CP Party and RAP Party. b. Slung in 3 x A22 Containers
2.	13 pers	2IC Stores RP Stores Line Stores Q Stores	<u>6306</u>	a. Includes 2IC Party, RP Party, Line Party, Q Party. b. Slung in 4 x A 22 Containers.

N.B. Either the recce party of 7 pers, or the kitchen party, can be included without exceeding weight limit of 8000 lbs

# MOVEMENT BY HELICOPTER BRIEFING SHEET

1.	MISSION No
2.	TYPE OF MISSION
	(Note: to include details, e.g., personnel, guns or stores lift and approx numbers of loads)
3.	LS - From (Note: indicate by name - e.g, LZ KING , and by grid reference)
4.	LS - To
5.	CODE IDENTIFIER/SMOKE
6.	FREQUENCY/CALL SIGN
7.	TIME TO COMMENCE MISSION
8.	SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS (e.g., Crew Guidance or Ground Marshaller)
	/
	**************************************

## Distribution

1 per helicopter 1 per landing site comd 1 briefing officer OI OC Pathfinder Detachment

Annex F to 1 Fd Regt RAA Movement SOP

Dec 66

#### DUTIES IN CONNECTION WITH HELICOPTER MOVEMENT

### DUTIES OF THE LANDING SITE COMMANDER

The landing site commander is to ensure that:-

#### AT THE DESPATCHING LS

- The LS meet the standards in size for the helicopter in use, and that any artifical hazards such as vehicles are kept clear of the LS.
- There is no movement of either personnel or vehicles on the LS without his authority.
- c. The LS is correctly marked with the code identifier for the day. He should do this himself. If no code identifier is used he must carry at leats twelve coloured smoke granades.
- d. All external loads have been correctly prepared and are safe.
  - €. "Hooking in" team is in position for each external load.
- Chalks of personnel under their Chalk Commanders are col-ectly jositioned for emplaning and are all familiar with the dri.ls.
- g. Heidentifies himself to the pilot as the landing site commander by means of a pair of DAYGLO bats and by a flourescent panel ecured around his waist.
- He places himself in such a position so as to be visible to the Flot and clear of the main rotor.
- j. There is no delay caused by lack of cargo nets. These must be backloaded mom the receiving LS.
- By meens of aand signals, directs the pilot of the helicopter on to the LP/Pick Up Foint.
- 1. He is at all times able to give a progress report and can advise on land promities should this be necessary
- An assistant is appointed, and that he is familar with
- n. du Les. CHINOOKS arriving in a cargo pick up area should be directed to land in front of an internal load or in back of an external load. Combinations of internal and external loads should be placed to allow the CHINOOK to land, load the laternal cargo from the rear and then move forward to pick up the external load.

## AT THE RECEIVING LS

- a. As for a,b,c and n, and in addition:-
- He positions himslef on the edge of the LS so as to be visable to the helicopter pilot as he approaches. He is thus able to give an early indication as to the point at which the load can be set down.

- c. Ammunition cargo nets are recovered as soon as possible and back loaded in the first available helicopter returning to the spatching LS.
- d. The pilot of the helicopter is directed by hand signals as near as possible to the point where an external load is to be released consistent with the safety of the helicopter.
- e. He indicates to the pilot by appropriate hand signals the departure route to be taken.

#### NOTE

The landing site commander should be equipped with goggles, this is particularly important in CHINOOK movement when the down wash from the main rotor creates a considerable amount of dust.

#### DUTIES OF CHALK COMMANDER

The chalk commander is reponsible for the following:-

- a. That his chalk is familiar with the emplaning and deplaning drills.
- b. The correct positioning of his chalks in file at the point indicated by the landing site commander.
- c. Doubling his chalk to the helicopter on receiving the thumbs up sign from the pilot and emplaring, both sides in the cases of IROQUOIS or by the aft ramp in a CHINOOK.
- d. Indicates that the chalk is ready for take off by giving the thumbs up sign to crew chief. This shall only be done when each member of the chalk has secured his seat belt.
- e. On landing he will wait for the thumbs up sign from the crew chief before leading his chalk from the helicopter.
- f.  $H_{\text{e}}$  will assist members of his chalk from the helicopter and indicate by means of the thumbs up sign when the chalk is clear of the main rotor.

#### DUTIES OF HOOKING UP TEAM

The hooking up team is responsible for the following:-

## a. WHEN CREW GUIDANCE IS USED

- (1) Indicating the load to be picked up by holding a DAYGLO bat above the load.
- (2) Ensuring that the 3 ft hook up sling is held aloft so as to assist the pilot in guiding his aircraft to a point above the load.
- (3) After hooking up, pull down on the load to test for security.
- (4) Indicate that the load is secure and ready for lift off by giving the thumbs up sign to the crew member.
- (5) Ensure that straps and sling are kept clear of the load so that no fouling may occur in lifting clear of the ground.
- (6) Ensure that the helicopter hook comes to the load, and not load to the hook.

WHEN GROUND MARSHALLER IS USED

As for (2), (3), (5) & (6) above and in addition:-

- ) --

- (1) Indicate to the marshaller by clear hand signal the direction and distance that the aircraft must move forward/back to be over the load.
- (2) Indicate to the marshaller by the thumbs up signal when the load is secure.

#### NOTE

b

Personnel selected as hook up teams for a move by CHINOOK should wear ear plugs and goggles.

# DUTIES OF THE MARSHALLER WITH IROQUOIS

A Marshaller shall ONLY be employed when crew guidance on "Hook Up" is not used.

His duties are as follows :-

- a. Indicate the position of the load to be picked up by standing 30 ft from and directly in front of the load.
- b. Carry two DAYGLO bats and guide the helicopter to a hook up position above the load using the appropriate signals.

#### MARSHALLING SIGNALS

- 1. Proceed to next marshaller. Right or left arm down; other arm moved across the body and extended to indicate direction of next marshaller.
- 2. This marshaller. Arms above head in vertical position with palms facing inwards.
- 3. Move ahead. Arms forward and bent slightly upward, palms facing backwards and repeatedly moved upward and backward from shoulder height.
- a. Turn to port (left). Point right arm 4. downward, left arm repeatedly moved upward and backward. Speed of arm novement indicating rate of turn.
  - b. Turn to starboard (right). Point left arm downward, right arm repeatedly moved upward and backward. Speed of arm movement indicating rate of turn.
- Move back. Arms by sides, palms facing forward, arms swept forwards and upwards repeatedly to should height.
- 6. Stop. Arms repeatedly crossed above head (the rapidity of the arm movement should be related to the urgency of the stop, i.e., the faster the movement the greater the urgency)
- 7. Horizontal movement
  - a. Move to port (left). Right arm extended horizontally sideways in direction of movement and other arm swung in front of the body in same direction in a repeating movement.
  - b. Move to starboard (right). Left arm extended horizontally sideways in direction of movement and other arm swing in front of body in same direction in a repeating movement.
- Release load. Left arm extended forward horizontally fist clenched, right hand making horizontal slicing movement below the left fist, palm downwards.
- Arms extended horizontally sideways, Hover. palms downwards.























10. Spot turn. Left or right hand moving upward and backwards from a horizontal position, to indicate direction of tail movement. Other hand pointing to centre of spot turn.

1415



11. Land. Arms crossed and extended downwards in front of the body.



12. Start Engine(s) and Start Rotor(s). Circling motion of right hand at head level with left arm pointing to engine (or rotor).



13. <u>Cut Engine(s)</u>. Either arm and hand level with shoulder hand moving across throat palm downward.



14. Marshalling Finished. Right arm raised with elbow at shoulder height with palms facing forward.



15. Signals for general use.

a. Affirmative Signal. Hand raised, thumb up.



b. Negative signal. Hand raised, thumb down.



16. Vertical Movement

a. Move upwards. Arms extended horizontally sideways beckoning upward with palms turned up. Speed of movement indicates rate of ascent.



b. Move upwards. Arms extended horizontally sideways beckoning downwards with palms turned down. Speed of movement indicates rate of descent.



17. a. Winch up. Left arm horizontal in front of body, fist clenched, right hand with palm turned up making upward motion.



b. Winch down. Left arm horizontal in front of body, fist clenched right hand with palm turned downwards making downward motion.



#### HELICOPTER EMPLANNING AND DEFLANNING DRILLS

#### Definations

- 1. a. Chalk: The number of troops carried on one helicopter at one time.
  - b. Chalk Commander: A designated individual who leads a chalk to a helicopter, controls the chalk when required in flights and leads the chalk from the helicopter on deplaning.
  - c. Crewman: A member of the helicopter crew who travels in the passenger cabin. His duties include assisting in control of the chalk from emplaning to deplaning.
  - d. Ready Position: A designated place where the chalk waits for the order to emplane. This is between 10 O'Clock and 2.0'Clock thirty feet from the helicopter with the IROQUOIS and at 6 O'Clock sixty feet for CHINOOK.

#### Type of Aircraft

2. These drills are designed to be used in helicopters flown by the US Army.

#### Briefing

- 3. This is the responsibility of the Battery assisted by the Aviation Unit. All troops must be briefed on the following points before helicopter transported operations.
  - a. Troops will normally be emplaned with rotors turning and are to be warned of the mrmal dangers of the main rotor, tail rotor engine exhausts, and "blade sailing". The land the both doors for IROQUOIS and by the aft be troops must never approach a helicopter from the rear except when emplaning and will never approach closer than sixty feet without a signal from the pilot or crew chief in CHINOOK.
  - c. No SMOKING is allowed inside, or within 50 (fifty) foot of a helicopter at any time.
  - d. Helicopters are not robust and care must be taken in handling weapons and bulky equipment. Weapons will be unloaded and carried at high port.
  - e. Radio aerials of manpack sets are to be dismantled before approaching the helicopter.
  - f. Troops must know the positions of exits and emergency exits.
  - g. Objects carried on the backs of troops must not protrude above the top of the shoulders.
  - h. When battle helmets are worn, the chin straps are to be fastened

- j. Jungle hats are to be removed and placed in the shirt before emplaning.
- k. Weapons such as machines guns are to have the bipod legs folded. All weapons are to be held between legs.
- 1. Troops must know that in the event of an impending crash they will be warned that the following action should be taken.
  - (1) Tighten safety belts and sit as erect as possible with arms folded.
  - (2) After touch dow disembark on the order of the aircraft comd.

#### Emplanement

- 4. It is the responsibility of the chalk commander to ensure that:
  - a. The next chalk to emplane adopts the "Ready" position.
  - b. Weapons unloaded and bayonets are NOT fixed
  - c. Having received the order "Emplane" given by the pilot or crew chief the chalk commander leads his chalk to the helicopters, stations himself near the door, supervises his chalk emplaning and directs them to the correct positions in the helicopter, i.e. to their seats or stations in the numbered order, see diagrams below:-

Figure 1

#### IROQUOIS UHID





Figure 2

CH 47 CHINOOK



- d. The chalk commander emplanes last and occupies his seat.
- e. Safety harnesses are secured with weapons held between the knees and when each man is ready he "proves" by raising one hand. When the chalk commander is satisfied that all are ready he indicates to the crew chief.

#### In flight Procedures

5. It is the responsibility of the chalk commander to ensure that all men remain in their positions throughout flight, and safety harness, if fitted, is retained until the "deplane" signal.

#### Deplanement


- 6. a. On approaching the landing Point all troops are to get their in hand and stand by to deplane.
  - b. When the aircraft is steady the crew chief will give the "deplane" signal by giving the "thumbs up" signal. At this signal troops deplane from both sides for IROQUOIS or by the aft ramp for CHINOOK. Personnel will go to ground 30 ft from aircraft and not move until the aircraft is clear of area.
  - c. Chalk commander will then move his chalk as quickly as possible to the RV or position indicated by LS Comd.
- 7. The night drills are basically the same as day drill's with the following changes:
  - a. In helicopter not fitted with an emplaning light the emplaning signal is given by switching on navigation lights.
  - b. The chalk commander signals that the pilot is clear to fly away by giving two flashes on his torch. (It is essential on night operations that all chalk commanders carry a torch). Care must be taken not to flash the torch directly at the pilot as this will impair his night vision.

### CONSTRUCTION AND MARKING OF LANDING SITES

LEGEND:

Cleared to ground | Free of obstacles over 2/3 metres high

NOTE: Where landing sites are required to accommodate more than one IROQUOIS. The separation between landing points (Centre to Centre) within the site shall be 45 metres.



LEGEND



Cleared to ground Level




Free of large stumps stones and holes

NOTE: Add 50m in length for each additional CHINOOK

#### Figure 3 - Marking of Landing Site


LS markings for day operations may be:-

- a. Plourescent Panels
- b. Smoke grenades
- 2. The markings should be situated on the upwind edge of the LS. They should be firmly secured to the ground or hand held when the the aircraft is on final approach. The latter method or smoke grenades are preferable for CHINOOK because of the down wash from the main rotor which usually lifts and damages the panels.



Example Code Identifier

NOTE: If more than one LS is to be used by a unit, variation to the code identifier can be shown by adding bars thus:-



NOTE: Under NO circumstances should the colours of the smoke thrown be indicated to the pilot by radio, It should be left to the pilot to confirm the colour of the smoke e.g. "Hullo one. this is COWBOY Six I see yellow smoke", If the pilot has correctly identified the smoke reply "COWBOY Six this is one 'affirmative' "

6 Jan 67

### MINUTES OF A 'G' STAFF CONFERENCE HELD AT 1 FD REGT RAA ON 6 JAN 67

Present:

Commanding Officer Second in Command BC 101 Fd Bty RAA BC 103 Fd Bty RAA BC 161 Fd Bty RNZA BC HQ Bty Adjutant

Action by

1. Aim. To determine a standard Operational Procedure on various points.

### 2. Firing of guns in local defence of Gun Positions

- a. 103 Bty will conduct trials on 7 Jan 67 on:
  - (1) MTSQ, using varying QE and Fuze settings.
  - (2) MTSQ, using constant QE and fuze setting but varying charges.
  - (3) Newly received anti-personnal round XM 546.

The aim is to determine the simplest and most effective method of using the guns in local defence.

103 Bty

b. It was noted that another method, that of using PD M51 set to "Delay" and bounced off the ground at a point selected by the gun No 1 so that the round burst about 15 ft in the air and as close as 110 metres, had been tried by 161 Bty and could be used as a last resort.

### 3. C of M and Prediction

a. All targets are to be predicted before firing according to ap ropriate technical procedures, except that:

(1) 103 predict	Bty, at the BC's discretion,	need not	GPOs
	until further notice.		Adjt

(2) HA targets, impromptu, need not be gros predicted unless specifically ordered Adjt

b. C of M graphs are to be prepared for charges 2,3,4,5,6,7-, in LA. HA graphs need only be GPOs prepared when specifically ordered.

c. DF(SOS) targets are to be always kept up to GPOs date for met and issued on gun programmes

d. DF targets need not be kept up to date for met unless they are ordered as "special" FOS

#### 4. DFs

a. Past policy has been to allow temporary DFs nicknamed Tin Trunk, to lapse automatically at FOs 0800 hrs the day after being initiated. This adjt meant that they were no longer kept up to date for met. This policy is now cancelled (See para 3 d above).

Action byb. There are no automatic cancellations of DF targets, or any other targets. Wherever targets are unsafe or are no longer required they should be cancelled by the originator FOs Adjt Fire Plans a. Six figure grid references may be used by originators in preparation of the Tiddler, AB 545 b. Heights need not be sent by originators. Regimental Targets (and higher) a. When height is not given by the originator it will be circulated by the adjusting battery, or the senior battery if the target is not GPOs recorded by firing. Direction GT will be circulated by the adjusting GPOs battery, or by the senior battery. DFs Scale of Fire. There is a discrepancy in both authorisation and scales between the present SOPs of Adjt 1 Fd Regt, 5 RAR and 6 RAR. 1 Fd Regt RAA will prepare a suggested paragraph for inclusion in TF SOPs. Fire Planning Conference a. There is to be a daily TF fire planning conference at 1500 hrs. Permanent tasks will be the preparation and co-ordination of H & I programmes and air strikes for the twenty four hours beginning 1800 hrs that day. The IO will issue the area and time block for the H & I rogramme to the Regt and Bty CPs/FDCs following this conference. The information will also be promulgated at the TF Comd's conference at 1630 hrs IO Clearances. The CO has prepared a new paper on the system of clearances. This will be issued shortly, in Adjt draft form, for comments.

SOPs. SOPs are ready in draft form at present. They

will be published following the issue, in the near future,

Captain Adjutant Adjt

#### Distribution

of new TF SOP.

5.

6.

8.

List E (less serials 6, 17, 18,20)

HQ 1 ATF NUI DAT /5 Jan 67

## NOTES FROM COMMANDER 1 ATF CONFERENCE 1400 HRS 4 JAN 67

1. Present Lt Col JA Warr Lt Col CM Townsend Lt Col DR Begg Capt R Guymer B Florence Maj

JM Maj Murphy Doyle Maj IG Maj FX Crowe

Maj SJ Maizey

Comd outlined ops for Jan 67 - to be confirmed by Brig SC Graham OBE, MC.

Comd outlined major friendly ops for next two months.

Malaria.

Comd emphasised 1 ATF instr.

- b. Greatest danger appears to be recently occupied VC camp sites. If tac feasible these camps should be avoided.
- Comds must balance tac feasibility against med risks.
- d. Worst areas of TF base area. Worst areas appear to be NE and EAST
- 1 ATF will try to obtain any med int on futire areas.
- Peasibility of aerial spraying prior to or during an op should be considered.
- Responsibility of ensuring 1 ATF instr carried out rests at all levels.

#### 5. Op CROWS NEST

- (1) Tracks not completely equipped with accessories particularly radios
- (2) RAAF stand by DUSTOFF not equipped for task.

#### b. OD CANBERRA

(1) Task difficult to achieve due to a time factor. Consider there should barrage, in front be no time limit on Search and Dostroy of own tps, should missions. Because of Op POBIN time be considered if limit was necessary.

COMPUDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Follow up Action Remarks

Now equipped -radios. Subject to frequent repair problem.

Now fixed.

Agreed, A rolling

#### CONFIDENTIAL

(2) Need arose for a recee elm in front of bn - say three to four hours ahou. This alm could advise on on, going, water and thus allow main force to be directed to a target area quicker. The recee ptls should be equipped with VHF radio and should provide medium recee (medium recee in terms of distance month). not time). 6 RAR agrees with requirement for recee alm in this theatre but for recce elm in this theatre but because trs need to be highly trained (SAS standard) there is neither the time nor the capability to undertake this task.

Light fire team employed on area tgt but not effective. Subsequently employed on a pinpoint tgt most offectively.

(1) Friendly (ARVN) booby traps are C. haphazardly spread along the road. Main areas appear to be RF/PF compounds, culverts, verges of bridges. No records have been kept. Sector is unaware of mined areas.

(2) Any ops in swamp (MUNG SAT) must be preceded by prior training due to extremes which can be encountered.

Op GUEENBEYAN

(1) Value of gunships on pinpoint (caves) targets. d.

- (2) Flame not effective in large caverns or multi layer tunnels.
- (3) CS effective in caves but not effective when sprayed/dusted on countryside.

Op HAYMAN

(1) Security problem - value of cover plan - information on need to know basis. Local knowledge in Vung Tau well before

- (2) Two man trg pack this will allow the soldier a choice of four types of combat rations. 24 hr Aust, C ration, two man pack, SAS type pack.
- (3) Need for scout cars for escerting. At present 106mm RCL vehicle converted. The requirement exists for these vehicles in the bn. 6 RAR agrees with need but not in the bn.

Agreed. Reports from

2d/18 Bn.

sandbagged areas.

Exercise care.

Try to avoid wired and

5 RAR Anti Mc Pl

Rocce Pl(selected

guidance in Vung

now used as a

volunteers trg

under SAS

Report to II FFV on ineffectiveness of OS.

DAGMG to bid for 8000 (4100 for days

Cay to not suitable. Resce tp of armd regt very suitable. Value of the discussed - bid necessary.

Int plan required.
?? TP agents. IOs
to look at specific areas in conjunction with

#### 6. 6 RAR

Lack of timely and accurate battle intelligence. During Op INGHAM intelligence available proved useless. Requirement for an intelligence plan of future tgt area. From 5 RAR are we using all sources? Co's

#### CONFIDENTIAL

一大八万名 日下京西北西西西南南南西西西西西

to got a copy (from G2 to CQ) of SAS patrol IT int agencies. reports. b. During Op INCHAM the value of fighting porters was proven as a means of providing security during ops. Requirement for ro-training of rifle coys. THE RESERVED 1 Fd Regt a. Due to reaction requirement extreme investigate possibility of four guis per battery.

(1) allowing gunners to stand down four guis per battery. (3) prepare base comp. b. Restriction on use of VT fuse has been removed. Designers warn that up to 10% may burst after arming - probably much loss. Radar serviceability not sood a promise at W. So Radio security bad. Simple code for Conference 00 103 Sig Sqn. Unit ops offre, 62 (Ope). contact reports. parties antegeness in process dearances for tgts - paper to better 1 Fd San

a. Requests for engr assistance for installations etc, destruction, search. Engre prefer to be told what is there not what is required. Agreed. required. Throughout Op WOLLOWGONG engrs will provide two man teams and so obtain engr intelligence of TAOR. Teams to provide early warning of any engr requirement necessary. in Fudiment Agreed - mutual lineon water 9 Sqn Requirement for winching try within engr sqn. Sect APC ogreed d. Protection for engr rd party - distance requires additional protection. Air to in lieu inf plan survey area prior to landing. 161 (Indep) Recoe Flt. Op QUEHNBEYAN - rebroadcast facilities now satisfactory. Delays - a 45 mins to instably day, 60 mins if outside normal hours.
Warning appreciated. If requirement for rebro ac request it be shown under Avn para not Sig para of Op O.

7.

8.

9.

Any station hearing an ac calling an ther station without success should request that station to switch to "Squrleh On".

#### CONFIDENTIAL

b. Sioux hel - radio sets may drift off frequency therefore a need for "Squelch On" may become necessary.

### COMPIDENTIAL

e. With aircraft flying most of the day any H and I tgt could be fired more accurately if the pilots could adjust fire. 1 Pd Regt agreed to provide a copy of the H and I programme for this purpose.

d. During air/int flights the pilot could fire an arty mission as well as report the incident.

Agreed. Arty/161 Rocce Flt to liase.

## 10. 1 APC Son

a. If APCs are used in a blocking role it has been found, in some country, one or two APCs are sufficient. The remainder of the APC group could be used in a mobile role.

b. The H13 greatly assists the APCs'in quickly locating good going and alsoin fixing and finding the enemy. Where possible it is requested that in a mobile role a H13 be in support of the APCs.

c. During Op INCHAM the gun ships, due to a lack of comms, fired on an AFC group. Could clearance from ground elements be given first and control of these aircraft be decentralised to the lowest possible level.

## 11. 3 SAS Sqn

a. During Op HAYMAN the SAS LO was taken from 5 RAR and placed with HQ 1 ATF. This merely slowed down corms between the brand the SAS groups. The LO should be at unit level.

b. During a recent op JADE con changed the FAC frequency without reference to SAS. This left SAS without any soums - where did the direction to change dome from. The SAS frequency was 42.30 mc/s, the FAC was changed to 9 Sqn RAAF internal net.

Agreed.

Agreed.

Agreed.

USAF LO to investigate.

Distribution:

Lists A and D.

CONFIDENTIAL

R746/1/1

1 Fd Regt RAA NUI DAT 18 Jan 67

## 1 ATF FIRE SUPPORT

Reference: A. R746-1-1 dated 5 Nov 66.

- 1. Enclosed are instructions on Fire Support for 1 ATF. These instructions include:
  - a. Duties of the Artillery Commander.
  - b. Duties of the GSO2 (Air).
  - c. Allocation and Control of Fire Support.
  - d. Function of Artillery Tactical Headquarters.
  - e. Safety of Own Troops and Aircraft.
- 2. These instructions are effective forthwith. They will be included in TF SOPs in due course.
- 3. Reference A is cancelled (NOT to all addressees).

Lieutenant Colonel
Commanding Officer

## Distribution

101 Fd Bty RAA 103 Fd Bty RAA 161 Fd Bty RNZA HQ Bty 1 Fd Regt CP	(6) (6) (4) RAA
Tac HQ 1/83 US Arty A Sqn 3 Cav Regt	{2} {4}
5 RAR 6 RAR	(2)
3 SAS 161(Indep) Recce HQ 1 ATF CO 2IC TFAIO LO	Flt (2) (6)
Comd's Diary Spare	{4 <sub>4</sub> }
Copy to: 4 Fd Regt RAA School Of Artille DRA (AHQ)	(2) ery (2) (2)

## FIRE SUPPORT OF THE TASK FORCE

## DUTIES OF THE ARTILLERY COMMANDER

1. The duties of the artillery commander at each level are generally similar and may be considered under two headings; those of an advisory nature to the task force (or unit) commander and his staff and those which concern command and control of the artillery grouped with or alloted to the task force.

## Duties in an Advisory Capacity -

- 2. The artillery commander advises t e task force commander on all matters concerning the artillery at his disposal, in particular
  - a. Employment of the artillery rescources.
  - b. The operational fitness of all artillery units in the task force.
  - c. The allocation, command and control of the task force and supporting artillery.
  - d. Ammunition expenditure including the allocation and availability of specialized ammunition.
  - e. States of readiness of artillery units.
  - f. Counter bombardment policy.
  - g. The integration of artillery support with that provided by naval or air forces.
  - h. The manner in which artillery fire and effort should be applied both for specific targets and missions and in fire plans.
  - j. The intergration of his own headquarters into the task force headquarters.
  - k. Air defence in the task force area should this become necessary.

## Duties Concerning Command and Control

- 3. The artillery commander exercises such powers of command and control over the artillery grouped with his task force for specific periods or operations as are authorised by the task force or higher commander. In this capacity he implements the task force artillery plan including the ffollowing:
  - a. Grouping, employment, allocation of effort and movement of the artillery.
  - b. Logistic support.
- 4. Control is exercised through pre-planned and impromptu allotment of artillery, fire orders and orders regarding ammunition expenditure. The duties of the artillery commander include:
  - a. Planning of artillery fire and subsequently issuing orders for tasks to the artillery comcerned.
  - b. Implementing, on behalf of the commander, procedures connected with the engagement of targets, including provision of safety measures to protect aircraft which could be endangered by artillery or mortar fire.
  - c. Control of fire including delegating authority for impromptu support

DUTIES OF THE GSO 2 (AIR)

Pre-planned Fire Support Then an operation is being planned at task force level. The normal procedure will be as follows:-The commander assisted as necessary by his staff and the artillery commander will plan the operation in outline. The commander will issue orders to units to take part in the operation. These orders may be written or verbal, and will include details of the fire support available in terms of guns and ammunition and air strike availability. If verbal orders are given it will be usual for the artillery commander and gop (Air) to give the details of the fire support availability. c. Unit commanders, who should be attended by their own artillery commanders if verbal orders are given by the commander, will then plan their operation and fire support requirement in detail. In this they should be assisted by their direct support battery commander. The direct support battery commander will then bring, or transmit by the best means available details of the fire support plan to Artillery Tactical HQ (Arty Tac) where the artillery commander under the direction of the task force commander and assisted by the GSO 2 (air) will complete the fire 1 plan. e. The artillery commander will then issue the necessary orders to all artillery units to take part in the operation. At the same time the GSO2(Air) will issue the necessary requests and instructions to produce the necessary air support. f. It will be normal for the artillery commander and the GSO2(Air) to remain at Arty Tac thoughout the operation to co-ordinate and modify the fire plan as required by units taking part. Quick Fire Plans and Impromptu Fire Support The same principles as stated in para 9 above apply. In this case a call for fire beyond the capacity of the direct support battery, or from a unit not having artillery observers or from outside the task force will be received in the task force CP and/or Arty Tac where the commander or his representative advised by artillery and air representatives will make an immediate allocation of fire support if required. This in no way alters the normal process of artillery observers calling for regimental or other concentrations, but provides additional fire support backing will re necessary. Here again the artillery commander working under the direction of the task force commander and assisted by the GSO2(Air) will co-ordinate the application of artillery and air support GSO2(Air) will co-ordinate the application of artillery and air support. FUNCTION OF ARTILLERY TACTICAL HEADQUARTERS The function of Arty Tac HQ is to assist the artillery commander in carrying out the duties shown in preceeding paragraphs. Arty Tac HQ will form an integral part of HQ TF and will include:-CO of the field regiment together with his BC HQ Bty and IO. b. TFAIO LOs as necessary. Communications and staff to allow the HQ to operate. Whilst he does not form part of Arty Tac, it will be convienient for the GSO2 Air) to work in the HQ when the fire planning and co-ord-ination is in progress. A suitable place will be established in Arty Tac for the use of the GSO2 Air).

ALLOCATION AND CONTROL OF FIRE SUPPORT

13. In periods of high activity the full staff will probably be required on duty but in quiet periods it will be normal for HQ to be man, d by a duty officer with the necessary communications staff.

## SAFETY OF OWN TROOPS AND AIRCRAFT

- 14. Whilst it is important that friendly troops and aircraft and friendly civilians are not endangered by artillery or mortar fire it is equally important that the time taken to ensure their safety does not delay the delivery of fire on the target.
- 15. Arrangements necessary to ensure the safety of friendly troops, civilians and aircraft fall into two broad categories:
  - a. Prevention of guns or mortars firing at targets in areas occupied by friendly troops or civilians. This process will be known as "ground clearance".
  - b. Warning to aircraft which might otherwise fly into the trajectories of projectiles. Although this amounts to a warning to aircraft, it will be known as 'air clearance'.

#### Ground Clearance

- The task force TAOR is subdivided into areas of responsibility for each battalion and into areas which remain the responsibility of HQ task force. The lines of demarcation may change from time to time to suit the tactical situation. In addition, there will be periodically superimposed on these areas, "No fire" areas, which will be known as 'Special Clearance Zones'.
- 17. Responsibility for giving ground clearance is as follows:-

Serial	Location of Target /	Authority for Granting Ground Clearance
1	Within the battalion. AO but not within a	HQ of the battalion in whose area the target lies, Clearance will be passed eby the BC of the direct support field battery who will report to the originator of the fire mission and to the CP/FDC/ base plate position controlling the Fire "Gridclear from ground troops" or "Grid negative ground clearance" as appropriate.
2	Within area reserved by HQ TF	The task force CP. Clearance will be passed to the originator of the fire mission and to the CP/FDC controlling the guns by Arty Tac in the form of "Gridclear from ground troops" or "Grid negative ground clearance" as appropriate.
3	Within Special Clearance Zones	As for Serial 2
4.	Outside the task force TAOR	eArty Tac will obtain the ground clearance from Sector or whichever other authority may control the area of the target and will pass the clearance message as in Serial 2. Where the target lies in the area controlled by the originator, ground clearance is implied and will be notified by Arty Tac to the CP/FDC controlling the guns.

Note Where a target lies so close to a boundary that troops on the opposite side of that boundary could be endangered, the originator must also seek ground clearance from the appropriate authority having resimilating for that area.

#### Air Clearance

- 18. All air clearance will be notified by Arty Tac to the originator of the fire mission and to the CP/FDC controlling the guns in the form of "Grid.....clear from air" or "Grid..... negative air clearance" as appropriate. Should a temporary delay be imposed by aircraft operating in the line of fire, Arty Tac will report "Grid.... Negative Air Clearance delay figures.....". When clearance is available the report "Grid.....clear from air" will be passed. The latter unqualified report must be received before guns or mortars are allowed to fire. (See also para 24 below).
- 19. Calls for fire on the regimental net will be monitored by Arty Tac which will acknowledge in the form of "Rodger" at the appropriate time after the CP/FDC has checked back the fire orders. Should the originator not be on the regimental net, the CP/FDC receiving the call must relay to Arty Tac for clearance.
- 20. On receipt of a call for fire Arty Tac will immediatly notify JADE, KANGAROO and if heavy guns are to be used PARIS controls of the impending fire mission in the following form:
  - a. FIRING FROM

b. AZIMUTH \_\_\_\_degrees
c. MAXIMUM ORDINATE \_\_\_\_feet
d. MAXIMUM RANGE \_\_\_\_metres

e. FIRING INTO

f. TIME : FROM ----TO

Note Only (a), (c), (e) and(f) passed to PARIS control.

21. Upon receipt of details of a fire mission, JADE and KANGAROO Controls are to broadcast immediately the pertinent information, specified in para 6, to all aircraft. Immediately following this broadcast, the JADE and KANGAROO operators are to advise Arty Tac that the warning has been passed to aircraft. This broadcast normally constitutes air clearance for the particular fire mission. Should an aircraft ask for a delay in direct response to the broadcast this will be passed immediately to Arty Tac.

#### General

- The responsibility for not firing until both ground and air clearances have been obtained ultimately rests with the CP/FDC controlling the guns or mortars. Clearances will be given by the authorities set out above direct on the regimental net or relayed through an intermediate station, but whichever way they are passed, the CP/FDC must receive them before fire is opened.
- 23. Not withstanding the responsibility stated in para 22 it always remains the responsibility of the detachment commander or crew chief of a weapon not to fire if an aircraft visible to him appears likely to be endangered.
- 24. The time taken to obtain clearances will usally be less than the normal reaction time of the guns. However, in genuine cases of operational emergency, the originator of a fire mission may order guns to fire without clearance but will then be required to justify his action.

#### RESTRICTED

R220/1/10

1 Fd Regt RAA NUI DAT

12 Feb 67

# 9 AND 10 FEB 67.

Present:

All Regimental Officers (less those required on duty) plus :

Capt H Warren LO 1/83 US Arty Bn RSM Acting Svy Offr Acting Sig Offr

1. Aim. To improve Unit SOPs.

Action By

## 2. Command and Control

#### a, Orders

(1) There is a requirement for the agency moving guns to be allotted to the Regiment (normally In Sp) in TF orders for an operation.

CO

(2) There is a requirement for co-ord between TF, Inf Bns and Regiment, on the use of codes, nicknames, and clear radio messages.

CO

#### b. Reconnaisance

(1) FOs should always report on possible gun areas. (Need for ground recce before a mov is not negated by such reports).

FOs

## c. Grouping of Artillery Resources

- (1) RHQ will deploy whenever two or more Fd Btys are deployed together.
- (2) One radar will normally be deployed with a fire support base (leaving one in base area) as soon as radars are working.

## d. Rear elements

(1) There is a requirement for substantial increase in the unit establishment in order to provide for adequate simultaneous operation and defence of both an operational fire support base as well as the TF base area. Amendment to est will be submitted

2IC BKs

QM ·

Adjt

103 Bty Adjt

#### 3. Communications

#### a. Radio

(1) Two types of lead are still required in order to make PRC 125 radios complete. Follow up of indents is required.

(2) There is a requirement for a larger pool of PRC 25 sets. RVE to be submitted.

(3) Previously submitted RVE for 292 aerials requires follow up action.

....b.

#### b. Line

- (1) More telephones are required to equip both base area and fwd operational areas. Further Adjt RVEs required.
- (2) Aust field telephone does not withstand Sig Offr service conditions. Defect reports should be submitted Sig Offr BKs Adjt
- (3) Switchboards A new type of switchboard containing more jacks has been requested for ominstallation in base area allowing normal switch-board, to be deployed. Follow up action is required
- (4) Procedure Regtl switch has a bad name Sig Offr for courtesy and response. Improvement is required.
- (5) New name is required for Regtl switch Adjt
- (6) Permanent Lines. Re-arrangement is required, to provide:
  - (a) A Btry 2/35 US Arty removed from Regtl Pire Orders line.
  - (b) A Btry 2/35 US Arty to be included on a local defence line from Regtl CP.
  - (c) TF Arty fire orders line between Arty
    Tac HQ, 1 Fd Regt CP and 1/83 FDC Sig Offr

#### c. Liaison

- (1) Arty Tac HQ should relay fire orders from outside BC sources to either Regtl CP or 1/83 FDC as appropriate, HQ Bty
- (2) When working adjacent to other formations Arty
  LOs with own communications need to be exchanged in
  order to simplify inter formation calls for fire
  and elearances.

#### d. Security

- (1) Use of the term "Foxhound" as an arm indicator is to cease. "Foxhound" is to be used as an appointment title only, and "India" as the arm indicator for all Infantry.
- (2) Use of the appointment title "Sunray" is to be in accordance with STAA pam 7. (i.e. "Sunray" refers to the commander at any level and may be All qualified by use of "My" "Your" "His!" "Our" "Their")
- (3) Use of PLUTO code for H & I s will be reconsidered. Meanwhile PLUTO code remains co operative.
- (4) DFs and other targets to be recorded by firing are to be sent in clear, not code.
- (5) Targets once engaged are to be referred to All in clear

## e. General

- (1) Locstats are to be read back by the first addressed-others acknowledge.
- (2) Serials of tiddlers are to be answered back with "out" not "over" as in packets of fire orders. All
- (3) The question of whether passwords are required will be taken up with HQ 1 ATF. Adjt
- (4) The need for common nicknames between TF, Inf Bns and Regt will be taken up with HQ 1 ATF. Adjt
- (5) Operators and users are to speak more slowly on radio nets. . All
- (6) SOI
  - (a) Distr to be increased to 18 per Bty. Sig Offr
  - (b) At present in TF, callwords apply to a frequency, NOT to a unit. It is felt that this is wrong and matter will be taken uptwith 1 ATF Adjt
- (7) ABCA Procedures. Where an FO or other station joins a foreign net he should retain his Regimental callword rather than Bty callword All

#### 4. Fire Support

- a Contact Drills. Sitreps are preferred to formal contact reports. The sitrep should FOs have all the available info.
  - b DFs
    - (1) Encoding. See para 3d above.
    - (2) A target which is moved after recording by firing is to be given a new tgt number. FOs The previous tgt (with its tgt number and grid reference) may then be retained or cancelled as desired.
- c Survey Datum points are to be established OC 131 West of NUI DAT for calibration checks ASP 2IC

#### d H & I Fire

- (1) Gun posns should be added to the H & I programme after vacation.
- (2) <u>Circulation</u>. The Regtl CP will circulate (Adjt areas and timings to Bty CPs. Bty CPs inform GPOs FCCs for clearances to Arty Tac. BCs

#### e. Fire Plans.

- (1) Tiddler forms are to be headed "Btys to GPOs engage" not "Tps" or "Guns"

  Adjt
  GPOs
  FOs
  BCs
- (2) Fire unit for mors is to be confirmed as either a pl or sec. Adjt

#### f. Clearance and Safety

(1) US pattern non oil-filled compasses are BKs to be withdrawn. Report stating that these QM compasses are unsatisfactory is to be submitted.

(2) Suggested amendment to Sec Comd's drills will be prepared to include comparison of QEs on the guns.

## g. Fire Discipline

(1) It is to be a fire plan refer (Pam 2 Part 4 par	clarified whether timings in r to time of firing or TOT. ra 42 refers).	Adjt
(2) "Ready"is to	o be used in accordance with	

(2) "Ready"is to be used in accordance with Fire Discipline Pam 2 Part 1 para 90. The previous Regimental instruction on reporting "Ready" is cancelled.

## h. Target Records

(1) 5 RAR mortars fit in with the Arty system of	
target numbering. 6 RAR who do not fit in should	BC
not use mortar numbers which resemble Arty numbers (i.e. four figures)	101 Bty

#### 5. <u>CB</u>

a. Mortreps .	To be	sent in	by all,	quickly	and	All
accurately. R	egiment	is too	blase.			

b. New Lightrep / Flareup pro-formas were issued. Old pro-formas are to be destroyed.

#### 6. Movement.

a. Amendments to	Unit SOPs are to be prepared.	A
working group wil	l be assembled for this purpose	SIC
chaired by the 2I	C and including BKs.	

. APC maximum weights are to be clarified. 2IC

7.						the base			0.7.0
	nually imp							Know	2IC
	osition at		, his t	ask, a	ircs of	fire,	and .		BKs
ammun	ition resu	pply etc.							

a 15-mes

Captain Adjutant

#### Distribution

List C (less serials 9,10,11,12,26, 27) Comd's Diary (4) Spare (6)

.. C'DIARY KG.

#### RESTRICTED

1 Fd Regt RAA NUI DAT

23 Feb 67

# MINUTES OF DEBRIEFING, OP BRIBIE, HELD AT 1 FD REGT RAA 20 FEB 67

Present:

1.

3

Co.manding Officer Second in Command Battery Commander 101 Fd Bty RAA Officers of 101 Fd Bty RAA Adjutant

Action by

Aim: To improve Unit SOPs.

#### Communications

a. A frequency is required for the Regiment for air/ground communications in both movement Adjt and resupply

b. During air movement and resupply, the station at the PZ is to use (where applicable) the name of the PZ as his callsign. e.g. A resupply from 101

Base area to 101 Bty(fwd) would have C/S "KOALA"

at the PZ and C/S 10 being 101 Bty(fwd).

c. Pending allocation of new Regimental frequencies
TF will be asked to rearrange the present allocation
within the Regiment so that SOIs will show as
Regimental main that frequency which the Regimental
net is in fact using.

#### Fire Support

#### a. Close tgts

(1) Attention is drawn to the "Close" Target procedure laid down in AT Vol III Pam 2 1966 Part 3 Section 18, FOs in particular Part C, "Procedure at the Gun Position". GPOs

(2) Clinometer laying is to be used for all "Close" missions in future. GPOs

#### 4. Movement

a. Regiment is to be prepared to mov by Caribou 2IC as well as other means of air tpt(CH-47,UH-ID) BKs

b. TF will be asked to establish (or expan!)
helicopter refuelling point in order to allow
for CH-47 refuelling to eliminate requirement for
CH-47s to return to VT in mid deployment.

c. Four sets of goggles for sub-unit (101, 103, 131, HQ Bty) are required to equip hook-up teams Adjt for CH-47 movement) QM

d.....

0	d. A set of illuminated panels for marking of LZs by night is required in each sub-unit (101, 103, 131, TQ Bty)	Adjt QM
5	Administration	
	a. All resupply is to be directed through the 2IC not direct from Bty(fwd) to Bty(rear)	2T 2 21 s
	b. A unit commodity code is to be introduced	BK 101 Bty 2IC

allans

Captain Adjutant

# Distribution

List C (less serials 9,10,11,12,26,27)
Regt CP
Comd's Diary (3)

R1300/1/1

1 Fd Regt RAA NUI DAT

HQ 1 ATF (Attn DAA & QMG)

24 Feb 67

## 1 FD REGT : AMMUNITION SCALING

Reference: A. 1 Fd Regt RAA R1300/1/1 dated 7 Jan 67.

- 1. The basic load of ammunition for the Regiment is that minimum amount of ammunition which is to be held in the Regimental area.
- 2. The basic load in rpg is as follows:

HE M51	345	FUZES	
Smk WP	25	CVT -	50
Smk White	10	MTSQ -	50
Illum	10		
Coloured Smk	10		
	400		

- 3. The basic load should not fall below 400 rpg at any time in the base area.
- 4. Reference A is cancelled and should be destroyed.

Lieutenant Colonel Commanding Officer

### Copy to

101 Fd Bty RAA 103 Fd Bty RAA 161 Fd Bty RNZA CP Tac HQ CO 2IC RSM Comd's Diary (3)

1

File: R540/1/2

1 Fd Regt RAA NUI DAT

25 Feb 67

List E (less serials 6,17,18,20,22,23)

#### CORRECTION OF THE MOMENT AND PREDICTION

Reference: A. 1 Fd Regt RAA R540/1/2 dated 7 Jan 67.

Met telegrams will be broadcast daily as follows:

0400 hrs for period 0500-1100 hrs

1000 hrs for period 1100-1700 hrs

1600 hrs for period 1700-2300 hrs

2200 hrs for period 2300-0500 hrs

- 2. All targets are to be predicted before firing according to appropriate technical procedures, except that:
  - a. Impromptu HA targets need not be predicted unless specifically ordered.
- 3. C of M graphs are to be prepared for charges 2,3,4,5,6,7(-), in LA; HA graphs need only be prepared when specifically ordered.
- 4. DF (SOS) targets are to be always kept up to date for met and issued on gun programmes.
- 5. DF targets need not be kept up to date for met unless they are ordered as "special".
- 6. Passage of Met Telegrams will be by either:
  - a. Line
  - b. R5223, or
  - c. Regt Net (Last resort)
- 7. Reference A is cancelled and should be destroyed.

a theres

Captain Adjutant R193/1/7


1 Fd Regt RAA NUI DAT

20 Feb 67


## REGIMENTAL LINE LAYOUT


Regimental lines are as shown below: 1.

#### TF Arty Fire Orders Line



## Regimental Fire Orders Line





Regimental Admin Lines

Regtl Exchange

30 lines (See Annex A)

a theres coft

Lieutenant Colonel Commanding Officer

#### Distribution

List C (less serials 12, 27) plus: Regtl CP 1/83 US Arty HQ 1 ATF

## ENTERPRISE DIRECTORY

CO	9
101 Fd Bty RAA ( Koala Exchange)	10
103 Fd Bty RAA (Exchange)	20
161 Fd Bty RNZA (Kiwi Exchange)	30
A Btry 2/35 US Arty (Husky 'A' Exchange)	40
Regt Orderly Room	70
HQ Bty Orderly Room	71
HQ Bty Q Store	7
Det 131 Div Loc Bty Orderly Room	72
A Radar	72A
B Radar	72B
Tpt .	73
Sergeants Mess	74
Officers Mess	75
RMO	76
RAP	77
RSM	78
Guard	78
Asst Adjt	79
1/83 US Arty (Heavyweight Exchange)	80
Command Post	90
Adjt	90A
Sig Off/Sig Cen	91
QM	93
Arty Tac HQ	95
LAD	97
A Sqn 3 Cav Regt (Escort Exchange)	ESCORT
1 Fd Sqn RAE (Elevate Exchange)	ELEVATE
HQ 1 ATF (Ebony Exchange)	EBONY
HQ 1 ATF (Dony Exchange)	EBONY

#### REGIMENTAL INFORMATION SHEET No 32 031200 - 041200H Feb 67

## Missions Fired

Grid 573617 at 1740hrs. Registration of DF by C/S 3.

Grid 498642 at 1914hrs. Registration of DF by C/S 3. Grid 538568 at 1950hrs. C/S 5A was used to cover a large b. area in which there were thought to be VC. As part of the same

programme C/S 4 fired into the same area at 2030 hrs.
d. Grid 584725 at 0635hrs. The pilot of the early morning
VR flight reported numerous lights - these were engaged but as the light improved the target was seen to be a series of small grass

Grid 538746 at 1031hrs. C/S 5B fired on a wisp of smoke. The FAC has twice in recent days received ground fire from this area so the target was well worked over. No results available.

Grid squares 6180 and 6181 at 1121hrs. Numerous cooking fires were reported in this area - XA THUA TICH - this morning by the pilot of the VR aircraft and as C/S 5B needed to expend 25 rds before changing barrels this area was selected.

#### Summary of Operations 2.

A/6RAR found a VC camp at YS 544626 containing clothing, ammunition clips and a little food. There were 17 bunkers in the

The FAC reported that 25 huts in YS5377 and YS5378 - the b. supposedly vacated hamlets to the east of BINH GIA - now have tunnels or trenches under them.

A/6RAR reported finding a but with two hot meals on the table. There was also a tree near the hut that had been used as an OP.

A/6RAR contacted 4VC resulting in 1VC KIA. The VC KIA had no weapon and was bathing in a stream when caught by the patrol.

C/6RAR - with 161 Fd Bty at the FSB - had a contact with an unknown number of VC - A DF was fired and the VC withdrew to the south west.

A/6RAR found a large VC camp, recently occupied, at YS533643.

The remainder of 6RAR committed to operation TAMBOURINE

moved out to the AO by APCs this morning.

5RAR : Patrolling continued and A/5RAR is currently erecting wire around HOA LONG.

#### En Sit - General 3.

A Sector agent report states that 500VC were sighted to the east of DAT DO and that they were wearing green uniforms, NVA type.

b. A woman travelling from XUYEN MOC to DAT DO reported presence of 300VC along the road. The VC had mixed equipment and wore blue pyjamas.

#### H&I Programme 4.

Seventy five serials were fired in the period. 155s - 46 serials : 24 for 1ATF, 22 for Sector.

- 6 serials : for Sector.

175mm - 23 serials : for IFFV. The serials for 1ATF were fired into the heavily wooded creek lines south west of BINH GIA. There have been scattered reports from this area recently.

#### 5 VC Casualty State

	KTA						WE	APONS		TONS
	BC	POSS	WIA	VCC	VCS	RALLIERS	CSW	AUTO	NORMAL	(tons)
031200 - 041200H	1									
TOTAL 1 ATF	433	24	97	79	164	1	15	12	111	236.4

#### 6. Miscellaneous

Maj-Gen D VINCENT OBE arrived to visit the TF. a.

be FMC has befor in recent days freedward ground fifth from this this

The point of the property of the property of the control of the co

"The common cormorant or shag b. Lays eggs inside a paper bag The reason you will see, no doubt, Is to keep the lighting out, But what these unobservant birds Have never noticed is that herds Is to keep the lighting out,
But what these unobservant birds
Have never noticed is that herds
Of wandering bears may come with buns
And steal the bags to hold the crumbs".

ratche to safe A. an Bear of an my reserved. Anon.

Capt Intelligence Officer

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Syverty fire sortals wore first in the period.

155s - 15 serials 1 M for 1ARS, 22 for Ecctor.

15 - 5 serials 1 for Sector.

175m - 23 serials 1 for Sector.

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# REGIMENTAL INFORMATION SHEET NO 33.

## 1. MISSIONS FIRED.

There was only one impromen target, YS 5357676 at 1947Hrs a suspected water point. This target was engaged by c/s 3 All other targets fired were registrations.

SUMMARY OF OPPERATIONS.
(a) Operation TAMBOURINE involving 6 PAP, 161 Fd Rty and 2. A Sqn 3 Cav Regt continued with minor contact (i) A/6RAR found three bundles of documents and reported that VC in a previous contact had some new Australian pneumatic matress sections and socks
(ii) C/6RAR found 30 pits with CHC at YS 557 647. There
were fresh tracks in the area, and also a little freshly cooked food. (iii) A/Sqn found a squad sized camp at YS 547 643 containing clothing, food, bedding, utensils and medical supplies. Camp has been used in the last two to three weeks. (iv) A Sqn found a company size camp at YS 533 667 comprising 7 buildings and 8 bunkers. (v) B/6RAR contacted 4 VC at YS 555 618 at 1710hrs. VC were engaged and fled north. Results unknown. (vi) A Sqn found 30 pits at 551 647 - appeared to have accomodated a squad in the last 48 hrs. (vii) A Sqn contacted 1 VC at YS 549 645 at 0945hrs. The VC fled east and his tracks led to a camp. The engineers later destroyed the bunkers in the camp and also a nearby (viii) Late entry: A Sqn reported finding four rice caches and two mounds which could be base plate positions , the latter at YS 549 670.

## 3. H&I PROGRAMME.

Due to possible temporary shortages of 105mm ammunition the 15 serials prepared forthe 105's were cancelled and instead 9 155mm serials were fired to the south west of BINH GIA

4. EN SIT - GENERAL.

Other than the above - NTR.

5. VC CASUALTY STATE.

	BC A.	IDAGG	WTA					MEAP	RICE	
-		FUND	WIA	VCC	VCS	PALLIERS	CSW	OTIA	NOPMAL	(tons)
		24		1	100			_		

Intelligence Officer.

Distribution:

List C Commanders Diary (4).

#### REGIMENTAL INFORMATION SHEET 051200 - 061200H Feb 67

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#### Missions Fired

10

a. Grid 593613 at 1818hrs. C/S 3 fired on a VC escape route.
b. Grid 580608 at 0907hrs. C/S 3 engaged an area from which
VC warning shots were heard. Some rounds landed in D/6RAR area resulting in a number of riendly casualties. The matter is presently under investigation.

## Summary of Operations

The following reports were received from Operation TAMBOURINE: a. A pressure mine damaged an APC at grid 565645. It is thought that the mine had been placed in position very recently. b. Platoon size camp found at grid 503636. c. D/6RAR had contact with 2VC at grid 585619. The VC were dressed in black. Result of contact: 2VC KIA and 1 Cossack carbine captured. One friendly WIA also resulted from this action. A second mine was detonated by an APC. The APCs in both instances sustained damage to the suspension system. e. D/6RAR contacted a second group of VC. They were dressed in ARVN type greens and were probably local VC. Result of action 1 WIA (poss).

## H&I Programme

Forty eight derials were fired.

175mm - 24 (14 for 1ATF, 10 for Sector).

8" - 10 (for Sector).

155mm - 10 (for Sector).

105mm - 4 (for 1ATF).

The 1ATF serials were split between the TAMBOURINE AO and an area centering on grid 5875. There has been a constant stream of reports from this latter area over the past three weeks - the area will continue to attract H&Is over the next few days.

#### En Sit General

Omitted.

### VC Casualty State

		IA					W	EAPONS		RICE
1200 -		POSS	WIA	VCC	VCS	RALLIERS	CSW	AUTO	NORMAL	(tons)
1200H	2								1	
DF DF	435	24	98	79	164	1	15	12	112	236.4

Intelligence Officer

ribution ot C menders Diary (4)

# REGIMENTAL INFORMATION SHEET No 35 061200 - 071200H Feb 67

#### 1. Missions Fired

a. Grid 541745 at 1328hrs. Possum pilot sighted smoke and engaged with C/S 4. No further results.

Grid 615782 at 2145hrs. C/S 5B fired into a suspected

VC location - harassing fire.
c. Grid 424685 at 0117hrs. C/S 2 engaged an area
west and north of A/5RAR in which lights were seen.
This was followed up by fire at grid 438698 and the lights were last reported to be moving north rapidly.

d. Grid 514685 at 0914hrs. C/Ss 1,2,3, & 4 fired suppresive fire in the area of an LZ. This fire was directed by the CO from the TF C and C (Command and Control) helicopter. The rounds fell well.

e. Grid 490660 at 1135hrs. RCP requested a little harassing fire be fired into LONG TAN. C/S 3 fired smoke rounds into the area.

smoke rounds into the area.

#### 2. Summary of Operations

a. A VC base camp at 616729 was hit with 6 X 7501b HE bombs and 6 X 7501b Napalm bombs. One hut was destroyed and one secondary fire started.

b. B/6RAR contacted an unknown number of VC at grid 543602. During the contact automatic fire was received from two other positions. Results 1VC KIA and 1 weapon recovered. The VC wore black ryjamas with grey felt hats and the VC KIA was carrying an authority to draw VX \$200000 VN \$200000.

c. D/5RAR had a contact with an unknown number of VC at grid 472660. The enemy were not in the killing area when engaged and there were negative results.

#### 3. H&I Programme

105mm - 6 NUI NGHE area: reaction to agent report.

155mm - 8 at Sector request. 8" - 7 at Sector request. 175mm - 18 8 for 1ATF - 10 for IIFFV.

#### En Sit General 4.

A National Police report (ARVN B3) has been received that 1 VC Bn of 200 men moved from vic HOI MY YS5156 to LONG MY YS4854 to join with D445 Bn. Purpose unknown.

#### 5. VC Casualty State

	K	IA				1	V	EA PON	8	RICE
061200 -	BC	POSS	WIA	VCC	VCS	RALLIERS	CSW	AUTO	NORMAL	(tons)
071200H	2								1	
TOTAL 1 ATF	437	24	98	79	164	1	15		13	236.4

Ammo Expenditure Jan 67

- 2244

101 Fd Bty 103 Fd Bty 161 Fd Bty - 2368 - 2403

cer

Distribution List C Commanders Diary (4)

## REGIMENTAL INFORMATION SHEET No 37. 131200H to 141200H Feb 67.

#### MISSIONS FIRED. 1.

(a) Grid 347 834 at 1705 hrs - FAC engaged a suspect VC camp using c/s 50B. This target had previously been struck by air.

Results not reported.

3

(b) Grid 377 650 at 2222 hrs .- At sectors request c/s 30 engaged a suspected VC supply route. Results not known.

(c) Grid 653 744 at 0005 hrs - c/s 50B fired on a suspected VC location . This target was initiated by 54 Arty Gp. at XUAN LCC. (d) In addition, eleven serials of fire plan CRAFT DOG ( part of cover plan for Op BEAMARIS ) were fired into the northern portion of the LONG HAI mountains.

#### SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS. 2.

(a) 5 RAR, 103 Fd Bty and A/3 Cav continued Op BEAUMARIS, the cordon and search pf AN NHUT YS 4659. Activity in the northern portion of the LONG HAI mountains on 13 Feb was designed as cover for Op BEAUMARIS.

(b) 11 ACR continued operations to the north of DUC THANH YS 4777.

They had sparodic contact.

(c) Cordon placed about AN NHUT by first light and villagers collected

for questioning. No results reported at this stage.

(d) An ARVN emplaced booby trap was tripped during the cordon of AN NHUT and resulted in 3 KIA (OC, 2IC C/5RAR and Capt P WILLIAMS 161 Fd Bty RNZA) and 4 WIA.

(o) Sector troops accounted for 7 VC KIA over the TET period, friedly

losses for the period were 3 ARVN KIA.

(f) Sector mounted a 2 batallion sweep through portion of the LONG HAT mountains on 12 Feb 67 in an attemp to make contact with D 445 Bn. There were no incidents/contacts.

(g) Twenty seven Ralliers have come in to Sector outpost, since the

end of TET. This figure is many times above the average.

#### H&I PROGRAME. 3.

155mm - 4 - Into north west corner of TAOR on information reported by a TF patrol.

175mm -80 - 45 for 1 ATF on information supplied by TF patrols into general area of YS 58 70.

- 16 for II FV into RSSZ. - 19 for sector, mainly to the east of DAT DO.

## -VC CASUALTY STATE.

				WEAPON		DEED MOVIO
BC POSS WIA VCPW VCS	DTN"	RALLIERS	CSW	AUTO	NORMAL	RICE TONS
31200H to 141200H No change.						
20 04 08 79 164	1	1	15	12	113	236.4 tons
439. 24 98 79 164	4		1 10	1.00		1

\* DTN = Detainees.

Capt Intelligence Officer.

Distribution. List C. Commanders Dairy (4).

#### REGIMENTAL INFORMATION SHEET No 38 141200 - 151200 Feb 67

#### Missions Fired

a. Grid 561676 at 1257 hrs. C/S 40 engaged an area of recent VC activity. Nothing was sighted as a result of the shoot. b. Grid 476536 at 1727hrs and grid 480546 at 1739hrs. Both targets engaged by C/S 25 using C/S 40 on information supplied by A/3 Cav patrols during the day. The shoots were not observed. Crid 561675 at 2156hrs. The area mentioned in (a) above was well worked over.

#### 2. Summary of Operations

Op BEAUMARIS, the cordon and search of AN NHUT resulted in the following :

6 VCC

3 Detainees 2 Deserters

12 Draft dodgers

5 people wko have aided VC.

Both battalions continued close TAOR patrolling. b. Airstrike using 6 X 500HE and 6 X 750 Napalm on grid 568746 resulted in destruction of 3 huts.

#### 3. H&I Programme

105mm - 5 - along a creek/track to the west of BINH BA that has shown signs of recent use.

155mm - 2 - )in the vicinity of a campsite reported by a 8" - 4 - )TF patrol .

175mm - 19- 10 for IIFFV in the RSSZ.

9 for 1ATF, along a creek line vic YS 5876. Vis recce aircraft and TF patrols have reported activity in this area over a period of many weeks.

#### VC Casualty State 4.

	K.	[A		-				WE	APONS		RICE
	BC	POSS	WIA	VCPW	VCS	DTN	RALLIERS	CSW	AUTO	NORMAL	(tons)
141200 <b>-</b> 151200H				6		3		4			
TOTAL 1 ATF	439	24	98	85	164	7	1	15	12	113	236.4

#### 5. Visitors

General Paul L FREEMAN, Commander US Continental Army Command, visited 1ATF.

Intelligence Officer

Distribution List C Commanders Dairy (4)

#### REGIMENTAL INFORMATION SHEET No 39

## Operation ERIBIE

- 1. BRIBIE was the name given to the operation involving 6RAR, 101 Fd Bty and US units in the LONG HAI Peninsula area 17/18 Feb 67.
- 2. Early in the morning of the 17 Feb. VC fired 60mm mortar and 81mm mortar or 75mm RR into the RF outpost at PHOUC HAI YS5153. Initial estimates placed the VC force at one coy but later reports indicated at least two coys.
- FAC aircraft and flareships were scrambled. Some artillery was fired in the early stages but was ceased when the VC entered the village and mingled with the people. The flareship was employed during the hours of darkness in an effort to keep the VC bottled up in PHOUC HAI. To ensure that they did not escape by sea a SWIFT boat from CATLO was stationed off shore. Very few VC were discovered trying to leave the area.
- 4. At this stage Sector asked 1ATF to provide APCs for the ARVN relief force to move to PHOUC HAI in. This request was denied by Comd 1ATF who advised Sector that TL4 (the road between PHOUC HAI and DAT DO) was most likely ambushed in order to catch the relief force. Sector was advised to send a small force into the area but to keep them off the road.
- Sector forces moved south along TL4 (partly off the road) and were ambushed though the VC did not fully spring the ambush as they doubtless expected further relief forces to be committed. Sector forces fought clear of the engagement and commenced a two prong sweep to the north-east from HOI MY YS5049 and LO GOM YS5154. This sweep resulted in one Sector coy moving into portion of the VC forces from a flank and a heavy fight ensued. Airstrikes were put into the area and Sector then reported that the VC were withdrawing to the north east.
- 6. In response to developments thus far Comd 1ATF decided to commit his forces as follows:
  - 6RAR: Bn less one companyto move by Airmobile Coy and 9 Sqn RAAF to assault landing vic YS5457 and then clear from east to west.
  - A/3 Cav: To move to a blocking position to the north of contact area vic 57 northing.
  - 5RAR : One coy to secure FSB at DAT DO.
  - 101 Fd Bty : To deploy to DAT DO by CH 47 (CHINOOK)
- 7. While the Australian forces were moving the Sector troops pulled back slightly and AOs were established. In this period, also, airstrikes were placed on the areas from which the VC engaged the Sector troops.
- 8. 6RAR landed after an incomplete preparation of the LZ by artillery (to allow the airstrikes mentioned above to go in) and immediately had contact. A/6RAR assaulted the VC, who were in a well prepared position, and overran the early defences but were forced to pull back by intense heavy automatic weapon fire. During this assault A/6RAR reported seeing about 20VC dead.
- 9. B/6RAR also had contact soon after landing and beat off two VC assaults. Later a deliberate attack was mounted against B/6RAR but this, too, was beaten off with help from artillery and airstrikes.
- 10. Conditions were fairly quiet during the night. A battalion from 9 US Div (2/47 Mochanised Bn) plus one bty M2A2s (C Bty 1/11 Arty) were alerted and moved from BEAR CAT to BARIA at first light on the 18th Feb. This force had deployed east of DAT DO by 180830hrs.
- 11. On the morning of the 18Feb 6RAR moved out to search the area Six Aust MIA were found, five KIA and one alive Six VC bodies were found,

Signs were found that the enemy had withdrawn NE and SW - RAAF helicopters fired on three fleeing males killing two and probably killing a third. 2/47 contacted 2VC in a tunnel at grid YS574631. One VC was captured, one escaped. 2/47 also detained three females carrying a large quantity of food and some quinine. Under interrogation the females revealed that they were part of a six strong tax collection party.

12. The search continued through the afternoon 18 Feb without major incident until about 1600 hrs when 6RAR was helilifted back to base. The 2/47 closed on the eastern side of DAT DO for the night and departed for BEAR CAT AM 19 Feb. 101 Fd Bty returned to base loc by road by last light 18 Feb 67.

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Intelligence Officer

Distribution
List C
Commanders Diary (4)

as follows:

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Occidence were fairly guint during the highest the signs, a battalion from 9 DB Dry [2]AS Postcotived Dry pains one boy Malles (0 May 1/11 Arty) were alarted and seven than some form that the telegraph and figure lates on the thin boy. This force and all seven large and the telegraphs.

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#### REGIMENTAL INFORMATION SHEET No 40 181200 - 191200H Fob 67

#### Missions Fired 1.

Yale 69 (C Bty 1/11 Arty) fired twenty nine targets in the period. The majority of these were Rec. and Adj shoots. b. C/S 80 fired 50 rds fuze VT into grid square 2969 on the strength of a B2 (ARVN) report of a VC coy being in that area.

Results not known.

c. Grid 523812 at 1343 hrs. C/S 50B fired on a trench and bunker system. A FAC directed the fire. Heavy foliage prevented BDA.

#### Summary of Operations 2.

Operation BRIBIE - Own casualties : SKIA, 24WIA. For details

of operation see sheet No 39. b. Operation RENMARK - 5RAR and 103 Fd Bty deployed on this operation PM 18 Fob 67. The FSB is located at grid 478562. In broad terms this operation involves clearing the VC from the eastern slopes of the LONG HAI mountains.

2/47 Mech Bn and C/1/11 Arty left DAT DO for BEAR CAT AM 19 Feb 67. A/2/35 accompanied this convoy. A Bty will make its way to XUYEN LOC and then will be re-allocated for a forth coming

US operation.

Rosults of B52 airstrike vic YS4752 180400H :-Tronches and foxholes - 461543

Trenches at 470520

Extensive camp area uncovered at 478521. This is a large and previously undiscovered camp with considerable bunkers and tunnels.

Tunnel entrance 467541

Two old camps 467541 and 473529 with 200-300ft trench exposed. Numerous fires burning in the entire area.

#### 3. H&I Programme

161 Bty fired 33 serials about NUI NGHE and about the south east corner of BINH BA. This was a purely precautionary measure as fewer patrols were operating.

1/83 (C/S 50A) fired one H&I mission into vic YS 3677 on some heavily used tracks reported by the ALO. This fire was

moved to cover a large area.

1/83 fired a further 28 serials to the east, centering on YS 5770. These were planned to cover the possibility that small VC groups had moved into this area from Op BRIBIE.

#### VC Casualty State 4.

	F	CIA							CAPONS		
	BC	POSS	WIA	VCPW	VCS	DIN	RALLIERS	CSW	AUTO	NORMAL	RICE TONS
Op BRIBIE	8	70								0.0	
TOTAL 1ATF	447	94	98	79	164	4	1	15	12	113	236.4

VIntelligence Officer

Distribution List C Commanders Diary (4)

## DECTREPRAT, INFORMATION SHEET NO 41. 191200H - 201200H Feb 67.

#### 1. MISSIONS FIRED.

(a) YS 523 812 at 1343hrs - Trench and bunker system engaged by FAC using c/s 50B. Results are not known. (b) YS 450 540 at 1512hrs - c/s 20 fired in support of a contact involving Recce Pl 5RAR. See 2b for details of contact.

(c) YS 451 561 at 1936hrs - c/s 20 fired to harass possible occupants of a VC camp at this location.
(d) YS 478 520 at 2035hrs - c/s 20 engaged lights on the mountain side. The lights were last reported

the mountain side. The lights were last reported moving generally south.

(e) YS 373 653 at 2027hrs - c/s 30 fired at fifteen or so lights descending the NUI THI mountains. The lights were not put out by the artillery fire and eventually passed out of sight behind a crest.

(f) YS 520 578 at 0140 hrs - c/s 50A engaged a suspect VC location at c/s 29s request.

(g) YS 576 809 at 1140 hrs - A FAC reported sighting a 105mm gun at this location. The target area was hit by an immediate airstrike and this was followed up by the 2 x 175mm s from YUYEN LOC and the remaining serviceable 175mm gun at this location. Further details Tomorrow.

#### 2. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS.

(a) B/5RAR contacted an estimated 10VC at YS 542 561. The (a) B/5RAR contacted an estimated 10VC at YS 542 561. The VC threw a grenade to initiate the incident and then withdrew south east leaving a delaying party of two VC B/5 found a platoon size camp with good OHC, clothing, food and utensils in the contact area. B/5 shortly afterwards detonated a booby trap resulting in 1 WIA (Aust). This soldier was evacuated by RAAF ALBATROSS.

(b) Recce Pl 5RAR contacted 4VC at 456 547. The VC, probably local force carried one BAR and carbines One VC. probably local force, carried one BAR and carbines. One VC a female aged 20, was killed in this contact. One M1 carbine was recovered.

#### 3. H & I PROGRAMME.

811 33 12 into area of Op BRIBIE centering on YS 53 57 and 21 divided between the far west and far east of our TAOR.

25 for IIFV and 19 for 1 ATF into the 175mm 14 -eastern and western areasmentioned above.

## VC CASUALTY STATES.

THAPONS WIA VCPW VCS DTN RALLIERS CSU AUTO NORMAL 191200H 201200H 1 1 Total 448 94 98 79 164 15 12 114 236.4.

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#### 1. lissions Fired

a. At the direction of Comd 1ATF C/S 20 fired WP rounds into YS 5457, YS 5557; YS 5657 in an attempt to burn off the paddi fields. The attempt met with little success because the fields are still quite wet.

b. YS 265582 at 1515hrs - C/S 50B engaged 2VC. The target was spotted by an air OP. The shoot was ended prematurely because

of clearance problem. Nil result.

c. YS 483517 at 1730hrs - C/S 25 (moving with A 3 Cav in LONG HAI area) requested this fire onto a track complex. d. YS 4775 and YS 4875 from approx 0030 to 0400. Possum pilot reported numerous fires and these were engaged by 50A. Early morning vis recce flights did not discover anything as a result of the shoot nor did they sight anything unusual in the general area.
e. YS 361645 at 0550hrs. C/S 30 fired on lights reported by

1/83d. Inspection in the improving light revealed that the

target could have been a small fire.

f. YS 474534 at 0708hrs. C/S 20 fired covering fire for Recce Pl 5RAR. No further reports available.

#### 2. Summary of Operations

a. D/5RAR found a company size camp at YS 480552 - In the camp there were 50 pits and one well. The camp, estimated to be 3-4 months old, was destroyed.

b. A/3Cav found a camouflaged but at YS 489513 and a further

3 huts 100 metres further south.

c. D/5RAR found 23 graves at YS 484550. They were 1-2 months old and were not investigated.

d. LFT killed 2VC at YS 488633.
e. An airstrike placed on a VC camp at YS 576808 using 12 X 1000 lb HE bombs resulted the destruction of 9 weapon pits and several foxholes - A further strike at YS 523811 using 10 X 1000 lb HE and 2 X 750 lb napalm bombs resulted in the uncovering of 500 metres of trench and one large secondary explosion which gave a burst 300 - 500 ft in diameter and 1700 ft high.

f. D/5RAR found three empty rice storage installations at YS 480546.
g. B/5RAR found a camp containing 30 pits at YS 460 568. The

camp had not been used for three months or so. The 105mm gun reported at YS 575 809 yesterday was subject, to two airstrikes and a heavy pounding by Artillery and was finally revealed as a log

#### 3. H&I PROGRAMME.

105mm - 8 - Routine coverage of LONG TAN and PHOUC LONG.

175mm - 66 - 36 for II FV 30 for 1 ATF into the north eastern corner of the TAOR - Routine coverage.

#### VC CASUALTY STATE.

Time	1	C KIA	WIA	VCPW	VCS	DTN	RALLIERS	CSW	AUTO	NORMAL	RICE (tons).
	BC	POSS							WEAPOI	NS.	
20 <b>-</b> 21.	2										
	450	94	98	79	164	4	1	15	12)	114	236.4

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#### REGIMENTAL INFORMATION SHEET No 43. 231200H - 241200H Feb 67.

#### MISSIONS FIRED.

1. YS 546 708 at 2100hrs - at the request of G OPS c/s 5A fired on three concealed lights reported by a pilot using a Starlight Scope.

b. Vicinity YS 349 682 at 2118hrs - c/s 10, 20, 30 engaged suspected VC movement along a well used trail. This target, also, was reported by a pilot.

c. YS 65 82, 65 83 and 71 79 at 0020hrs. 54th Artillery Group directed c/s 508 to fire on these grids. Target descriptions were not given.

o. YS 65 82, 65 83 and 71 79 at 0020hrs. 54th Artillery Group directed c/s 50B to fire on these grids. Target descriptions were not given.
d. YS 54 78, 54 77 and 55 77 between 0945 and 1318 hrs c/s 50A moved to LUSCOMBE airstrip and fired onto bunkers, a building and ridge lines. The building was destroyed and many trenches and bunkers were uncovered.

#### 2. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS.

a. The VC have recovered a trench line preciously uncovered by an airstrike YS 523 811.

b. AkU patrol found 190 VC stick grenades and 11 x M26 grehades,445 SA rounds, 3 x 60mm bombs and 6 x M79 grenades, IO 6 RAR considers these date from Operation SMITHFIELD - YS 487 670.

c. At YS 457 692 c/6 RAR found a VC camp consisting of 40 pits about 3 - 4 months old. A well and two graves were also found in the area. d. FAC experienced jamming (rebroadcast of commercial station) and traced it to YS 36 62. Jamming has been traced to this location on several occasions in the past.

e. Airstrikes at 535 812 and 547 779 using 6 x 1000lb HE ,6 x 750lb napalm bombs and 20mm cannon fire exposed 200 feet of trench, four bunkers, started one secondary fire and damaged one structure.

#### H&I PROGRAMME.

175mm - 67 - 20 for II FV into RSSZ.

20 for II FV area YS 55 85.

27 for 1 ATF covering an area to the north east both within and outside the TAOR.

#### 4. VC CASUALTY STATE.

Date	BC	C KIA POSS	VCWIA	VCPW	VCS	DTN	RALLIERS	CSW	WEAPO AUTO	NS NORMAL	RICE (tons).
231200 to 241200		No	Change.								
	450	94	98	79	164	4	1	15	12	114	236.4

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#### REGIMENTAL INFORMATION SHEET No 44.

#### 251200 - 261200 H Feb 67

#### MISSIONS FIRED.

- (a) YS 3900 8237 at 1820hrs c/s 50B fired 30 rounds into an occupied VC base camp reported by a tF patrol. No surveillance.
- (b) YS 398 818 at 1820hrs c/s 50A fired on an occupied VC camp reported by a TF patrol. Results are not known.
- (c). YS 354 676 at 2116hrs c/s 30 fired on suspected VC movement. No results available.
- (d) YS 634 858 at 0004 c/s 50B fired on two ox-carts, reported by a Possum pilot using starlight scope. Initial rounds destroyed both carts.

### 2. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS.

- (a). Airstrike at YS 523 812 using 8 x 1000lb HE bombs exposed 200 metres of trench line. Generaly the area, a VC base camp, was extensively damaged.
- (b). Two men and eight children were apprehended by A Son 3 Cav Regt but were released after being brought to HQ 1ATF for questioning.
- (c) Airstrike on VC Bn size camp using 12 x 1000lb HE bombs and 4 x napalm bombs resulted in one secondary fire with white smoke.
- (d). Patrolling of TAOR by both battalions and A Son 3 Cav Regt continued.

#### H & I PROGRAMME.

- 8" 17 11 into an area in which VC units have recently been reported;
  6 on the strength of VR sightings.
- 175mm 40 28 for II FV into RSSZ and outside the north east corner of our TAOR

12 for 1 ATF - scattered far and wide in response to intiliintelligence reports and VR sightings.

#### 4. VC CASUALTY STATE.

Date/time.	VSKI	[A			T			I	WEAPON	S	
	BC	POSS	WIA	VCPW	VCS	DTN	RALLIERS	CSW	AUTO	NORMAL	RICE (tons).
251200H- 2612 JOH.	1									1	
	451	94	98	79	164	4	1	,15	12	114	236.4

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## REGIMENTAL INFORMATION SHEET No 45 261200 - 271200H Feb 67

#### 1. Missions Fired

a. YS 351800 at 1430hrs. Details in 2b.

b. YS 352891, 644855 at 2255hrs. C/S 50B engaged these targets for 54 Arty Gp. Target descriptions were not given as are classified (?).

c. YS 370661 at 2329hrs. C/S 30 fired at lights.

d. YS 190720 at 0300hrs. Pilot of RED HAZE aircraft used 50B to fire at Sampans. Results were not reported.

e. YS 6178, 6179 and 6072 at 0520hrs. C/S 50B fired on three RED HAZE reports.

f. YS 3580. The Base Camp mentioned in 2b was engaged on several occassions during the morning.

#### 2. Summary of Operations

a. 4Tp A Sqn 3 Cav found 1X4 gallon and 1X2 gallon drum of rice in a creek bed at YS 395648.

b. FAC reported sighting "largest VC camp Ive ever seen" at YS 351800. This camp was shortly afterwards hit with 12 X 750 lb bombs which produced one large secondary explosion, destroyed 40 metres of trenchline, two bunkers and one hut and damaged 40 metres of trenchline and 4 bunkers. At this stage FAC reported that bombs "barely scratched the target". After the airstrike guns (2 X 8", 6 X 175mm) from XUYEN LOC, BEAR CAT and NUI DAT engaged the target and produced one secondary target with a large ball of flame and black smoke and uncovered 100 metres of trenchline. A number of airstrikes and a good deal of artillery fire was placed in this area during the night and AM 27 Feb 67.

c. A TF patrol obtained 2 VC KIA and 1 VCPW.

d. Both Battalions and A Sqn 3 Cav continued patrolling of the TAOR.

#### 3. H&I Programme

105mm - 7- all in area west of the TF base where a rallier stated that VC occaisionally "prop" on their way to and from HOA LONG.

175mm -62-40 for IIFFV. These were split between the RSSZ and an area 10,000 metres north of XUYEN MOC.

22 for 1ATF (vic YS 5979) along a creek line known to contain VC camps. A recent rallier placed several small VC adm and command elements in this area.

#### 4. VC Casualty State

	KI	Α						WE	APONS		RICE
	BC	POSS	WIA	VCPW	VCS	DTN	RALLIERS	CSW	AUTO	NORMAL	
261200 -											
271200H	2			1							
TOTAL											
1 ATF	453	94	98	80	164	-		15	12	114	236.4

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